platform_system_sepolicy/public/adbd.te
Josh Gao a3bc3cffdf Remove support for legacy f_adb interface.
Bug: http://b/34228376
Test: m
Change-Id: I1321ada1521bb3e3fd08105f1a41d519ee486683
2017-01-11 15:03:50 -08:00

127 lines
4.1 KiB
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# adbd seclabel is specified in init.rc since
# it lives in the rootfs and has no unique file type.
type adbd, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
userdebug_or_eng(`
allow adbd self:process setcurrent;
allow adbd su:process dyntransition;
')
# Do not sanitize the environment or open fds of the shell. Allow signaling
# created processes.
allow adbd shell:process { noatsecure signal };
# Set UID and GID to shell. Set supplementary groups.
allow adbd self:capability { setuid setgid };
# Drop capabilities from bounding set on user builds.
allow adbd self:capability setpcap;
# Create and use network sockets.
net_domain(adbd)
# Access /dev/usb-ffs/adb/ep0
allow adbd functionfs:dir search;
allow adbd functionfs:file rw_file_perms;
# Use a pseudo tty.
allow adbd devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# adb push/pull /data/local/tmp.
allow adbd shell_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow adbd shell_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# adb pull /data/misc/profman.
allow adbd profman_dump_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow adbd profman_dump_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# adb push/pull sdcard.
allow adbd tmpfs:dir search;
allow adbd rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms; # /sdcard symlink
allow adbd tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms; # /mnt/sdcard symlink
allow adbd sdcard_type:dir create_dir_perms;
allow adbd sdcard_type:file create_file_perms;
# adb pull /data/anr/traces.txt
allow adbd anr_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow adbd anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# Set service.adb.*, sys.powerctl, and sys.usb.ffs.ready properties.
set_prop(adbd, shell_prop)
set_prop(adbd, powerctl_prop)
set_prop(adbd, ffs_prop)
# Access device logging gating property
get_prop(adbd, device_logging_prop)
# Read device's serial number from system properties
get_prop(adbd, serialno_prop)
# Run /system/bin/bu
allow adbd system_file:file rx_file_perms;
# Perform binder IPC to surfaceflinger (screencap)
# XXX Run screencap in a separate domain?
binder_use(adbd)
binder_call(adbd, surfaceflinger)
# b/13188914
allow adbd gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow adbd ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
r_dir_file(adbd, system_file)
# Read /data/misc/adb/adb_keys.
allow adbd adb_keys_file:dir search;
allow adbd adb_keys_file:file r_file_perms;
userdebug_or_eng(`
# Write debugging information to /data/adb
# when persist.adb.trace_mask is set
# https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=72895
allow adbd adb_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow adbd adb_data_file:file create_file_perms;
')
# ndk-gdb invokes adb forward to forward the gdbserver socket.
allow adbd { app_data_file ephemeral_data_file }:dir search;
allow adbd { app_data_file ephemeral_data_file }:sock_file write;
allow adbd { appdomain ephemeral_app }:unix_stream_socket connectto;
# ndk-gdb invokes adb pull of app_process, linker, and libc.so.
allow adbd zygote_exec:file r_file_perms;
allow adbd system_file:file r_file_perms;
# Allow pulling the SELinux policy for CTS purposes
allow adbd selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow adbd selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
allow adbd kernel:security read_policy;
allow adbd surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
allow adbd bootchart_data_file:dir search;
allow adbd bootchart_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
allow adbd storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow adbd storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow adbd mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow adbd mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
# Access to /data/media.
# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
# accesses to the underlying FS.
allow adbd media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow adbd media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
r_dir_file(adbd, apk_data_file)
allow adbd rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
###
### Neverallow rules
###
# No transitions from adbd to non-shell domains. adbd only ever
# transitions to the shell domain. In particular, we never want
# to see a transition from adbd to su (aka "adb root")
neverallow adbd { domain -shell }:process transition;
neverallow adbd { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:process dyntransition;