platform_system_sepolicy/assert.te
Stephen Smalley 346cae2781 bluetooth app requires net_admin for enabling bluetooth.
Change-Id: I571731169036a3203d0145af67f45b3d9eb6366b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-03-21 21:01:57 +00:00

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2.2 KiB
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# Policy assertions.
# These neverallow rules are checked by checkpolicy at policy build time.
# checkpolicy will refuse to generate the kernel policy if any of these
# assertions fail.
# Superuser capabilities.
# Only exception is sys_nice for binder, might not be necessary.
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } self:capability ~sys_nice;
neverallow bluetooth self:capability ~{ sys_nice net_admin };
neverallow appdomain self:capability2 *;
# Block device access.
neverallow appdomain dev_type:blk_file { read write };
# Kernel memory access.
neverallow appdomain kmem_device:chr_file { read write };
# Setting SELinux enforcing status or booleans.
# Conditionally allowed to system_app for SEAndroidManager.
neverallow { domain -unconfineddomain -system -system_app } kernel:security { setenforce setbool };
# Load security policy.
neverallow appdomain kernel:security load_policy;
# Privileged netlink socket interfaces.
neverallow appdomain self:{ netlink_socket netlink_firewall_socket netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_selinux_socket netlink_audit_socket netlink_ip6fw_socket netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket } *;
# Access to /proc/pid entries for any non-app domain.
# Violated by cts.te rules so commented out for now.
#neverallow appdomain { domain - appdomain }:dir search;
#neverallow appdomain { domain - appdomain }:lnk_file read;
#neverallow appdomain { domain - appdomain }:file { read write };
# ptrace access to non-app domains.
neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process ptrace;
# Transition to a non-app domain.
# Shell excluded since it has a transition to runas.
neverallow { appdomain -shell } ~appdomain:process { transition dyntransition };
# Map low memory.
neverallow appdomain self:memprotect mmap_zero;
# Write to /system.
neverallow appdomain system_file:dir_file_class_set write;
# Write to system-owned parts of /data.
# This is the default type for anything under /data not otherwise
# specified in file_contexts. Define a different type for portions
# that should be writable by apps.
# Exception for system_app for Settings.
neverallow { appdomain -system_app } system_data_file:dir_file_class_set write;