75806ef3c5
Ideally, public should only contain APIs (types / attributes) for
vendor. The other statements like allow/neverallow/typeattributes are
regarded as implementation detail for platform and should be in private.
Bug: 232023812
Test: m selinux_policy
Test: diff <(git diff --staged | grep "^-" | cut -b2- | sort) \
<(git diff --staged | grep "^+" | cut -b2- | sort)
Test: remove comments on plat_sepolicy.cil, replace base_typeattr_*
to base_typeattr and then compare old and new plat_sepolicy.cil
Change-Id: I5e7d2da4465ab0216de6bacdf03077d37f6ffe12
66 lines
2.4 KiB
Text
66 lines
2.4 KiB
Text
typeattribute fsck_untrusted coredomain;
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# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
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allow fsck_untrusted devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
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# Allow stdin/out back to vold
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allow fsck_untrusted vold:fd use;
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allow fsck_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
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# Run fsck on vold block devices
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allow fsck_untrusted block_device:dir search;
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allow fsck_untrusted vold_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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allow fsck_untrusted proc_mounts:file r_file_perms;
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# To determine if it is safe to run fsck on a filesystem, e2fsck
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# must first determine if the filesystem is mounted. To do that,
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# e2fsck scans through /proc/mounts and collects all the mounted
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# block devices. With that information, it runs stat() on each block
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# device, comparing the major and minor numbers to the filesystem
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# passed in on the command line. If there is a match, then the filesystem
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# is currently mounted and running fsck is dangerous.
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# Allow stat access to all block devices so that fsck can compare
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# major/minor values.
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allow fsck_untrusted dev_type:blk_file getattr;
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# Untrusted fsck should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data
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neverallow fsck_untrusted {
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boot_block_device
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frp_block_device
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metadata_block_device
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recovery_block_device
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root_block_device
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swap_block_device
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system_block_device
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userdata_block_device
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cache_block_device
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dm_device
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}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
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# Only allow entry from vold via fsck binaries
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neverallow { domain -vold } fsck_untrusted:process transition;
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neverallow * fsck_untrusted:process dyntransition;
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neverallow fsck_untrusted { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;
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# fsck_untrusted should never have sys_admin permissions. If it requires sys_admin
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# permissions, that is a code mistake that needs to be fixed, not a permission that
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# should be granted. Same with setgid and setuid.
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neverallow fsck_untrusted self:global_capability_class_set { setgid setuid sys_admin };
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###
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### dontaudit rules
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###
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# Ignores attempts to access sysfs. fsck binaries seem to like trying to go
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# here, but nothing bad happens if they can't, and they shouldn't be allowed.
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dontaudit fsck_untrusted sysfs:file rw_file_perms;
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dontaudit fsck_untrusted sysfs_dm:file rw_file_perms;
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dontaudit fsck_untrusted sysfs_dm:dir rw_dir_perms;
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# Ignore attempts to access tmpfs. fsck don't need to do this.
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dontaudit fsck_untrusted tmpfs:lnk_file read;
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