cc39f63773
Divide policy into public and private components. This is the first step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform policies. The policy in the public directory will be exported for use in non-platform policy creation. Backwards compatibility with it will be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform version. Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy, and the need for attributes is minimal. For now, almost all types and avrules are left in public. Test: Tested by building policy and running on device. Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
38 lines
1.1 KiB
Text
38 lines
1.1 KiB
Text
# Any fsck program run on untrusted block devices
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type fsck_untrusted, domain, domain_deprecated;
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# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
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allow fsck_untrusted devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
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# Allow stdin/out back to vold
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allow fsck_untrusted vold:fd use;
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allow fsck_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
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# Run fsck on vold block devices
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allow fsck_untrusted block_device:dir search;
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allow fsck_untrusted vold_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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r_dir_file(fsck_untrusted, proc)
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# Untrusted fsck should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data
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neverallow fsck_untrusted {
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boot_block_device
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frp_block_device
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metadata_block_device
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recovery_block_device
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root_block_device
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swap_block_device
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system_block_device
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userdata_block_device
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cache_block_device
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dm_device
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}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
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# Only allow entry from vold via fsck binaries
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neverallow { domain -vold } fsck_untrusted:process transition;
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neverallow * fsck_untrusted:process dyntransition;
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neverallow fsck_untrusted { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;
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