b07c12c39d
Remove references in sepolicy. Leave a few of the types defined since they're public and may be used in device-specific policy. Bug: 211461392 Test: build/boot cuttlefish Change-Id: I615137b92b82b744628ab9b7959ae5ff28001169
124 lines
4.4 KiB
Text
124 lines
4.4 KiB
Text
# Perfetto user-space tracing daemon (unprivileged)
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type traced_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
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# Allow init to exec the daemon.
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init_daemon_domain(traced)
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tmpfs_domain(traced)
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# Allow apps in other MLS contexts (for multi-user) to access
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# share memory buffers created by traced.
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typeattribute traced_tmpfs mlstrustedobject;
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# Allow traced to start with a lower scheduling class and change
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# class accordingly to what defined in the config provided by
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# the privileged process that controls it.
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allow traced self:global_capability_class_set { sys_nice };
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# Allow to pass a file descriptor for the output trace from "perfetto" (the
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# cmdline client) and other shell binaries to traced and let traced write
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# directly into that (rather than returning the trace contents over the socket).
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allow traced perfetto:fd use;
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allow traced shell:fd use;
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allow traced shell:fifo_file { read write };
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# Allow the service to create new files within /data/misc/perfetto-traces.
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allow traced perfetto_traces_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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allow traced perfetto_traces_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
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# ... and /data/misc/perfetto-traces/bugreport*
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allow traced perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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allow traced perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
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# Allow traceur to pass open file descriptors to traced, so traced can directly
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# write into the output file without doing roundtrips over IPC.
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allow traced traceur_app:fd use;
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allow traced trace_data_file:file { read write };
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# Allow perfetto to access the proxy service for notifying Traceur.
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allow traced tracingproxy_service:service_manager find;
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binder_use(traced);
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binder_call(traced, system_server);
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# Allow traced to use shared memory supplied by producers. Typically, traced
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# (i.e. the tracing service) creates the shared memory used for data transfer
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# from the producer. This rule allows an alternative scheme, where the producer
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# creates the shared memory, that is then adopted by traced (after validating
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# that it is appropriately sealed).
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# This list has to replicate the tmpfs domains of all applicable domains that
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# have perfetto_producer() macro applied to them.
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# perfetto_tmpfs excluded as it should never need to use the producer-supplied
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# shared memory scheme.
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allow traced {
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appdomain_tmpfs
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heapprofd_tmpfs
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surfaceflinger_tmpfs
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traced_probes_tmpfs
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userdebug_or_eng(`system_server_tmpfs')
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}:file { getattr map read write };
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# Allow traced to notify Traceur when a trace ends by setting the
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# sys.trace.trace_end_signal property.
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set_prop(traced, system_trace_prop)
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# Allow to lazily start producers.
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set_prop(traced, traced_lazy_prop)
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# Allow traced to talk to statsd for logging metrics.
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unix_socket_send(traced, statsdw, statsd)
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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### traced should NEVER do any of this
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# Disallow mapping executable memory (execstack and exec are already disallowed
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# globally in domain.te).
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neverallow traced self:process execmem;
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# Block device access.
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neverallow traced dev_type:blk_file { read write };
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# ptrace any other process
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neverallow traced domain:process ptrace;
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# Disallows access to /data files, still allowing to write to file descriptors
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# passed through the socket.
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neverallow traced {
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data_file_type
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-perfetto_traces_data_file
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-perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file
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-system_data_file
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-system_data_root_file
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-media_userdir_file
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-system_userdir_file
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-vendor_userdir_file
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# TODO(b/72998741) Remove vendor_data_file exemption. Further restricted in a
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# subsequent neverallow. Currently only getattr and search are allowed.
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-vendor_data_file
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-zoneinfo_data_file
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with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
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}:dir *;
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neverallow traced { system_data_file }:dir ~{ getattr search };
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neverallow traced zoneinfo_data_file:dir ~r_dir_perms;
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neverallow traced { data_file_type -zoneinfo_data_file }:lnk_file *;
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neverallow traced {
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data_file_type
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-zoneinfo_data_file
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-perfetto_traces_data_file
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-perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file
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-trace_data_file
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with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
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}:file ~write;
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# Only init is allowed to enter the traced domain via exec()
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neverallow { domain -init } traced:process transition;
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neverallow * traced:process dyntransition;
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# Limit the processes that can access tracingproxy_service.
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neverallow {
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domain
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-traced
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-dumpstate
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-traceur_app
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-shell
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-system_server
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-perfetto
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} tracingproxy_service:service_manager find;
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