336d0fed4e
I took current AOSP policy as base, then removed sepolicy so that the set of type and attributes was a subset of types and attributes in Q sepolicy, with exception of those that have not yet been cleand up in current AOSP: mediaswcodec_server netd_socket mediaextractor_update_service thermalserviced thermalserviced_exec Bug: 133196056 Test: n/a Change-Id: I863429d61d3fad0272c1d3f1e429cd997513a74a Merged-In: I3e091652fa8d1757b1f71f7559186d5b32f000d5
37 lines
1.1 KiB
Text
37 lines
1.1 KiB
Text
# blkid for untrusted block devices
|
|
|
|
typeattribute blkid_untrusted coredomain;
|
|
|
|
# Allowed read-only access to vold block devices to extract UUID/label
|
|
allow blkid_untrusted block_device:dir search;
|
|
allow blkid_untrusted vold_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Allow stdin/out back to vold
|
|
allow blkid_untrusted vold:fd use;
|
|
allow blkid_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
|
|
|
|
# For blkid launched through popen()
|
|
allow blkid_untrusted blkid_exec:file rx_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
###
|
|
### neverallow rules
|
|
###
|
|
|
|
# Untrusted blkid should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data
|
|
neverallow blkid_untrusted {
|
|
boot_block_device
|
|
frp_block_device
|
|
metadata_block_device
|
|
recovery_block_device
|
|
root_block_device
|
|
swap_block_device
|
|
system_block_device
|
|
userdata_block_device
|
|
cache_block_device
|
|
dm_device
|
|
}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Only allow entry from vold via blkid binary
|
|
neverallow { domain -vold } blkid_untrusted:process transition;
|
|
neverallow * blkid_untrusted:process dyntransition;
|
|
neverallow blkid_untrusted { file_type fs_type -blkid_exec -shell_exec }:file entrypoint;
|