c626a882f5
This is required for the restorecon /adb_keys in init.rc or
for any other relabeling of rootfs files to more specific types on
kernels that support setting security contexts on rootfs inodes.
Addresses denials such as:
avc: denied { relabelfrom } for comm="init" name="adb_keys" dev="rootfs" ino=1917 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
We do not need to prohibit relabelfrom of such files because our goal
is to prevent writing to executable files, while relabeling the file
to another type will take it to a non-executable (or non-writable) type.
In contrast, relabelto must be prohibited by neverallow so that a
modified file in a writable type cannot be made executable.
Change-Id: I7595f615beaaa6fa524f3c32041918e197bfbebe
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
97 lines
3.7 KiB
Text
97 lines
3.7 KiB
Text
# init switches to init domain (via init.rc).
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type init, domain;
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# init is unconfined.
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unconfined_domain(init)
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tmpfs_domain(init)
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allow init self:capability { sys_rawio mknod };
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# Run helpers from / or /system without changing domain.
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# We do not include exec_type here since generally those
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# should always involve a domain transition.
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allow init rootfs:file execute_no_trans;
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allow init system_file:file execute_no_trans;
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# Running e2fsck or mkswap via fs_mgr.
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allow init dev_type:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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# Mounting filesystems.
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# Only allow relabelto for types used in context= mount options,
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# which should all be assigned the contextmount_type attribute.
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# This can be done in device-specific policy via type or typeattribute
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# declarations.
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allow init fs_type:filesystem ~relabelto;
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allow init unlabeled:filesystem ~relabelto;
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allow init contextmount_type:filesystem relabelto;
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# Allow read-only access to context= mounted filesystems.
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allow init contextmount_type:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow init contextmount_type:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
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# restorecon /adb_keys or any other rootfs files to a more specific type.
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allow init rootfs:file relabelfrom;
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# restorecon and restorecon_recursive calls from init.rc files.
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# system/core/init.rc requires at least cache_file and data_file_type.
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# init.<board>.rc files often include device-specific types, so
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# we just allow all file types except /system files here.
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allow init {file_type -system_file -exec_type}:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
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# Unlabeled file access for upgrades from 4.2.
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allow init unlabeled:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom };
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allow init unlabeled:notdevfile_class_set { create_file_perms relabelfrom };
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# Create /data/security from init.rc post-fs-data.
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allow init security_file:dir { create setattr };
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# setprop selinux.reload_policy 1 from init.rc post-fs-data.
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allow init security_prop:property_service set;
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# Reload policy upon setprop selinux.reload_policy 1.
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r_dir_file(init, security_file)
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allow init kernel:security load_policy;
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# Any operation that can modify the kernel ring buffer, e.g. clear
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# or a read that consumes the messages that were read.
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allow init kernel:system syslog_mod;
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# Set usermodehelpers and /proc security settings.
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allow init usermodehelper:file rw_file_perms;
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allow init proc_security:file rw_file_perms;
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# Transitions to seclabel processes in init.rc
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allow init adbd:process transition;
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allow init healthd:process transition;
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allow init recovery:process transition;
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allow init shell:process transition;
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allow init ueventd:process transition;
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allow init watchdogd:process transition;
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# Init creates keystore's directory on boot, and walks through
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# the directory as part of a recursive restorecon.
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allow init keystore_data_file:dir { open create read getattr setattr search };
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allow init keystore_data_file:file { getattr };
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# Init creates /data/local/tmp at boot
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allow init shell_data_file:dir { open create read getattr setattr search };
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allow init shell_data_file:file { getattr };
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# Use setexeccon(), setfscreatecon(), and setsockcreatecon().
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# setexec is for services with seclabel options.
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# setfscreate is for labeling directories and socket files.
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# setsockcreate is for labeling local/unix domain sockets.
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allow init self:process { setexec setfscreate setsockcreate };
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# Create /data/property and files within it.
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allow init property_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow init property_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# The init domain is only entered via setcon from the kernel domain,
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# never via an exec-based transition.
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neverallow { domain -kernel} init:process dyntransition;
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neverallow domain init:process transition;
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neverallow init { file_type fs_type }:file entrypoint;
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