23e0a7f23a
avc: denied { find } for
interface=android.hardware.configstore::ISurfaceFlingerConfigs
scontext=u:r:system_server:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:s0
tclass=hwservice_manager permissive=0
Bug: 35197529
Test: Device boots without this denial
Change-Id: Ia43bc5879e03a1f2056e373b17cc6533636f98b1
539 lines
21 KiB
Text
539 lines
21 KiB
Text
###
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### Domain for all zygote spawned apps
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###
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### This file is the base policy for all zygote spawned apps.
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### Other policy files, such as isolated_app.te, untrusted_app.te, etc
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### extend from this policy. Only policies which should apply to ALL
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### zygote spawned apps should be added here.
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###
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# TODO: deal with tmpfs_domain pub/priv split properly
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# Read system properties managed by zygote.
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allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file read;
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# WebView and other application-specific JIT compilers
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allow appdomain self:process execmem;
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allow appdomain ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
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# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from zygote.
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allow appdomain zygote:fd use;
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# gdbserver for ndk-gdb reads the zygote.
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# valgrind needs mmap exec for zygote
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allow appdomain zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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# Notify zygote of death;
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allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld;
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# Place process into foreground / background
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allow appdomain cgroup:dir { search write };
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allow appdomain cgroup:file rw_file_perms;
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# Read /data/dalvik-cache.
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Read the /sdcard and /mnt/sdcard symlinks
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
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allow appdomain tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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# Notify zygote of the wrapped process PID when using --invoke-with.
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allow appdomain zygote:fifo_file write;
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# Allow apps to create and write method traces in /data/misc/trace.
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allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:file { create w_file_perms };
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')
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# Notify shell and adbd of death when spawned via runas for ndk-gdb.
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allow appdomain shell:process sigchld;
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allow appdomain adbd:process sigchld;
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# child shell or gdbserver pty access for runas.
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allow appdomain devpts:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
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# Use pipes and sockets provided by system_server via binder or local socket.
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allow appdomain system_server:fd use;
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allow appdomain system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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allow appdomain system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
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allow appdomain system_server:tcp_socket { read write getattr getopt shutdown };
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# Communication with other apps via fifos
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allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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# Communicate with surfaceflinger.
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allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
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# App sandbox file accesses.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } app_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
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# Traverse into expanded storage
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allow appdomain mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Keychain and user-trusted credentials
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r_dir_file(appdomain, keychain_data_file)
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allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# TextClassifier
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r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app }, textclassifier_data_file)
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# Access to OEM provided data and apps
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allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;
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# Execute the shell or other system executables.
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allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } system_file:file x_file_perms;
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not_full_treble(`allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
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# Renderscript needs the ability to read directories on /system
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allow appdomain system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain system_file:lnk_file { getattr open read };
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# Renderscript specific permissions to open /system/vendor/lib64.
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not_full_treble(`
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allow appdomain vendor_file_type:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain vendor_file_type:lnk_file { getattr open read };
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')
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full_treble_only(`
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# For looking up Renderscript vendor drivers
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } vendor_file:dir { open read };
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')
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# Allow apps access to /vendor/app except for privileged
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# apps which cannot be in /vendor.
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r_dir_file({ appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app }, vendor_app_file)
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allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } vendor_app_file:file execute;
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# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
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r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_overlay_file)
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# Allow apps access to /vendor/framework
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# for vendor provided libraries.
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r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_framework_file)
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# Execute dex2oat when apps call dexclassloader
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allow appdomain dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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# Read/write wallpaper file (opened by system).
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allow appdomain wallpaper_file:file { getattr read write };
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# Read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
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allow appdomain ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
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# Read ShortcutManager icon files (opened by system).
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allow appdomain shortcut_manager_icons:file { getattr read };
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# Read icon file (opened by system).
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allow appdomain icon_file:file { getattr read };
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# Old stack dumping scheme : append to a global trace file (/data/anr/traces.txt).
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#
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# TODO: All of these permissions except for anr_data_file:file append can be
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# withdrawn once we've switched to the new stack dumping mechanism, see b/32064548
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# and the rules below.
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allow appdomain anr_data_file:dir search;
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allow appdomain anr_data_file:file { open append };
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# New stack dumping scheme : request an output FD from tombstoned via a unix
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# domain socket.
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#
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# Allow apps to connect and write to the tombstoned java trace socket in
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# order to dump their traces. Also allow them to append traces to pipes
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# created by dumptrace. (Also see the rules below where they are given
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# additional permissions to dumpstate pipes for other aspects of bug report
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# creation).
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unix_socket_connect(appdomain, tombstoned_java_trace, tombstoned)
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allow appdomain tombstoned:fd use;
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allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file append;
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# Allow apps to send dump information to dumpstate
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allow appdomain dumpstate:fd use;
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allow appdomain dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr shutdown };
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allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file { write getattr };
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allow appdomain shell_data_file:file { write getattr };
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# Write profiles /data/misc/profiles
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allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:dir { search write add_name };
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allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Send heap dumps to system_server via an already open file descriptor
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# % adb shell am set-watch-heap com.android.systemui 1048576
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# % adb shell dumpsys procstats --start-testing
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# debuggable builds only.
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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allow appdomain heapdump_data_file:file append;
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')
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# Write to /proc/net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl file.
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allow appdomain qtaguid_proc:file rw_file_perms;
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# read /proc/net/xt_qtguid/stats
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r_dir_file({ appdomain -ephemeral_app}, proc_net)
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# Everybody can read the xt_qtaguid resource tracking misc dev.
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# So allow all apps to read from /dev/xt_qtaguid.
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allow appdomain qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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# Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
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# They need that to render the standard UI.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# Use the Binder.
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binder_use(appdomain)
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# Perform binder IPC to binder services.
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binder_call(appdomain, binderservicedomain)
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# Perform binder IPC to other apps.
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binder_call(appdomain, appdomain)
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# Perform binder IPC to ephemeral apps.
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binder_call(appdomain, ephemeral_app)
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# TODO(b/36375899): Replace this with hal_client_domain once mediacodec is properly attributized
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# as OMX HAL
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hwbinder_use({ appdomain -isolated_app })
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_omx_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
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# Talk with graphics composer fences
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allow appdomain hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
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# Already connected, unnamed sockets being passed over some other IPC
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# hence no sock_file or connectto permission. This appears to be how
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# Chrome works, may need to be updated as more apps using isolated services
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# are examined.
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allow appdomain appdomain:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr read write shutdown };
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# Backup ability for every app. BMS opens and passes the fd
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# to any app that has backup ability. Hence, no open permissions here.
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allow appdomain backup_data_file:file { read write getattr };
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allow appdomain cache_backup_file:file { read write getattr };
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allow appdomain cache_backup_file:dir getattr;
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# Backup ability using 'adb backup'
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allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow appdomain system_data_file:file { getattr read };
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# Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
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# Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
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# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
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# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Read/write visible storage
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } fuse:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } fuse:file create_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } sdcardfs:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } sdcardfs:file create_file_perms;
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# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
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# accesses to the underlying FS.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } { media_rw_data_file vfat }:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } { media_rw_data_file vfat }:file create_file_perms;
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# Access OBBs (vfat images) mounted by vold (b/17633509)
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# File write access allowed for FDs returned through Storage Access Framework
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } vfat:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } vfat:file rw_file_perms;
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# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
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# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
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#
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# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
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# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
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# For art.
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Allow any app to read shared RELRO files.
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allow appdomain shared_relro_file:dir search;
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allow appdomain shared_relro_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Allow apps to read/execute installed binaries
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allow appdomain apk_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain apk_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
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# /data/resource-cache
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allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# logd access
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read_logd(appdomain)
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control_logd({ appdomain -ephemeral_app untrusted_v2_app })
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# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
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allow appdomain zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
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use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app })
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allow appdomain console_device:chr_file { read write };
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# only allow unprivileged socket ioctl commands
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allowxperm { appdomain -bluetooth } self:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
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ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# TODO is write really necessary ?
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auditallow { appdomain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') } ion_device:chr_file { write append };
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# TODO(b/36375899) replace with hal_client_domain for mediacodec (hal_omx)
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get_prop({ appdomain -isolated_app }, hwservicemanager_prop);
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# Allow app access to mediacodec (IOMX HAL)
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binder_call({ appdomain -isolated_app }, mediacodec)
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# Allow AAudio apps to use shared memory file descriptors from the HAL
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_audio:fd use;
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# Allow app to access shared memory created by camera HAL1
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_camera:fd use;
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# RenderScript always-passthrough HAL
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
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# TODO: switch to meminfo service
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allow appdomain proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
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# For app fuse.
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allow appdomain app_fuse_file:file { getattr read append write };
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_client)
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_manager)
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_vsync)
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, performance_client)
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# Apps do not directly open the IPC socket for bufferhubd.
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pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, bufferhub_client)
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###
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### CTS-specific rules
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###
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# For cts/tests/tests/permission/src/android/permission/cts/FileSystemPermissionTest.java.
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# testRunAsHasCorrectCapabilities
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allow appdomain runas_exec:file getattr;
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# Others are either allowed elsewhere or not desired.
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# Apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
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# device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl append };
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# Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
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# This is used for e.g. adb backup/restore.
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allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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allow appdomain adbd:fd use;
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allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };
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allow appdomain cache_file:dir getattr;
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# Allow apps to run with asanwrapper.
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with_asan(`allow appdomain asanwrapper_exec:file rx_file_perms;')
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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### These are things that Android apps should NEVER be able to do
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###
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# Superuser capabilities.
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# bluetooth requires net_admin and wake_alarm.
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } self:capability *;
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } self:capability2 *;
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# Block device access.
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neverallow appdomain dev_type:blk_file { read write };
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# Access to any of the following character devices.
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neverallow appdomain {
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audio_device
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camera_device
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dm_device
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radio_device
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rpmsg_device
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video_device
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}:chr_file { read write };
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# Note: Try expanding list of app domains in the future.
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neverallow { untrusted_app isolated_app shell } graphics_device:chr_file { read write };
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neverallow { appdomain -nfc } nfc_device:chr_file
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{ read write };
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } hci_attach_dev:chr_file
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{ read write };
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neverallow appdomain tee_device:chr_file { read write };
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# Privileged netlink socket interfaces.
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neverallow appdomain
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domain:{
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netlink_tcpdiag_socket
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netlink_nflog_socket
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netlink_xfrm_socket
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netlink_audit_socket
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netlink_dnrt_socket
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} *;
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# These messages are broadcast messages from the kernel to userspace.
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# Do not allow the writing of netlink messages, which has been a source
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# of rooting vulns in the past.
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neverallow appdomain domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { write append };
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# Sockets under /dev/socket that are not specifically typed.
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neverallow appdomain socket_device:sock_file write;
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# Unix domain sockets.
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neverallow appdomain adbd_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow { appdomain -radio } rild_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow appdomain vold_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow appdomain zygote_socket:sock_file write;
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# ptrace access to non-app domains.
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neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process ptrace;
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# Write access to /proc/pid entries for any non-app domain.
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neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:file write;
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# signal access to non-app domains.
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# sigchld allowed for parent death notification.
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# signull allowed for kill(pid, 0) existence test.
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# All others prohibited.
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neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process
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{ sigkill sigstop signal };
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# Transition to a non-app domain.
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# Exception for the shell and su domains, can transition to runas, etc.
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# Exception for crash_dump.
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neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') } { domain -appdomain -crash_dump }:process
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{ transition };
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neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') } { domain -appdomain }:process
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{ dyntransition };
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# Write to rootfs.
|
|
neverallow appdomain rootfs:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
|
|
# Write to /system.
|
|
neverallow appdomain system_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
|
|
# Write to entrypoint executables.
|
|
neverallow appdomain exec_type:file
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
|
|
# Write to system-owned parts of /data.
|
|
# This is the default type for anything under /data not otherwise
|
|
# specified in file_contexts. Define a different type for portions
|
|
# that should be writable by apps.
|
|
neverallow appdomain system_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
|
|
# Write to various other parts of /data.
|
|
neverallow appdomain drm_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
|
|
apk_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
|
|
apk_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
|
|
apk_private_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
|
|
apk_private_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -shell }
|
|
shell_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth }
|
|
bluetooth_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow appdomain
|
|
keystore_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow appdomain
|
|
systemkeys_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow appdomain
|
|
wifi_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow appdomain
|
|
dhcp_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
|
|
# access tmp apk files
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app -priv_app }
|
|
{ apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir_file_class_set *;
|
|
|
|
# Access to factory files.
|
|
neverallow appdomain efs_file:dir_file_class_set write;
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -shell } efs_file:dir_file_class_set read;
|
|
|
|
# Write to various pseudo file systems.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -nfc }
|
|
sysfs:dir_file_class_set write;
|
|
neverallow appdomain
|
|
proc:dir_file_class_set write;
|
|
|
|
# Access to syslog(2) or /proc/kmsg.
|
|
neverallow appdomain kernel:system { syslog_read syslog_mod syslog_console };
|
|
|
|
# SELinux is not an API for apps to use
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -shell } *:security { compute_av check_context };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -shell } *:netlink_selinux_socket *;
|
|
|
|
# Ability to perform any filesystem operation other than statfs(2).
|
|
# i.e. no mount(2), unmount(2), etc.
|
|
neverallow appdomain fs_type:filesystem ~getattr;
|
|
|
|
# prevent creation/manipulation of globally readable symlinks
|
|
neverallow appdomain {
|
|
apk_data_file
|
|
cache_file
|
|
cache_recovery_file
|
|
dev_type
|
|
rootfs
|
|
system_file
|
|
tmpfs
|
|
}:lnk_file no_w_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Blacklist app domains not allowed to execute from /data
|
|
neverallow {
|
|
bluetooth
|
|
isolated_app
|
|
nfc
|
|
radio
|
|
shared_relro
|
|
system_app
|
|
} {
|
|
data_file_type
|
|
-dalvikcache_data_file
|
|
-system_data_file # shared libs in apks
|
|
-apk_data_file
|
|
}:file no_x_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Applications should use the activity model for receiving events
|
|
neverallow {
|
|
appdomain
|
|
-shell # bugreport
|
|
} input_device:chr_file ~getattr;
|
|
|
|
# Do not allow access to Bluetooth-related system properties except for a few whitelisted domains.
|
|
# neverallow rules for access to Bluetooth-related data files are above.
|
|
neverallow {
|
|
appdomain
|
|
-bluetooth
|
|
-system_app
|
|
} bluetooth_prop:file create_file_perms;
|