platform_system_sepolicy/private/heapprofd.te
Ryan Savitski 3f3e222527 perfetto profiling: fix access to ART apex files
The profilers cannot open files under
/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art/dalvik-cache because they're not
allowed to search /data/misc/apexdata with the apex_module_data_file
label.

Example denial:
  avc: denied { search } for name="apexdata" dev="dm-37" ino=89
  scontext=u:r:traced_perf:s0
  tcontext=u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

Tested: patched & flashed onto a TM device, then profiled system_server
Bug: 241544593
Change-Id: Ifd8b94a9ebcae09701e95f6cd6a14383209963db
2022-08-19 00:30:40 +01:00

80 lines
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# Android heap profiling daemon. go/heapprofd.
#
# On user builds, this daemon is responsible for receiving the initial
# profiling configuration, finding matching target processes (if profiling by
# process name), and sending the activation signal to them (+ setting system
# properties for new processes to start profiling from startup). When profiling
# is triggered in a process, it spawns a private heapprofd subprocess (in its
# own SELinux domain), which will exclusively handle profiling of its parent.
#
# On debug builds, this central daemon performs profiling for all target
# processes (which talk directly to this daemon).
type heapprofd_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
type heapprofd_tmpfs, file_type;
init_daemon_domain(heapprofd)
tmpfs_domain(heapprofd)
# Allow apps in other MLS contexts (for multi-user) to access
# shared memory buffers created by heapprofd.
typeattribute heapprofd_tmpfs mlstrustedobject;
set_prop(heapprofd, heapprofd_prop);
# Necessary for /proc/[pid]/cmdline access & sending signals.
typeattribute heapprofd mlstrustedsubject;
# Allow sending signals to processes. This excludes SIGKILL, SIGSTOP and
# SIGCHLD, which are controlled by separate permissions.
allow heapprofd self:capability kill;
# When scanning /proc/[pid]/cmdline to find matching processes for by-name
# profiling, only allowlisted domains will be allowed by SELinux. Avoid
# spamming logs with denials for entries that we can not access.
dontaudit heapprofd domain:dir { search open };
# Write trace data to the Perfetto traced daemon. This requires connecting to
# its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
perfetto_producer(heapprofd)
# When handling profiling for all processes, heapprofd needs to read
# executables/libraries/etc to do stack unwinding.
r_dir_file(heapprofd, nativetest_data_file)
r_dir_file(heapprofd, system_file_type)
r_dir_file(heapprofd, apk_data_file)
r_dir_file(heapprofd, dalvikcache_data_file)
r_dir_file(heapprofd, vendor_file_type)
r_dir_file(heapprofd, shell_test_data_file)
# ART apex files and directory access to the containing /data/misc/apexdata.
r_dir_file(heapprofd, apex_art_data_file)
allow heapprofd apex_module_data_file:dir { getattr search };
# Some dex files are not world-readable.
# We are still constrained by the SELinux rules above.
allow heapprofd self:global_capability_class_set dac_read_search;
# For checking profileability.
allow heapprofd packages_list_file:file r_file_perms;
# This is going to happen on user but is benign because central heapprofd
# does not actually need these permission.
# If the dac_read_search capability check is rejected, the kernel then tries
# to perform a dac_override capability check, so we need to dontaudit that
# as well.
dontaudit heapprofd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_read_search dac_override };
never_profile_heap(`{
bpfloader
init
kernel
keystore
llkd
logd
ueventd
vendor_init
vold
}')
full_treble_only(`
neverallow heapprofd vendor_file:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
')