fea6e66fad
As per the discussion in: https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/71184/ init sets the enforcing mode in its code prior to switching to the init domain via a setcon command in the init.rc file. Hence, the setenforce permission is checked while still running in the kernel domain. Further, as init has no reason to ever set the enforcing mode again, we do not need to allow setenforce to the init domain and this prevents reverting to permissive mode via an errant write by init later. We could technically dontaudit the kernel setenforce access instead since the first call to setenforce happens while still permissive (and thus we never need to allow it in policy) but we allow it to more accurately represent what is possible. Change-Id: I70b5e6d8c99e0566145b9c8df863cc8a34019284 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
13 lines
435 B
Text
13 lines
435 B
Text
# init switches to init domain (via init.rc).
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type init, domain;
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# init is unconfined.
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unconfined_domain(init)
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tmpfs_domain(init)
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relabelto_domain(init)
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# add a rule to handle unlabelled mounts
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allow init unlabeled:filesystem mount;
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allow init {fs_type dev_type file_type}:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
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allow init kernel:security load_policy;
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allow init usermodehelper:file rw_file_perms;
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allow init proc_security:file rw_file_perms;
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