4ab64c940f
Conservatively grant access to packages_list_file to everything that had
access to system_data_file:file even if the comment in the SELinux
policy suggests it was for another use.
Ran a diff on the resulting SEPolicy, the only difference of domains
being granted is those that had system_data_file:dir permissiosn which
is clearly not applicable for packages.list
diff -u0 <(sesearch --allow -t system_data_file ~/sepolicy | sed 's/system_data_file/packages_list_file/') <(sesearch --allow -t packages_list_file ~/sepolicy_new)
--- /proc/self/fd/16 2019-03-19 20:01:44.378409146 +0000
+++ /proc/self/fd/18 2019-03-19 20:01:44.378409146 +0000
@@ -3 +2,0 @@
-allow appdomain packages_list_file:dir getattr;
@@ -6 +4,0 @@
-allow coredomain packages_list_file:dir getattr;
@@ -8 +5,0 @@
-allow domain packages_list_file:dir search;
@@ -35 +31,0 @@
-allow system_server packages_list_file:dir { rename search setattr read lock create reparent getattr write relabelfrom ioctl rmdir remove_name open add_name };
@@ -40 +35,0 @@
-allow tee packages_list_file:dir { search read lock getattr ioctl open };
@@ -43,3 +37,0 @@
-allow traced_probes packages_list_file:dir { read getattr open search };
-allow vendor_init packages_list_file:dir { search setattr read create getattr write relabelfrom ioctl rmdir remove_name open add_name };
-allow vold packages_list_file:dir { search setattr read lock create getattr mounton write ioctl rmdir remove_name open add_name };
@@ -48 +39,0 @@
-allow vold_prepare_subdirs packages_list_file:dir { read write relabelfrom rmdir remove_name open add_name };
@@ -50 +40,0 @@
-allow zygote packages_list_file:dir { search read lock getattr ioctl open };
Bug: 123186697
Change-Id: Ieabf313653deb5314872b63cd47dadd535af7b07
73 lines
2.4 KiB
Text
73 lines
2.4 KiB
Text
# android user-space log manager
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type logd, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
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type logd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
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# Read access to pseudo filesystems.
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r_dir_file(logd, cgroup)
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r_dir_file(logd, proc_kmsg)
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r_dir_file(logd, proc_meminfo)
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allow logd self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid setpcap sys_nice audit_control };
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allow logd self:global_capability2_class_set syslog;
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allow logd self:netlink_audit_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_write };
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allow logd kernel:system syslog_read;
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allow logd kmsg_device:chr_file { getattr w_file_perms };
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allow logd system_data_file:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
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allow logd packages_list_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow logd pstorefs:dir search;
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allow logd pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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# Access to /data/misc/logd/event-log-tags
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allow logd misc_logd_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow logd misc_logd_file:file rw_file_perms;
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')
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allow logd runtime_event_log_tags_file:file rw_file_perms;
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# Access device logging gating property
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get_prop(logd, device_logging_prop)
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r_dir_file(logd, domain)
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allow logd kernel:system syslog_mod;
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control_logd(logd)
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read_runtime_log_tags(logd)
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allow runtime_event_log_tags_file tmpfs:filesystem associate;
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# Typically harmlessly blindly trying to access via liblog
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# event tag mapping while in the untrusted_app domain.
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# Access for that domain is controlled and gated via the
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# event log tag service (albeit at a performance penalty,
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# expected to be locally cached).
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dontaudit domain runtime_event_log_tags_file:file { map open read };
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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### logd should NEVER do any of this
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# Block device access.
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neverallow logd dev_type:blk_file { read write };
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# ptrace any other app
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neverallow logd domain:process ptrace;
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# ... and nobody may ptrace me (except on userdebug or eng builds)
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neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-crash_dump -llkd') } logd:process ptrace;
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# Write to /system.
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neverallow logd system_file:dir_file_class_set write;
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# Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data
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neverallow logd { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_data_file packages_list_file }:dir_file_class_set write;
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# Only init is allowed to enter the logd domain via exec()
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neverallow { domain -init } logd:process transition;
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neverallow * logd:process dyntransition;
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# protect the event-log-tags file
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neverallow {
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domain
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-init
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-logd
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} runtime_event_log_tags_file:file no_w_file_perms;
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