platform_system_sepolicy/vendor/mediacodec.te
Steven Moreland 169bfcfe88 Merge changes Icdf207c5,I20aa48ef
am: 30a06d278f

Change-Id: Ia505b1539cfd64bb93c2f5fe0dbd0603df5e9f5f
2019-08-20 13:41:45 -07:00

34 lines
1.2 KiB
Text

type mediacodec, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
type mediacodec_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
init_daemon_domain(mediacodec)
# can route /dev/binder traffic to /dev/vndbinder
vndbinder_use(mediacodec)
hal_server_domain(mediacodec, hal_codec2)
hal_server_domain(mediacodec, hal_omx)
# mediacodec may use an input surface from a different Codec2 or OMX service
hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_codec2)
hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_omx)
hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_allocator)
hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_graphics_allocator)
allow mediacodec gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow mediacodec ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow mediacodec video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow mediacodec video_device:dir search;
crash_dump_fallback(mediacodec)
# mediacodec should never execute any executable without a domain transition
neverallow mediacodec { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
# Lengthier explanation here:
# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
neverallow mediacodec domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;