c55cf17a6b
Apparently some manufacturers sign APKs with the platform key which use renderscript. Renderscript works by compiling the .so file, and placing it in the app's home directory, where the app loads the content. Drop platform_app from the neverallow restriction to allow partners to add rules allowing /data execute for this class of apps. We should revisit this in the future after we have a better solution for apps which use renderscript. Bug: 29857189 Change-Id: I058a802ad5eb2a67e657b6d759a3ef4e21cbb8cc
458 lines
17 KiB
Text
458 lines
17 KiB
Text
###
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### Domain for all zygote spawned apps
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###
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### This file is the base policy for all zygote spawned apps.
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### Other policy files, such as isolated_app.te, untrusted_app.te, etc
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### extend from this policy. Only policies which should apply to ALL
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### zygote spawned apps should be added here.
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###
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# WebView and other application-specific JIT compilers
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allow appdomain self:process execmem;
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allow appdomain ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
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# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from zygote.
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allow appdomain zygote:fd use;
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# gdbserver for ndk-gdb reads the zygote.
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# valgrind needs mmap exec for zygote
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allow appdomain zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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# Read system properties managed by zygote.
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allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file read;
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# Notify zygote of death;
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allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld;
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# Place process into foreground / background
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allow appdomain cgroup:dir { search write };
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allow appdomain cgroup:file rw_file_perms;
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# Read /data/dalvik-cache.
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Read the /sdcard and /mnt/sdcard symlinks
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allow appdomain rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow appdomain tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
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allow appdomain tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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# Notify zygote of the wrapped process PID when using --invoke-with.
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allow appdomain zygote:fifo_file write;
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# Allow apps to create and write method traces in /data/misc/trace.
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allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:file { create w_file_perms };
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')
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# Notify shell and adbd of death when spawned via runas for ndk-gdb.
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allow appdomain shell:process sigchld;
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allow appdomain adbd:process sigchld;
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# child shell or gdbserver pty access for runas.
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allow appdomain devpts:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
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# Use pipes and sockets provided by system_server via binder or local socket.
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allow appdomain system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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allow appdomain system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
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allow appdomain system_server:tcp_socket { read write getattr getopt shutdown };
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# Communication with other apps via fifos
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allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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# Communicate with surfaceflinger.
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allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
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# App sandbox file accesses.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } app_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
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# lib subdirectory of /data/data dir is system-owned.
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allow appdomain system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain system_data_file:file { execute execute_no_trans open execmod };
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# Traverse into expanded storage
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allow appdomain mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Keychain and user-trusted credentials
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allow appdomain keychain_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain keychain_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Access to OEM provided data and apps
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allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;
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# Execute the shell or other system executables.
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allow appdomain shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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allow appdomain system_file:file rx_file_perms;
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allow appdomain toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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# Renderscript needs the ability to read directories on /system
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r_dir_file(appdomain, system_file)
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# Execute dex2oat when apps call dexclassloader
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allow appdomain dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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# Read/write wallpaper file (opened by system).
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allow appdomain wallpaper_file:file { getattr read write };
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# Read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
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allow appdomain ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
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# Read ShortcutManager icon files (opened by system).
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allow appdomain shortcut_manager_icons:file { getattr read };
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# Read icon file (opened by system).
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allow appdomain icon_file:file { getattr read };
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# Write to /data/anr/traces.txt.
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allow appdomain anr_data_file:dir search;
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allow appdomain anr_data_file:file { open append };
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# Allow apps to send dump information to dumpstate
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allow appdomain dumpstate:fd use;
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allow appdomain dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr shutdown };
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allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file { write getattr };
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allow appdomain shell_data_file:file { write getattr };
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# Write profiles /data/misc/profiles
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allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:dir { search write add_name };
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allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Profiles for foreign dex files are just markers and only need create permissions.
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allow appdomain user_profile_foreign_dex_data_file:dir { search write add_name };
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allow appdomain user_profile_foreign_dex_data_file:file create;
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# There is no way to create user_profile_foreign_dex_data_file without
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# generating open/read denials. These permissions should not be granted and the
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# denial is harmless. dontaudit to suppress the denial.
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dontaudit appdomain user_profile_foreign_dex_data_file:file { open read };
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# Send heap dumps to system_server via an already open file descriptor
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# % adb shell am set-watch-heap com.android.systemui 1048576
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# % adb shell dumpsys procstats --start-testing
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# debuggable builds only.
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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allow appdomain heapdump_data_file:file append;
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')
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# Write to /proc/net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl file.
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allow appdomain qtaguid_proc:file rw_file_perms;
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# Everybody can read the xt_qtaguid resource tracking misc dev.
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# So allow all apps to read from /dev/xt_qtaguid.
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allow appdomain qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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# Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
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# They need that to render the standard UI.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# Use the Binder.
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binder_use(appdomain)
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# Perform binder IPC to binder services.
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binder_call(appdomain, binderservicedomain)
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# Perform binder IPC to other apps.
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binder_call(appdomain, appdomain)
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# Already connected, unnamed sockets being passed over some other IPC
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# hence no sock_file or connectto permission. This appears to be how
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# Chrome works, may need to be updated as more apps using isolated services
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# are examined.
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allow appdomain appdomain:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr read write shutdown };
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# Backup ability for every app. BMS opens and passes the fd
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# to any app that has backup ability. Hence, no open permissions here.
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allow appdomain backup_data_file:file { read write getattr };
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allow appdomain cache_backup_file:file { read write getattr };
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allow appdomain cache_backup_file:dir getattr;
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# Backup ability using 'adb backup'
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allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file getattr;
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# Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
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allow appdomain media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
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# Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
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allow appdomain radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
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# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
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# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
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allow appdomain storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow appdomain mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Read/write visible storage
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allow appdomain fuse:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain fuse:file create_file_perms;
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allow appdomain sdcardfs:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain sdcardfs:file create_file_perms;
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# Access OBBs (vfat images) mounted by vold (b/17633509)
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# File write access allowed for FDs returned through Storage Access Framework
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allow appdomain vfat:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain vfat:file rw_file_perms;
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# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
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# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
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#
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# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
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# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
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allow appdomain usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
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allow appdomain usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
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# For art.
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Allow any app to read shared RELRO files.
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allow appdomain shared_relro_file:dir search;
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allow appdomain shared_relro_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Allow apps to read/execute installed binaries
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allow appdomain apk_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain apk_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };
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# /data/resource-cache
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allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# logd access
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read_logd(appdomain)
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control_logd(appdomain)
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# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
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allow appdomain zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
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use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app })
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allow appdomain console_device:chr_file { read write };
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# only allow unprivileged socket ioctl commands
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allowxperm { appdomain -bluetooth } self:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
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ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# For app fuse.
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allow appdomain app_fuse_file:file { getattr read append write };
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###
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### CTS-specific rules
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###
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# For cts/tests/tests/permission/src/android/permission/cts/FileSystemPermissionTest.java.
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# testRunAsHasCorrectCapabilities
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allow appdomain runas_exec:file getattr;
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# Others are either allowed elsewhere or not desired.
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# For cts/tests/tests/security/src/android/security/cts/SELinuxTest.java
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# Check SELinux policy and contexts.
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selinux_check_access(appdomain)
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selinux_check_context(appdomain)
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# Apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
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# device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl append };
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# Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
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# This is used for e.g. adb backup/restore.
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allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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allow appdomain adbd:fd use;
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allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };
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allow appdomain cache_file:dir getattr;
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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### These are things that Android apps should NEVER be able to do
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###
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# Superuser capabilities.
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# bluetooth requires net_admin and wake_alarm.
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } self:capability *;
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } self:capability2 *;
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# Block device access.
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neverallow appdomain dev_type:blk_file { read write };
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# Access to any of the following character devices.
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neverallow appdomain {
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audio_device
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camera_device
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dm_device
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gps_device
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radio_device
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rpmsg_device
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video_device
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}:chr_file { read write };
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# Note: Try expanding list of app domains in the future.
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neverallow { untrusted_app isolated_app shell } graphics_device:chr_file { read write };
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neverallow { appdomain -nfc } nfc_device:chr_file
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{ read write };
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } hci_attach_dev:chr_file
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{ read write };
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neverallow appdomain tee_device:chr_file { read write };
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# Privileged netlink socket interfaces.
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neverallow appdomain
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domain:{
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netlink_firewall_socket
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netlink_tcpdiag_socket
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netlink_nflog_socket
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netlink_xfrm_socket
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netlink_audit_socket
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netlink_ip6fw_socket
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netlink_dnrt_socket
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} *;
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# These messages are broadcast messages from the kernel to userspace.
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# Do not allow the writing of netlink messages, which has been a source
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# of rooting vulns in the past.
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neverallow appdomain domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { write append };
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# Sockets under /dev/socket that are not specifically typed.
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neverallow appdomain socket_device:sock_file write;
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# Unix domain sockets.
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neverallow appdomain adbd_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow appdomain installd_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow { appdomain -radio } rild_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow appdomain vold_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow appdomain zygote_socket:sock_file write;
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# ptrace access to non-app domains.
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neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process ptrace;
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# Write access to /proc/pid entries for any non-app domain.
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neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:file write;
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# signal access to non-app domains.
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# sigchld allowed for parent death notification.
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# signull allowed for kill(pid, 0) existence test.
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# All others prohibited.
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neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process
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{ sigkill sigstop signal };
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# Transition to a non-app domain.
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# Exception for the shell domain and the su domain, can transition to runas,
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# etc.
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neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') } { domain -appdomain }:process
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{ transition dyntransition };
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# Write to rootfs.
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neverallow appdomain rootfs:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# Write to /system.
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neverallow appdomain system_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# Write to entrypoint executables.
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neverallow appdomain exec_type:file
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# Write to system-owned parts of /data.
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# This is the default type for anything under /data not otherwise
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# specified in file_contexts. Define a different type for portions
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# that should be writable by apps.
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neverallow appdomain system_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# Write to various other parts of /data.
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neverallow appdomain drm_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -system_app }
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gps_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
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apk_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
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apk_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
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apk_private_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
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apk_private_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -shell }
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shell_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth }
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bluetooth_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow appdomain
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keystore_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow appdomain
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systemkeys_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow appdomain
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wifi_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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neverallow appdomain
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dhcp_data_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# access tmp apk files
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neverallow { appdomain -platform_app -priv_app }
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{ apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir_file_class_set *;
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# Access to factory files.
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neverallow appdomain efs_file:dir_file_class_set write;
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neverallow { appdomain -shell } efs_file:dir_file_class_set read;
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# Write to various pseudo file systems.
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -nfc }
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sysfs:dir_file_class_set write;
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neverallow appdomain
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proc:dir_file_class_set write;
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# Access to syslog(2) or /proc/kmsg.
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neverallow { appdomain -system_app }
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kernel:system { syslog_mod syslog_console };
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neverallow { appdomain -system_app -shell }
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kernel:system syslog_read;
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# Ability to perform any filesystem operation other than statfs(2).
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# i.e. no mount(2), unmount(2), etc.
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neverallow appdomain fs_type:filesystem ~getattr;
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# prevent creation/manipulation of globally readable symlinks
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neverallow appdomain {
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apk_data_file
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cache_file
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cache_recovery_file
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dev_type
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rootfs
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system_file
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security_file
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tmpfs
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}:lnk_file no_w_file_perms;
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# Blacklist app domains not allowed to execute from /data
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neverallow {
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bluetooth
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isolated_app
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nfc
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radio
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shared_relro
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system_app
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} {
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data_file_type
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-dalvikcache_data_file
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-system_data_file # shared libs in apks
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-apk_data_file
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}:file no_x_file_perms;
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# Foreign dex profiles are just markers. Prevent apps to do anything but touch them.
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neverallow appdomain user_profile_foreign_dex_data_file:file rw_file_perms;
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neverallow appdomain user_profile_foreign_dex_data_file:dir { open getattr read ioctl remove_name };
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