5d89abde99
These denials occur on boot when android_get_control_file also
changes from readlink() to realpath(), because realpath() will
lstat() the given path.
Some other domains (fastbootd, update_engine, etc.) also uses
libcutils to write to kernel log, where android_get_control_file()
is invoked, hence getattr is added to them as well.
04-28 06:15:22.290 618 618 I auditd : type=1400 audit(0.0:4): avc: denied { getattr } for comm="logd" path="/dev/kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=20917 scontext=u:r:logd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0
03-20 19:52:23.431 900 900 I auditd : type=1400 audit(0.0:7): avc: denied { getattr } for comm="android.hardwar" path="/dev/kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=20917 scontext=u:r:hal_health_default:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0
...
03-20 22:40:42.316 1 1 W init : type=1400 audit(0.0:33): avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=21999 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0
Test: no denials related to these
Change-Id: I5263dd6b64c06fb092f3461858f57a1a09107429
72 lines
2.3 KiB
Text
72 lines
2.3 KiB
Text
# android user-space log manager
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type logd, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
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type logd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
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# Read access to pseudo filesystems.
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r_dir_file(logd, cgroup)
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r_dir_file(logd, proc_kmsg)
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r_dir_file(logd, proc_meminfo)
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allow logd self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid setpcap sys_nice audit_control };
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allow logd self:global_capability2_class_set syslog;
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allow logd self:netlink_audit_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_write };
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allow logd kernel:system syslog_read;
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allow logd kmsg_device:chr_file { getattr w_file_perms };
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allow logd system_data_file:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
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allow logd pstorefs:dir search;
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allow logd pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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# Access to /data/misc/logd/event-log-tags
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allow logd misc_logd_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow logd misc_logd_file:file rw_file_perms;
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')
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allow logd runtime_event_log_tags_file:file rw_file_perms;
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# Access device logging gating property
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get_prop(logd, device_logging_prop)
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r_dir_file(logd, domain)
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allow logd kernel:system syslog_mod;
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control_logd(logd)
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read_runtime_log_tags(logd)
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allow runtime_event_log_tags_file tmpfs:filesystem associate;
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# Typically harmlessly blindly trying to access via liblog
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# event tag mapping while in the untrusted_app domain.
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# Access for that domain is controlled and gated via the
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# event log tag service (albeit at a performance penalty,
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# expected to be locally cached).
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dontaudit domain runtime_event_log_tags_file:file { map open read };
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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### logd should NEVER do any of this
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# Block device access.
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neverallow logd dev_type:blk_file { read write };
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# ptrace any other app
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neverallow logd domain:process ptrace;
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# ... and nobody may ptrace me (except on userdebug or eng builds)
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neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-crash_dump -llkd') } logd:process ptrace;
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# Write to /system.
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neverallow logd system_file:dir_file_class_set write;
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# Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data
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neverallow logd { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_data_file }:dir_file_class_set write;
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# Only init is allowed to enter the logd domain via exec()
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neverallow { domain -init } logd:process transition;
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neverallow * logd:process dyntransition;
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# protect the event-log-tags file
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neverallow {
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domain
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-init
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-logd
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} runtime_event_log_tags_file:file no_w_file_perms;
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