platform_system_sepolicy/private/system_app.te
Ryan Savitski b2fecc3954 tm-qpr backport: allow perfetto profiling of system_server and sys/platform apps
This is a reduced backport of aosp/2419280, as the full change adds
domain-wide allow rules as well as neverallows, and we want to avoid
conflicts against pre-existing TM vendor policies.

This backport is downscoped to:
* system_server.te:  allow profiling system_server, runs as "system".
* system_app.te:     allow profiling all other apps running as "system",
                     e.g. com.android.settings.
* platform_app.te:   for platform-signed apps running in the normal app
                     UID range, e.g. com.android.systemui.

Merging logistics:
* AOSP and udc-dev have the full change, so prevent automerged conflicts
  via Merged-In.
* api=33 sepolicy prebuilts are in a stacked patch as those should flow
  into downstream branches, and afaiu will need to be CP'd to AOSP.

Bug: 272719059
Ignore-AOSP-First: tm-qpr-dev backport
Merged-In: I792ec1812d94b4fa9a8688ed74f2f62f6a7f33a6
Change-Id: I5de4a39b002baabad7ef9e5a21c10dc6d87295eb
2023-03-13 17:13:54 +00:00

198 lines
5.6 KiB
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###
### Apps that run with the system UID, e.g. com.android.system.ui,
### com.android.settings. These are not as privileged as the system
### server.
###
typeattribute system_app coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
app_domain(system_app)
net_domain(system_app)
binder_service(system_app)
# android.ui and system.ui
allow system_app rootfs:dir getattr;
# Read and write /data/data subdirectory.
allow system_app system_app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_app system_app_data_file:{ file lnk_file } create_file_perms;
# Read and write to /data/misc/user.
allow system_app misc_user_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_app misc_user_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Access to apex files stored on /data (b/136063500)
# Needed so that Settings can access NOTICE files inside apex
# files located in the assets/ directory.
allow system_app apex_data_file:dir search;
allow system_app staging_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# Read wallpaper file.
allow system_app wallpaper_file:file r_file_perms;
# Read icon file.
allow system_app icon_file:file r_file_perms;
# Write to properties
set_prop(system_app, adaptive_haptics_prop)
set_prop(system_app, arm64_memtag_prop)
set_prop(system_app, bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop)
set_prop(system_app, bluetooth_audio_hal_prop)
set_prop(system_app, bluetooth_prop)
set_prop(system_app, debug_prop)
set_prop(system_app, system_prop)
set_prop(system_app, exported_bluetooth_prop)
set_prop(system_app, exported_system_prop)
set_prop(system_app, exported3_system_prop)
set_prop(system_app, gesture_prop)
set_prop(system_app, locale_prop)
set_prop(system_app, logd_prop)
set_prop(system_app, net_radio_prop)
set_prop(system_app, timezone_prop)
set_prop(system_app, usb_control_prop)
set_prop(system_app, usb_prop)
set_prop(system_app, log_tag_prop)
userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(system_app, logpersistd_logging_prop)')
auditallow system_app net_radio_prop:property_service set;
auditallow system_app usb_control_prop:property_service set;
auditallow system_app usb_prop:property_service set;
# Allow Settings to enable Dynamic System Update
set_prop(system_app, dynamic_system_prop)
# ctl interface
set_prop(system_app, ctl_default_prop)
set_prop(system_app, ctl_bugreport_prop)
# Allow developer settings to query gsid status
get_prop(system_app, gsid_prop)
# Create /data/anr/traces.txt.
allow system_app anr_data_file:dir ra_dir_perms;
allow system_app anr_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Settings need to access app name and icon from asec
allow system_app asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
# Allow system apps (like Settings) to interact with statsd
binder_call(system_app, statsd)
# Allow system apps to interact with incidentd
binder_call(system_app, incidentd)
# Allow system app to interact with Dumpstate HAL
hal_client_domain(system_app, hal_dumpstate)
allow system_app servicemanager:service_manager list;
# TODO: scope this down? Too broad?
allow system_app {
service_manager_type
-apex_service
-dnsresolver_service
-dumpstate_service
-installd_service
-lpdump_service
-mdns_service
-netd_service
-system_suspend_control_internal_service
-system_suspend_control_service
-tracingproxy_service
-virtual_touchpad_service
-vold_service
-default_android_service
}:service_manager find;
# suppress denials for services system_app should not be accessing.
dontaudit system_app {
dnsresolver_service
dumpstate_service
installd_service
mdns_service
netd_service
virtual_touchpad_service
vold_service
}:service_manager find;
# suppress denials caused by debugfs_tracing
dontaudit system_app debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
# Ignore access to zram when Debug.getMemInfo is called.
dontaudit system_app sysfs_zram:dir search;
allow system_app keystore:keystore_key {
get_state
get
insert
delete
exist
list
reset
password
lock
unlock
is_empty
sign
verify
grant
duplicate
clear_uid
user_changed
};
allow system_app keystore:keystore2_key {
delete
get_info
grant
rebind
update
use
};
# Allow Settings to manage WI-FI keys.
allow system_app wifi_key:keystore2_key {
delete
get_info
rebind
update
use
};
# settings app reads /proc/version
allow system_app {
proc_version
}:file r_file_perms;
# Settings app writes to /dev/stune/foreground/tasks.
allow system_app cgroup:file w_file_perms;
allow system_app cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
allow system_app cgroup_v2:dir w_dir_perms;
control_logd(system_app)
read_runtime_log_tags(system_app)
get_prop(system_app, device_logging_prop)
# allow system apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
# modify them other than to connect
allow system_app system_server:udp_socket {
connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
# Settings app reads ro.oem_unlock_supported
get_prop(system_app, oem_unlock_prop)
# Settings app reads ro.usb.uvc.enabled
get_prop(system_app, usb_uvc_enabled_prop)
###
### Neverallow rules
###
# app domains which access /dev/fuse should not run as system_app
neverallow system_app fuse_device:chr_file *;
# Apps which run as UID=system should not rely on any attacker controlled
# filesystem locations, such as /data/local/tmp. For /data/local/tmp, we
# allow writes to files passed by file descriptor to support dumpstate and
# bug reports, but not reads.
neverallow system_app shell_data_file:dir { no_w_dir_perms open search read };
neverallow system_app shell_data_file:file { open read ioctl lock };
# system_app should be the only domain writing the adaptive haptics prop
neverallow { domain -init -system_app } adaptive_haptics_prop:property_service set;