84e1c61193
vold works with two broad classes of block devices: untrusted devices that come in from the wild, and trusted devices. When running blkid and fsck, we pick which SELinux execution domain to use based on which class the device belongs to. Bug: 19993667 Change-Id: I44f5bac5dd94f0f76f3e4ef50ddbde5a32bd17a5
43 lines
1.2 KiB
Text
43 lines
1.2 KiB
Text
# Any fsck program run by init
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type fsck, domain;
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type fsck_exec, exec_type, file_type;
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init_daemon_domain(fsck)
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# /dev/__null__ created by init prior to policy load,
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# open fd inherited by fsck.
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allow fsck tmpfs:chr_file { read write ioctl };
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# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
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allow fsck devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
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# Allow stdin/out back to vold
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allow fsck vold:fd use;
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allow fsck vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
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# Run fsck on certain block devices
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allow fsck block_device:dir search;
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allow fsck userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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allow fsck cache_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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allow fsck dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# fsck should never be run on these block devices
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neverallow fsck {
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boot_block_device
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frp_block_device
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metadata_block_device
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recovery_block_device
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root_block_device
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swap_block_device
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system_block_device
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vold_device
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}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
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# Only allow entry from init or vold via fsck binaries
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neverallow { domain -init -vold } fsck:process transition;
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neverallow domain fsck:process dyntransition;
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neverallow fsck { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;
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