336d0fed4e
I took current AOSP policy as base, then removed sepolicy so that the set of type and attributes was a subset of types and attributes in Q sepolicy, with exception of those that have not yet been cleand up in current AOSP: mediaswcodec_server netd_socket mediaextractor_update_service thermalserviced thermalserviced_exec Bug: 133196056 Test: n/a Change-Id: I863429d61d3fad0272c1d3f1e429cd997513a74a Merged-In: I3e091652fa8d1757b1f71f7559186d5b32f000d5
49 lines
1.7 KiB
Text
49 lines
1.7 KiB
Text
# Any fsck program run on untrusted block devices
|
|
type fsck_untrusted, domain;
|
|
|
|
# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
|
|
allow fsck_untrusted devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
|
|
|
|
# Allow stdin/out back to vold
|
|
allow fsck_untrusted vold:fd use;
|
|
allow fsck_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
|
|
|
|
# Run fsck on vold block devices
|
|
allow fsck_untrusted block_device:dir search;
|
|
allow fsck_untrusted vold_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
allow fsck_untrusted proc_mounts:file r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# To determine if it is safe to run fsck on a filesystem, e2fsck
|
|
# must first determine if the filesystem is mounted. To do that,
|
|
# e2fsck scans through /proc/mounts and collects all the mounted
|
|
# block devices. With that information, it runs stat() on each block
|
|
# device, comparing the major and minor numbers to the filesystem
|
|
# passed in on the command line. If there is a match, then the filesystem
|
|
# is currently mounted and running fsck is dangerous.
|
|
# Allow stat access to all block devices so that fsck can compare
|
|
# major/minor values.
|
|
allow fsck_untrusted dev_type:blk_file getattr;
|
|
|
|
###
|
|
### neverallow rules
|
|
###
|
|
|
|
# Untrusted fsck should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data
|
|
neverallow fsck_untrusted {
|
|
boot_block_device
|
|
frp_block_device
|
|
metadata_block_device
|
|
recovery_block_device
|
|
root_block_device
|
|
swap_block_device
|
|
system_block_device
|
|
userdata_block_device
|
|
cache_block_device
|
|
dm_device
|
|
}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Only allow entry from vold via fsck binaries
|
|
neverallow { domain -vold } fsck_untrusted:process transition;
|
|
neverallow * fsck_untrusted:process dyntransition;
|
|
neverallow fsck_untrusted { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;
|