platform_system_sepolicy/netd.te
William Roberts 2f5a6a96bd Replace unix_socket_connect() and explicit property sets with macro
A common source of mistakes when authoring sepolicy is properly
setting up property sets. This is a 3 part step of:
1. Allowing the unix domain connection to the init/property service
2. Allowing write on the property_socket file
3. Allowing the set on class property_service

The macro unix_socket_connect() handled 1 and 2, but could be
confusing for first time policy authors. 3 had to be explicitly
added.

To correct this, we introduce a new macros:
set_prop(sourcedomain, targetprop)

This macro handles steps 1, 2 and 3.

No difference in sediff is expected.

(cherrypicked from commit 625a3526f1)

Change-Id: I630ba0178439c935d08062892990d43a3cc1239e
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@linux.intel.com>
2015-05-07 10:32:06 -07:00

85 lines
2.8 KiB
Text

# network manager
type netd, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
type netd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
init_daemon_domain(netd)
net_domain(netd)
allow netd self:capability { net_admin net_raw kill };
# Note: fsetid is deliberately not included above. fsetid checks are
# triggered by chmod on a directory or file owned by a group other
# than one of the groups assigned to the current process to see if
# the setgid bit should be cleared, regardless of whether the setgid
# bit was even set. We do not appear to truly need this capability
# for netd to operate.
dontaudit netd self:capability fsetid;
allow netd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
allow netd self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
allow netd self:netlink_nflog_socket create_socket_perms;
allow netd self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms;
allow netd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow netd system_file:file x_file_perms;
allow netd devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# For /proc/sys/net/ipv[46]/route/flush.
allow netd proc_net:file write;
# For /sys/modules/bcmdhd/parameters/firmware_path
# XXX Split into its own type.
allow netd sysfs:file write;
# Set dhcp lease for PAN connection
set_prop(netd, dhcp_prop)
set_prop(netd, system_prop)
auditallow netd system_prop:property_service set;
# Connect to PAN
domain_auto_trans(netd, dhcp_exec, dhcp)
allow netd dhcp:process signal;
# Needed to update /data/misc/wifi/hostapd.conf
# TODO: See what we can do to reduce the need for
# these capabilities
allow netd self:capability { dac_override chown fowner };
allow netd wifi_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow netd wifi_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
# Needed to update /data/misc/net/rt_tables
allow netd net_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow netd net_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
# Allow netd to spawn hostapd in it's own domain
domain_auto_trans(netd, hostapd_exec, hostapd)
allow netd hostapd:process signal;
# Allow netd to spawn dnsmasq in it's own domain
domain_auto_trans(netd, dnsmasq_exec, dnsmasq)
allow netd dnsmasq:process signal;
# Allow netd to start clatd in its own domain
domain_auto_trans(netd, clatd_exec, clatd)
allow netd clatd:process signal;
set_prop(netd, ctl_mdnsd_prop)
# Allow netd to operate on sockets that are passed to it.
allow netd netdomain:{tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket dccp_socket tun_socket} {read write getattr setattr getopt setopt};
allow netd netdomain:fd use;
###
### Neverallow rules
###
### netd should NEVER do any of this
# Block device access.
neverallow netd dev_type:blk_file { read write };
# ptrace any other app
neverallow netd { domain }:process ptrace;
# Write to /system.
neverallow netd system_file:dir_file_class_set write;
# Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data
neverallow netd { app_data_file system_data_file }:dir_file_class_set write;