platform_system_sepolicy/keystore.te
Stephen Smalley d4731ad8c7 Remove -kernel -recovery from keystore_data_file neverallow.
Aside from the keystore daemon itself, only init needs any access
to keystore_data_file (in order to create and potentially restorecon
/data/misc/keystore).  The exceptions for the kernel and recovery domains
are unnecessary; no allow rule permits this access in current policy.

Change-Id: I5cf6f29ec08174017ac8f5fb36fef166ce360ca0
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-10-22 11:13:17 -04:00

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type keystore, domain;
type keystore_exec, exec_type, file_type;
# keystore daemon
init_daemon_domain(keystore)
typeattribute keystore mlstrustedsubject;
binder_use(keystore)
binder_service(keystore)
allow keystore keystore_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow keystore keystore_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
allow keystore keystore_exec:file { getattr };
allow keystore tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow keystore tee:unix_stream_socket connectto;
###
### Neverallow rules
###
### Protect ourself from others
###
neverallow { domain -keystore } keystore_data_file:dir ~{ open create read getattr setattr search relabelto };
neverallow { domain -keystore } keystore_data_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
neverallow { domain -keystore -init } keystore_data_file:dir *;
neverallow { domain -keystore -init } keystore_data_file:notdevfile_class_set *;
neverallow domain keystore:process ptrace;
allow keystore keystore_service:service_manager add;
# Audited locally.
service_manager_local_audit_domain(keystore)
auditallow keystore { service_manager_type -keystore_service }:service_manager find;
# Check SELinux permissions.
selinux_check_access(keystore)