platform_system_sepolicy/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/crosvm.te
Yurii Zubrytskyi f9a00364c8 platform/system/sepolicy - SEPolicy Prebuilts for Tiramisu
Bug: 225745567
Test: Build
Change-Id: I49fb91c7a60fb1e871bdf3553d978bb16c476fd7
Merged-In: I49fb91c7a60fb1e871bdf3553d978bb16c476fd7
2022-04-29 07:34:35 +00:00

102 lines
3.7 KiB
Text

type crosvm, domain, coredomain;
type crosvm_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
type crosvm_tmpfs, file_type;
# Let crosvm open /dev/kvm.
allow crosvm kvm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# Most other domains shouldn't access /dev/kvm.
neverallow { domain -crosvm -ueventd -shell } kvm_device:chr_file getattr;
neverallow { domain -crosvm -ueventd } kvm_device:chr_file ~getattr;
neverallowxperm { domain -crosvm } kvm_device:chr_file ioctl ~{ KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION };
# Let crosvm mlock VM memory and page tables.
allow crosvm self:capability ipc_lock;
# Let crosvm create temporary files.
tmpfs_domain(crosvm)
# Let crosvm receive file descriptors from VirtualizationService.
allow crosvm virtualizationservice:fd use;
# Allow sending VirtualizationService the failure reason from the VM via pipe.
allow crosvm virtualizationservice:fifo_file write;
# Let crosvm read the composite disk images (virtualizationservice_data_file), APEXes
# (staging_data_file), APKs (apk_data_file and shell_data_file where the latter is for test apks in
# /data/local/tmp), and instance.img (app_data_file). Note that the open permission is not given as
# the files are passed as file descriptors.
allow crosvm {
virtualizationservice_data_file
staging_data_file
apk_data_file
app_data_file
apex_compos_data_file
shell_data_file
}:file { getattr read ioctl lock };
# Allow searching the directory where the composite disk images are.
allow crosvm virtualizationservice_data_file:dir search;
# Don't allow crosvm to open files that it doesn't own.
# This is important because a malicious application could try to start a VM with a composite disk
# image referring by name to files which it doesn't have permission to open, trying to get crosvm to
# open them on its behalf. By preventing crosvm from opening any other files we prevent this
# potential privilege escalation. See http://b/192453819 for more discussion.
neverallow crosvm {
virtualizationservice_data_file
staging_data_file
apk_data_file
app_data_file
userdebug_or_eng(`-shell_data_file')
}:file open;
# The instance image and the composite image should be writable as well because they could represent
# mutable disks.
allow crosvm {
virtualizationservice_data_file
app_data_file
apex_compos_data_file
}:file write;
# Allow crosvm to pipe console log to shell or app which could be the owner of a VM.
allow crosvm adbd:fd use;
allow crosvm adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
# For ACPI
allow crosvm self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
# The console log can also be written to /data/local/tmp. This is not safe as the log then can be
# visible to the processes which don't own the VM. Therefore, this is a debugging only feature.
userdebug_or_eng(`allow crosvm shell_data_file:file w_file_perms;')
# Don't allow crosvm to have access to ordinary vendor files that are not for VMs.
full_treble_only(`
neverallow crosvm {
vendor_file_type
-vendor_vm_file
-vendor_vm_data_file
# These types are not required for crosvm, but the access is granted to globally in domain.te
# thus should be exempted here.
-vendor_configs_file
-vndk_sp_file
-vendor_task_profiles_file
}:file *;
')
# app_data_file and shell_data_file is the only app_data_file_type that is
# allowed for crosvm to read. Note that the use of app_data_file is allowed
# only for the instance disk image. This is enforced inside the
# virtualizationservice by checking the file context of all disk image files.
neverallow crosvm {
app_data_file_type
-app_data_file
-shell_data_file
}:file read;
# Only virtualizationservice can run crosvm
neverallow {
domain
-crosvm
-virtualizationservice
} crosvm_exec:file no_x_file_perms;