9b2e0cbeea
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
33 lines
1.4 KiB
Text
33 lines
1.4 KiB
Text
# 464xlat daemon
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type clatd, domain;
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type clatd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
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net_domain(clatd)
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r_dir_file(clatd, proc_net)
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# Access objects inherited from netd.
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allow clatd netd:fd use;
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allow clatd netd:fifo_file { read write };
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# TODO: Check whether some or all of these sockets should be close-on-exec.
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allow clatd netd:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { read write };
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allow clatd netd:netlink_nflog_socket { read write };
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allow clatd netd:netlink_route_socket { read write };
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allow clatd netd:udp_socket { read write };
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allow clatd netd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
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allow clatd netd:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
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allow clatd self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw setuid setgid };
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# clatd calls mmap(MAP_LOCKED) with a 1M buffer. MAP_LOCKED first checks
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# capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK), and then checks to see the requested amount is
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# under RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. If the latter check succeeds clatd won't have
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# needed CAP_IPC_LOCK. But this is not guaranteed to succeed on all devices
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# so we permit any requests we see from clatd asking for this capability.
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# See https://android-review.googlesource.com/127940 and
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# https://b.corp.google.com/issues/21736319
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allow clatd self:global_capability_class_set ipc_lock;
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allow clatd self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
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allow clatd self:{ packet_socket rawip_socket tun_socket } create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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allow clatd tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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