Password security for FBE disk encryption keys

Added a new call change_user_key which changes the way that disk
encryption keys are protected; a key can now be protected with a
combination of an auth token and a secret which is a hashed password.
Both of these are passed to unlock_user_key.

This change introduces a security bug, b/26948053, which must be fixed
before we ship.

Bug: 22950892
Change-Id: Iac1e45bb6f86f2af5c472c70a0fe3228b02115bf
This commit is contained in:
Paul Crowley 2016-02-08 15:55:41 +00:00
parent 1ab7349e49
commit 0572080814
6 changed files with 142 additions and 37 deletions

View file

@ -380,10 +380,16 @@ int CryptCommandListener::CryptfsCmd::runCommand(SocketClient *cli,
if (!check_argc(cli, subcommand, argc, 3, "<user>")) return 0;
return sendGenericOkFail(cli, e4crypt_destroy_user_key(atoi(argv[2])));
} else if (subcommand == "change_user_key") {
if (!check_argc(cli, subcommand, argc, 7,
"<user> <serial> <token> <old_secret> <new_secret>")) return 0;
return sendGenericOkFail(cli, e4crypt_change_user_key(
atoi(argv[2]), atoi(argv[3]), argv[4], argv[5], argv[6]));
} else if (subcommand == "unlock_user_key") {
if (!check_argc(cli, subcommand, argc, 5, "<user> <serial> <token>")) return 0;
if (!check_argc(cli, subcommand, argc, 6, "<user> <serial> <token> <secret>")) return 0;
return sendGenericOkFail(cli, e4crypt_unlock_user_key(
atoi(argv[2]), atoi(argv[3]), parseNull(argv[4])));
atoi(argv[2]), atoi(argv[3]), argv[4], argv[5]));
} else if (subcommand == "lock_user_key") {
if (!check_argc(cli, subcommand, argc, 3, "<user>")) return 0;

View file

@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
using android::base::StringPrintf;
using android::vold::kEmptyAuthentication;
// NOTE: keep in sync with StorageManager
static constexpr int FLAG_STORAGE_DE = 1 << 0;
@ -94,6 +95,9 @@ namespace {
// Map user ids to key references
std::map<userid_t, std::string> s_de_key_raw_refs;
std::map<userid_t, std::string> s_ce_key_raw_refs;
// TODO abolish this map. Keys should not be long-lived in user memory, only kernel memory.
// See b/26948053
std::map<userid_t, std::string> s_ce_keys;
// ext4enc:TODO get this const from somewhere good
const int EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE = 8;
@ -196,21 +200,16 @@ static std::string get_ce_key_path(userid_t user_id) {
return StringPrintf("%s/ce/%d/current", user_key_dir.c_str(), user_id);
}
static bool read_and_install_key(const std::string &key_path, std::string &raw_ref)
{
std::string key;
if (!android::vold::retrieveKey(key_path, key)) return false;
if (!install_key(key, raw_ref)) return false;
return true;
}
static bool read_and_install_user_ce_key(userid_t user_id)
{
static bool read_and_install_user_ce_key(
userid_t user_id, const android::vold::KeyAuthentication &auth) {
if (s_ce_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) != 0) return true;
const auto key_path = get_ce_key_path(user_id);
std::string raw_ref;
if (!read_and_install_key(key_path, raw_ref)) return false;
s_ce_key_raw_refs[user_id] = raw_ref;
const auto ce_key_path = get_ce_key_path(user_id);
std::string ce_key;
if (!android::vold::retrieveKey(ce_key_path, auth, ce_key)) return false;
std::string ce_raw_ref;
if (!install_key(ce_key, ce_raw_ref)) return false;
s_ce_keys[user_id] = ce_key;
s_ce_key_raw_refs[user_id] = ce_raw_ref;
LOG(DEBUG) << "Installed ce key for user " << user_id;
return true;
}
@ -239,7 +238,8 @@ static bool path_exists(const std::string &path) {
// NB this assumes that there is only one thread listening for crypt commands, because
// it creates keys in a fixed location.
static bool store_key(const std::string &key_path, const std::string &key) {
static bool store_key(const std::string &key_path,
const android::vold::KeyAuthentication &auth, const std::string &key) {
if (path_exists(key_path)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Already exists, cannot create key at: " << key_path;
return false;
@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ static bool store_key(const std::string &key_path, const std::string &key) {
if (path_exists(user_key_temp)) {
android::vold::destroyKey(user_key_temp);
}
if (!android::vold::storeKey(user_key_temp, key)) return false;
if (!android::vold::storeKey(user_key_temp, auth, key)) return false;
if (rename(user_key_temp.c_str(), key_path.c_str()) != 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to move new key to location: " << key_path;
return false;
@ -264,16 +264,17 @@ static bool create_and_install_user_keys(userid_t user_id, bool create_ephemeral
// If the key should be created as ephemeral, don't store it.
s_ephemeral_users.insert(user_id);
} else {
if (!store_key(get_de_key_path(user_id), de_key)) return false;
if (!store_key(get_de_key_path(user_id), kEmptyAuthentication, de_key)) return false;
if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir + "/ce/" + std::to_string(user_id),
0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false;
if (!store_key(get_ce_key_path(user_id), ce_key)) return false;
if (!store_key(get_ce_key_path(user_id), kEmptyAuthentication, ce_key)) return false;
}
std::string de_raw_ref;
if (!install_key(de_key, de_raw_ref)) return false;
s_de_key_raw_refs[user_id] = de_raw_ref;
std::string ce_raw_ref;
if (!install_key(ce_key, ce_raw_ref)) return false;
s_ce_keys[user_id] = ce_key;
s_ce_key_raw_refs[user_id] = ce_raw_ref;
LOG(DEBUG) << "Created keys for user " << user_id;
return true;
@ -329,8 +330,11 @@ static bool load_all_de_keys() {
}
userid_t user_id = atoi(entry->d_name);
if (s_de_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) == 0) {
auto key_path = de_dir + "/" + entry->d_name;
std::string key;
if (!android::vold::retrieveKey(key_path, kEmptyAuthentication, key)) return false;
std::string raw_ref;
if (!read_and_install_key(de_dir + "/" + entry->d_name, raw_ref)) return false;
if (!install_key(key, raw_ref)) return false;
s_de_key_raw_refs[user_id] = raw_ref;
LOG(DEBUG) << "Installed de key for user " << user_id;
}
@ -351,7 +355,7 @@ int e4crypt_enable(const char* path)
std::string device_key;
std::string device_key_path = std::string(path) + device_key_leaf;
if (!android::vold::retrieveKey(device_key_path, device_key)) {
if (!android::vold::retrieveKey(device_key_path, kEmptyAuthentication, device_key)) {
LOG(INFO) << "Creating new key";
if (!random_key(device_key)) {
return -1;
@ -362,7 +366,7 @@ int e4crypt_enable(const char* path)
android::vold::destroyKey(key_temp);
}
if (!android::vold::storeKey(key_temp, device_key)) return false;
if (!android::vold::storeKey(key_temp, kEmptyAuthentication, device_key)) return false;
if (rename(key_temp.c_str(), device_key_path.c_str()) != 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to move new key to location: "
<< device_key_path;
@ -453,9 +457,12 @@ int e4crypt_destroy_user_key(userid_t user_id) {
return 0;
}
bool success = true;
s_ce_keys.erase(user_id);
std::string raw_ref;
success &= lookup_key_ref(s_ce_key_raw_refs, user_id, raw_ref) && evict_key(raw_ref);
s_ce_key_raw_refs.erase(user_id);
success &= lookup_key_ref(s_de_key_raw_refs, user_id, raw_ref) && evict_key(raw_ref);
s_de_key_raw_refs.erase(user_id);
auto it = s_ephemeral_users.find(user_id);
if (it != s_ephemeral_users.end()) {
s_ephemeral_users.erase(it);
@ -496,11 +503,58 @@ static int emulated_unlock(const std::string& path, mode_t mode) {
return 0;
}
static bool parse_hex(const char *hex, std::string &result) {
if (strcmp("!", hex) == 0) {
result = "";
return true;
}
if (android::vold::HexToStr(hex, result) != 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid FBE hex string"; // Don't log the string for security reasons
return false;
}
return true;
}
int e4crypt_change_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial,
const char* token_hex, const char* old_secret_hex, const char* new_secret_hex) {
LOG(DEBUG) << "e4crypt_change_user_key " << user_id << " serial=" << serial <<
" token_present=" << (strcmp(token_hex, "!") != 0);
if (!e4crypt_is_native()) return 0;
if (s_ephemeral_users.count(user_id) != 0) return 0;
std::string token, old_secret, new_secret;
if (!parse_hex(token_hex, token)) return -1;
if (!parse_hex(old_secret_hex, old_secret)) return -1;
if (!parse_hex(new_secret_hex, new_secret)) return -1;
auto auth = new_secret.empty()
? kEmptyAuthentication
: android::vold::KeyAuthentication(token, new_secret);
auto it = s_ce_keys.find(user_id);
if (it == s_ce_keys.end()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Key not loaded into memory, can't change for user " << user_id;
return -1;
}
auto ce_key = it->second;
auto ce_key_path = get_ce_key_path(user_id);
android::vold::destroyKey(ce_key_path);
if (!store_key(ce_key_path, auth, ce_key)) return -1;
return 0;
}
// TODO: rename to 'install' for consistency, and take flags to know which keys to install
int e4crypt_unlock_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial, const char* token) {
LOG(DEBUG) << "e4crypt_unlock_user_key " << user_id << " " << (token != nullptr);
int e4crypt_unlock_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial,
const char* token_hex, const char* secret_hex) {
LOG(DEBUG) << "e4crypt_unlock_user_key " << user_id << " serial=" << serial <<
" token_present=" << (strcmp(token_hex, "!") != 0);
if (e4crypt_is_native()) {
if (!read_and_install_user_ce_key(user_id)) {
if (s_ce_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) != 0) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Tried to unlock already-unlocked key for user " << user_id;
return 0;
}
std::string token, secret;
if (!parse_hex(token_hex, token)) return false;
if (!parse_hex(secret_hex, secret)) return false;
android::vold::KeyAuthentication auth(token, secret);
if (!read_and_install_user_ce_key(user_id, auth)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't read key for " << user_id;
return -1;
}

View file

@ -28,8 +28,11 @@ int e4crypt_crypto_complete(const char* path);
int e4crypt_init_user0();
int e4crypt_vold_create_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial, bool ephemeral);
int e4crypt_destroy_user_key(userid_t user_id);
int e4crypt_change_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial,
const char* token, const char* old_secret, const char* new_secret);
int e4crypt_unlock_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial, const char* token);
int e4crypt_unlock_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial,
const char* token, const char* secret);
int e4crypt_lock_user_key(userid_t user_id);
int e4crypt_prepare_user_storage(const char* volume_uuid, userid_t user_id,

View file

@ -37,17 +37,22 @@
namespace android {
namespace vold {
const KeyAuthentication kEmptyAuthentication { "", "" };
static constexpr size_t AES_KEY_BYTES = 32;
static constexpr size_t GCM_NONCE_BYTES = 12;
static constexpr size_t GCM_MAC_BYTES = 16;
// FIXME: better name than "secdiscardable" sought!
static constexpr size_t SECDISCARDABLE_BYTES = 1<<14;
static const char* kCurrentVersion = "1";
static const char* kRmPath = "/system/bin/rm";
static const char* kSecdiscardPath = "/system/bin/secdiscard";
static const char* kFn_keymaster_key_blob = "keymaster_key_blob";
static const char* kFn_encrypted_key = "encrypted_key";
static const char* kFn_keymaster_key_blob = "keymaster_key_blob";
static const char* kFn_secdiscardable = "secdiscardable";
static const char* kFn_stretching = "stretching";
static const char* kFn_version = "version";
static bool checkSize(const std::string& kind, size_t actual, size_t expected) {
if (actual != expected) {
@ -160,11 +165,23 @@ static bool writeStringToFile(const std::string &payload, const std::string &fil
return true;
}
bool storeKey(const std::string &dir, const std::string &key) {
static keymaster::AuthorizationSet buildParams(
const KeyAuthentication &auth, const std::string &secdiscardable) {
keymaster::AuthorizationSetBuilder paramBuilder;
auto appId = hashSecdiscardable(secdiscardable) + auth.secret;
addStringParam(paramBuilder, keymaster::TAG_APPLICATION_ID, appId);
if (!auth.token.empty()) {
addStringParam(paramBuilder, keymaster::TAG_AUTH_TOKEN, auth.token);
}
return paramBuilder.build();
}
bool storeKey(const std::string &dir, const KeyAuthentication &auth, const std::string &key) {
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(mkdir(dir.c_str(), 0700)) == -1) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "key mkdir " << dir;
return false;
}
if (!writeStringToFile(kCurrentVersion, dir + "/" + kFn_version)) return false;
std::string secdiscardable;
if (ReadRandomBytes(SECDISCARDABLE_BYTES, secdiscardable) != OK) {
// TODO status_t plays badly with PLOG, fix it.
@ -172,8 +189,10 @@ bool storeKey(const std::string &dir, const std::string &key) {
return false;
}
if (!writeStringToFile(secdiscardable, dir + "/" + kFn_secdiscardable)) return false;
auto extraParams = addStringParam(keymaster::AuthorizationSetBuilder(),
keymaster::TAG_APPLICATION_ID, hashSecdiscardable(secdiscardable)).build();
// Future proofing for when we add key stretching per b/27056334
auto stretching = auth.secret.empty() ? "nopassword" : "none";
if (!writeStringToFile(stretching, dir + "/" + kFn_stretching)) return false;
auto extraParams = buildParams(auth, secdiscardable);
Keymaster keymaster;
if (!keymaster) return false;
std::string kmKey;
@ -186,11 +205,16 @@ bool storeKey(const std::string &dir, const std::string &key) {
return true;
}
bool retrieveKey(const std::string &dir, std::string &key) {
bool retrieveKey(const std::string &dir, const KeyAuthentication &auth, std::string &key) {
std::string version;
if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_version, version)) return false;
if (version != kCurrentVersion) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Version mismatch, expected " << kCurrentVersion << " got " << version;
return false;
}
std::string secdiscardable;
if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_secdiscardable, secdiscardable)) return false;
auto extraParams = addStringParam(keymaster::AuthorizationSetBuilder(),
keymaster::TAG_APPLICATION_ID, hashSecdiscardable(secdiscardable)).build();
auto extraParams = buildParams(auth, secdiscardable);
std::string kmKey;
if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob, kmKey)) return false;
std::string encryptedMessage;

View file

@ -22,14 +22,27 @@
namespace android {
namespace vold {
// Represents the information needed to decrypt a disk encryption key.
// If "token" is nonempty, it is passed in as a required Gatekeeper auth token.
// If "secret" is nonempty, it is appended to the application-specific
// binary needed to unlock.
class KeyAuthentication {
public:
KeyAuthentication(std::string t, std::string s): token {t}, secret {s} {};
const std::string token;
const std::string secret;
};
extern const KeyAuthentication kEmptyAuthentication;
// Create a directory at the named path, and store "key" in it,
// in such a way that it can only be retrieved via Keymaster and
// can be securely deleted.
// It's safe to move/rename the directory after creation.
bool storeKey(const std::string &dir, const std::string &key);
bool storeKey(const std::string &dir, const KeyAuthentication &auth, const std::string &key);
// Retrieve the key from the named directory.
bool retrieveKey(const std::string &dir, std::string &key);
bool retrieveKey(const std::string &dir, const KeyAuthentication &auth, std::string &key);
// Securely destroy the key stored in the named directory and delete the directory.
bool destroyKey(const std::string &dir);

View file

@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ using namespace keymaster;
// This is tailored to the needs of KeyStorage, but could be extended to be
// a more general interface.
// Wrapper for a keymaster_operation_handle_t representing an
// ongoing Keymaster operation. Aborts the operation
// in the destructor if it is unfinished. Methods log failures
@ -100,6 +99,12 @@ inline AuthorizationSetBuilder& addStringParam(AuthorizationSetBuilder &&params,
return params.Authorization(tag, val.data(), val.size());
}
template <keymaster_tag_t Tag>
inline void addStringParam(AuthorizationSetBuilder &params,
TypedTag<KM_BYTES, Tag> tag, const std::string& val) {
params.Authorization(tag, val.data(), val.size());
}
} // namespace vold
} // namespace android