Merge changes from topic "deny-create-user-dirs"

* changes:
  Prepare /data/user/0 and /data/media/obb during initUser0
  Don't return /data/data from BuildDataUserCePath()
This commit is contained in:
Eric Biggers 2022-05-12 18:41:21 +00:00 committed by Gerrit Code Review
commit 9fb8825578
3 changed files with 62 additions and 15 deletions

View file

@ -94,9 +94,16 @@ const std::string prepare_subdirs_path = "/system/bin/vold_prepare_subdirs";
const std::string systemwide_volume_key_dir =
std::string() + DATA_MNT_POINT + "/misc/vold/volume_keys";
const std::string data_data_dir = std::string() + DATA_MNT_POINT + "/data";
const std::string data_user_0_dir = std::string() + DATA_MNT_POINT + "/user/0";
const std::string media_obb_dir = std::string() + DATA_MNT_POINT + "/media/obb";
// Some users are ephemeral, don't try to wipe their keys from disk
std::set<userid_t> s_ephemeral_users;
// The system DE encryption policy
EncryptionPolicy s_device_policy;
// Map user ids to encryption policies
std::map<userid_t, EncryptionPolicy> s_de_policies;
std::map<userid_t, EncryptionPolicy> s_ce_policies;
@ -443,11 +450,12 @@ bool fscrypt_initialize_systemwide_keys() {
makeGen(options), &device_key))
return false;
EncryptionPolicy device_policy;
if (!install_storage_key(DATA_MNT_POINT, options, device_key, &device_policy)) return false;
// This initializes s_device_policy, which is a global variable so that
// fscrypt_init_user0() can access it later.
if (!install_storage_key(DATA_MNT_POINT, options, device_key, &s_device_policy)) return false;
std::string options_string;
if (!OptionsToString(device_policy.options, &options_string)) {
if (!OptionsToString(s_device_policy.options, &options_string)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to serialize options";
return false;
}
@ -455,7 +463,7 @@ bool fscrypt_initialize_systemwide_keys() {
if (!android::vold::writeStringToFile(options_string, options_filename)) return false;
std::string ref_filename = std::string(DATA_MNT_POINT) + fscrypt_key_ref;
if (!android::vold::writeStringToFile(device_policy.key_raw_ref, ref_filename)) return false;
if (!android::vold::writeStringToFile(s_device_policy.key_raw_ref, ref_filename)) return false;
LOG(INFO) << "Wrote system DE key reference to:" << ref_filename;
KeyBuffer per_boot_key;
@ -470,24 +478,63 @@ bool fscrypt_initialize_systemwide_keys() {
return true;
}
static bool prepare_special_dirs() {
// Create /data/user/0 and its bind-mount alias /data/data. This *should*
// happen in fscrypt_prepare_user_storage(). However, it actually must be
// done early, before the rest of user 0's CE storage is prepared. This is
// because zygote may need to set up app data isolation before then, which
// requires mounting a tmpfs over /data/data to ensure it remains hidden.
// This issue arises due to /data/data being in the top-level directory.
//
// /data/user/0 used to be a symlink to /data/data, so we must first delete
// the old symlink if present.
if (android::vold::IsSymlink(data_user_0_dir) && android::vold::Unlink(data_user_0_dir) != 0)
return false;
if (!prepare_dir(data_data_dir, 0771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false;
if (!prepare_dir(data_user_0_dir, 0700, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false;
if (android::vold::BindMount(data_data_dir, data_user_0_dir) != 0) return false;
// If /data/media/obb doesn't exist, create it and encrypt it with the
// device policy. Normally, device-policy-encrypted directories are created
// and encrypted by init; /data/media/obb is special because it is located
// in /data/media. Since /data/media also contains per-user encrypted
// directories, by design only vold can write to it. As a side effect of
// that, vold must create /data/media/obb.
//
// We must tolerate /data/media/obb being unencrypted if it already exists
// on-disk, since it used to be unencrypted (b/64566063).
bool encrypt_obb = !android::vold::pathExists(media_obb_dir) && fscrypt_is_native();
if (!prepare_dir(media_obb_dir, 0770, AID_MEDIA_RW, AID_MEDIA_RW)) return false;
if (encrypt_obb && !EnsurePolicy(s_device_policy, media_obb_dir)) return false;
return true;
}
bool fscrypt_init_user0_done;
bool fscrypt_init_user0() {
LOG(DEBUG) << "fscrypt_init_user0";
if (!prepare_special_dirs()) return false;
if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir, 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false;
if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir + "/ce", 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false;
if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir + "/de", 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false;
if (!android::vold::pathExists(get_de_key_path(0))) {
if (!create_and_install_user_keys(0, false)) return false;
// Since /data/user/0 was created already, and directory creation
// and encryption should always happen together, encrypt
// /data/user/0 right away without waiting for the request to
// prepare user 0's CE storage.
if (!EnsurePolicy(s_ce_policies[0], data_user_0_dir)) return false;
}
// TODO: switch to loading only DE_0 here once framework makes
// explicit calls to install DE keys for secondary users
if (!load_all_de_keys()) return false;
}
// We can only safely prepare DE storage here, since CE keys are probably
// entangled with user credentials. The framework will always prepare CE
// storage once CE keys are installed.
// We only prepare DE storage here, since user 0's CE key won't be installed
// yet unless it was just created. The framework will prepare the user's CE
// storage later, once their CE key is installed.
if (!fscrypt_prepare_user_storage("", 0, 0, android::os::IVold::STORAGE_FLAG_DE)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare user 0 storage";
return false;

View file

@ -1160,14 +1160,6 @@ std::string BuildDataMiscDePath(const std::string& volumeUuid, userid_t userId)
std::string BuildDataUserCePath(const std::string& volumeUuid, userid_t userId) {
// TODO: unify with installd path generation logic
std::string data(BuildDataPath(volumeUuid));
if (volumeUuid.empty() && userId == 0) {
std::string legacy = StringPrintf("%s/data", data.c_str());
struct stat sb;
if (lstat(legacy.c_str(), &sb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
/* /data/data is dir, return /data/data for legacy system */
return legacy;
}
}
return StringPrintf("%s/user/%u", data.c_str(), userId);
}
@ -1187,6 +1179,12 @@ dev_t GetDevice(const std::string& path) {
}
}
// Returns true if |path| exists and is a symlink.
bool IsSymlink(const std::string& path) {
struct stat stbuf;
return lstat(path.c_str(), &stbuf) == 0 && S_ISLNK(stbuf.st_mode);
}
// Returns true if |path1| names the same existing file or directory as |path2|.
bool IsSameFile(const std::string& path1, const std::string& path2) {
struct stat stbuf1, stbuf2;

View file

@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ std::string BuildDataUserDePath(const std::string& volumeUuid, userid_t userid);
dev_t GetDevice(const std::string& path);
bool IsSymlink(const std::string& path);
bool IsSameFile(const std::string& path1, const std::string& path2);
status_t EnsureDirExists(const std::string& path, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid);