E.g. during installation to protect the system.
Ignore-AOSP-First: this depends on changes to framework and/or incfs and does not make sense without them. We'll merge it at a single large scale merge later.
Bug: 160635296
Test: atest PackageManagerShellCommandTest PackageManagerShellCommandIncrementalTest IncrementalServiceTest PackageManagerServiceTest ChecksumsTest
Change-Id: I5851e1e9dbc8e8c2b331c407002cf7133bf6e35a
* changes:
Remove Keymaster::isSecure() and simplify callers
Make vold use keystore2 instead of keymaster
Remove HardwareAuthToken support from vold::Keymaster
Now that isSecure() always returns true, we can remove it and simplify
all the callers (i.e. cryptfs). Refer to the commit description for
Iaebfef082eca0da8a305043fafb6d85e5de14cf8 for why this function always
return true.
Bug: 181910578
Test: Cuttlefish and bramble boot
Change-Id: I185dd8180bd7842b05295263f0b1aa7205329a88
Make vold use keystore2 for all its operations instead of directly using
keymaster. This way, we won't have any clients that bypass keystore2,
and we'll no longer need to reserve a keymaster operation for vold.
Note that we now hardcode "SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT" (TEE)
when talking to Keystore2 since Keystore2 only allows TEE and STRONGBOX.
Keystore2 presents any SOFTWARE implementation as a TEE to callers when
no "real" TEE is present. As far as storage encryption is concerned,
there's no advantage to using a STRONGBOX when a "real" TEE is present,
and a STRONGBOX can't be present if a "real" TEE isn't, so asking
Keystore2 for a TEE is the best we can do in any situation.
The difference in behaviour only really affects the full disk encryption
code in cryptfs.cpp, which used to explicitly check that the keymaster
device is a "real" TEE (as opposed to a SOFTWARE implementation) before
using it (it can no longer do so since Keystore2 doesn't provide a way
to do this).
A little code history digging (7c49ab0a0b in particular) shows that
cryptfs.cpp cared about two things when using a keymaster.
- 1) that the keys generated by the keymaster were "standalone" keys -
i.e. that the keymaster could operate on those keys without
requiring /data or any other service to be available.
- 2) that the keymaster was a non-SOFTWARE implementation so that things
would still work in case a "real" TEE keymaster was ever somehow
added to the device after first boot.
Today, all "real" TEE keymasters always generate "standalone" keys, and
a TEE has been required in Android devices since at least Android N. The
only two exceptions are Goldfish and ARC++, which have SOFTWARE
keymasters, but both those keymasters also generate "standalone" keys.
We're also no longer worried about possibly adding a "real" TEE KM to
either of those devices after first boot. So there's no longer a reason
cryptfs.cpp can't use the SOFTWARE keymaster on those devices.
There's also already an upgrade path in place (see
test_mount_encrypted_fs() in cryptfs.cpp) to upgrade the kdf that's
being used once a TEE keymaster is added to the device. So it's safe for
cryptfs.cpp to ask for a TEE keymaster from Keystore2 and use it
blindly, without checking whether or not it's a "real" TEE, which is why
Keymaster::isSecure() just returns true now. A future patch will remove
that function and simplify its callers.
Bug: 181910578
Test: cuttlefish and bramble boot. Adding, switching between, stopping
and removing users work.
Change-Id: Iaebfef082eca0da8a305043fafb6d85e5de14cf8
HardwareAuthTokens are no longer used by vold since Android P. So remove
the auth token parameter from vold. This patch doesn't remove the token
from IVold.aidl, and the methods in VoldNativeService.cpp return an
error if a non-empty auth token is passed to them.
Bug: 181910578
Test: cuttlefish and bramble boot with patch
Change-Id: I1a9f54e10f9efdda9973906afd0a5de5a699ada5
So shell / root will always access to them directly not via fuse.
And zygote will be unmount these directories to prevent them being
abused for leaking app visibility.
Also, /mnt/androidwritable is not very useful now as it's the same as
/mnt/installer, but we should make shell / root to access /mnt/androidwritable
later and /mnt/installer should only access obb but not data dir.
Bug: 182997439
Test: Able to boot without errors
Test: df on /sdcard/Android/data shows it's no on fuse.
Change-Id: I2ad10b1e80c135f637d37ddf502ee010f89f4946
Revert "Change mounting storage data and obb to on by default"
Revert submission 13469849-turn_on_iso-sc-dev
Reason for revert: Failing existing CTS b/182843583
Reverted Changes:
If819ee161:Change mounting storage data and obb to on by defa...
I46a095448:Change mounting storage data and obb to on by defa...
Change-Id: Ic5156df1cac3a5ecd661b5f3bfa0095b2b767d5d
reboot maybe cause a deadlock scenario:
1:init->vdc->vold for abort_fuse blocked on futex hold by another
vold binder_x
2:binder_x blocked in binder_ioctl_write_read wait a dead service's
response
3:dead service is exiting and schedule a deferred work for put files
in binder_vma_close, after put files is completed, the binder_x will
eventually wake up
4:kworker execute binder_deferred_work is blocked on fuse request:
crash> bt 1707
PID: 1707 TASK: ffffffe366175e80 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "kworker/2:4"
#0 [ffffff801b8b3ac0] __switch_to at ffffff962ce88a60
#1 [ffffff801b8b3b10] __schedule at ffffff962e2d3d30
#2 [ffffff801b8b3b70] schedule at ffffff962e2d3ff4
#3 [ffffff801b8b3bc0] __fuse_request_send at ffffff962d20e008
#4 [ffffff801b8b3c00] fuse_request_send at ffffff962d20deac
#5 [ffffff801b8b3c30] fuse_flush at ffffff962d217fa4
#6 [ffffff801b8b3c80] filp_close at ffffff962d0bd7b4
#7 [ffffff801b8b3cb0] put_files_struct at ffffff962d0e7658
#8 [ffffff801b8b3d30] binder_deferred_func at ffffff962dc9e60c
#9 [ffffff801b8b3d90] process_one_work at ffffff962cee761c
#10 [ffffff801b8b3e00] worker_thread at ffffff962cee7a68
#11 [ffffff801b8b3e60] kthread at ffffff962ceecc14
waiting for init abort_fuse
suggested by maco, do not acquire lock when abort fuse.
Test: reboot stress test
Change-Id: If6dd7f5e9c413a16ba047204c33d82d6ff41c4ae
Signed-off-by: lijiazi <lijiazi@xiaomi.com>
The error messages that are printed when probing for rollback resistance
support on a device that doesn't support rollback-resistant keys can
make it sound like something is going wrong. Print a WARNING message
afterwards to try to make it clear what is going on. Also adjust or add
DEBUG messages when starting to generate each key so that it's easier to
distinguish the log messages for different key generation operations.
Bug: 182815123
Test: boot on device that doesn't support rollback-resistant keys and
check log.
Change-Id: I37a13eb5c1e839fb94581f3e7ec1cd8da0263d2b
Merged-In: I37a13eb5c1e839fb94581f3e7ec1cd8da0263d2b
The error messages that are printed when probing for rollback resistance
support on a device that doesn't support rollback-resistant keys can
make it sound like something is going wrong. Print a WARNING message
afterwards to try to make it clear what is going on. Also adjust or add
DEBUG messages when starting to generate each key so that it's easier to
distinguish the log messages for different key generation operations.
Bug: 182815123
Test: boot on device that doesn't support rollback-resistant keys and
check log.
Change-Id: I37a13eb5c1e839fb94581f3e7ec1cd8da0263d2b
The FUSE daemon is often holding fds on behalf of other apps and if a
volume is ejected the daemon would often get killed first while vold
is walking /proc/<pid>/fd to kill pids with open fds on the
volume. This is required for the volume unmount successfully.
To mitigate this, we avoid killing the FUSE daemon during the usual
/proc walk. This ensures that we first send SIGINT, SIGTERM and
SIGKILL to other apps first. There is an additional SIGKILL attempt
and on that last attempt, we kill the FUSE daemon as a last resort
Test: Manual
Bug: 171673908
Change-Id: I100d2ce4cb4c145cbb49e0696842e97dfba2c1c9
