This adds support for private volumes which is just a filesystem
wrapped in a dm-crypt layer. For now we're using the exact same
configuration as internal encryption (aes-cbc-essiv:sha256), but we
don't store any key material on the removable media. Instead, we
store the key on internal storage, and use the GPT partition GUID
to identify which key should be used.
This means that private external storage is effectively as secure as
the internal storage of the device. That is, if the internal storage
is encrypted, then our external storage key is also encrypted.
When partitioning disks, we now support a "private" mode which has
a PrivateVolume partition, and a currently unused 16MB metadata
partition reserved for future use. It also supports a "mixed" mode
which creates both a PublicVolume and PrivateVolume on the same
disk. Mixed mode is currently experimental.
For now, just add ext4 support to PrivateVolume; we'll look at f2fs
in a future change. Add VolumeBase lifecycle for setting up crypto
mappings, and extract blkid logic into shared method. Sprinkle some
more "static" around the cryptfs code to improve invariants.
Bug: 19993667
Change-Id: Ibd1df6250735b706959a1eb9d9f7219ea85912a0
Redirect all crypto calls to e4crypt equivalents if file level encryption
detected. Note this change implements only the ones needed for minimal
functionality.
Requires matching change:
https://googleplex-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/642778/
Change-Id: I622d1a91704de4b3ab655486e6d38cd6718e6016
Redirect all crypto calls to e4crypt equivalents if file level encryption
detected. Note this change implements only the ones needed for minimal
functionality.
Requires matching change:
https://googleplex-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/642778/
Change-Id: I622d1a91704de4b3ab655486e6d38cd6718e6016
This reverts commit 6a69cfc411.
The original fix seems to have led to boot failures in QA. Rather than
risk shipping, revert the change. Bug 18764230 reopened.
Requires change
https://googleplex-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/629950/
Bug: 19278390
Bug: 19199624
Change-Id: Ia858c4db0abb917f9364ec8048f59ca4fb48e233
The libcrypto and libssl modules (and their respective static and host
versions) use LOCAL_EXPORT_C_INCLUDE_DIRS thus just including the module
is sufficient.
Additionally, cryptfs.h was including an OpenSSL header just to get the
length of a SHA-256 hash. Rather than force all users of this header to
also depend on libcrypto, it's easier just to define that value in the
header file.
Change-Id: I3e3e0db906a212e1093944b298e4a8ff2e2fb07d
Add maybeenabledefaultencryption function, that encrypts based
on the encryption flag and appropriate environment variable
Bug: 18764230
Change-Id: Id9a1967d09a7ae63a51240c0a5f3c41505af0e9a
Store long field values in multiple underlying fixed-length entries
and concatenate them together when reading back.
Bug: 17556485
Change-Id: I2f8033d18c208993fa1b010712be0dad5d8b646b
There are cases where the /dev/block/dm-0 fails to open.
This leads to the device not completing the boot up sequence.
Currently, the only way out is to reboot.
Bug: 17898962
Change-Id: If4583ebb1ef1ebdbaf680d69b876459aaec2f4ce
(cherry picked from commit 7fc1de8a44)
There are cases where the /dev/block/dm-0 fails to open.
This leads to the device not completing the boot up sequence.
Currently, the only way out is to reboot.
Bug: 17898962
Change-Id: If4583ebb1ef1ebdbaf680d69b876459aaec2f4ce
Correct implementations of keymaster should reject using an n-bit
RSA key to sign less than n bits of data, because we specify that
keymaster should not perform padding.
Change-Id: Ibdff1bbfbee84fd5bdbfb3149a124dbbaa7827fc
Note that this also changes the boot sequence, and moves the test for corrupted
data to cryptfs_restart_internal.
Bug: 17213613
Change-Id: I0f86e8fe3d482e2d1373bd0f4d0d861e63ad8904
Store salted scrypt of intermediate key in crypto header
When mount fails, check if matches, and if it does return error
code prompting a wipe
Bug: 11477689
Change-Id: I3dcf9e0c64f2a01c8ba8eaf58df82cbe717d421b
Set flag on starting encryption to say it failed, and only clear
when we get into a recoverable state (partially or fully encrypted.)
Go to recovery on seeing this flag on boot
Bug: 16552363
Change-Id: I7e452b653edf3a087ecfaba8f81f41765a1c8daf
This reverts commit 5cc86c5741.
Without two more commits, this will break encryption. I'll re-commit when the other two pass code review.
Change-Id: I71720d065c16cf0f7f534e74ffe883f1e113c477
Stop encryption when battery is low, mark position, and continue on reboot.
Note - support for multiple encrypted volumes removed as no devices seem
to exist with an fstab that uses this feature. If you want support for such
a device, contact me and we will re-add it with appropriate testing.
Bug: 13284213
Change-Id: I1f7178e4f7dd8ea816cbc03ab5c4f6543e98acaa
If we are not to double prompt, we need to pass the password from
CryptKeeper to KeyStore. Since the entire framework is taken down
and restarted, we must store the password in a secure system daemon.
There seems no better way than holding it in vold.
Change-Id: Ia60f2f051fc3f87c4b6468465f17b655f43f97de
Add a call to vold that says if we decrypted the data partition. Reset the
flag so that it only returns true the first time.
Bug: 12990752
Change-Id: Ib00be87137c00fb8ad29205c85a3ea187764b702
Modify enablecrypto command to make the password optional. When it is
not there, default encrypt the device.
Remove a warning by making at least some parts of this file const-correct.
Bug: 11985952
Change-Id: Ie27da4c4072386d9d6519d97ff46c6dc4ed188dc
Store encryption type in crypto footer, and provide functions to
manipulate it. Add mount_default_encrypted command to vdc to allow
mounting of default encrypted volumes at boot time.
Bug: 8769627
Change-Id: Ie41848f258e128b48b579e09789abfa24c95e2b2
Currently, if a non-framework process or service is using /data,
unmounting will fail as nothing will kill it.
Instead of rebooting on unmount failure, we now kill all processes
using /data, then try one more time.
Bug: 11291208
Change-Id: I6c5276c78aa55965914ace96e1db74dc80fca3c1
We now run an sdcard fuse daemon on top of a physical SD card.
Add support for that.
Bug: 10330128
Change-Id: I6a291f861ccb0f2911c07cc8f659e2cec4e6d76c
scrypt is a sequential memory-hard key derivation algorithm that makes
it more difficult for adversaries to brute force passwords using
specialized equipment. See http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf for
more details of the algorithm.
This adds support for initializing disk encryption using scrypt and
upgrading from the previous PBKDF2 algorithm.
Change-Id: I1d26db4eb9d27fea7310be3e49c8e6219e6d2c3b
In order to make it easier to upgrade the crypto footer, extract some
constants to a header file instead. Then the header can control what the
current version is and the upgrade_crypto_ftr code should be the only
thing that needs to be updated.
Change-Id: I3ed5a7d3b640419cd8af91388d94a00de8cc09db
In order to display the correct language, timezone, airplane
mode and other settings on the decrypt screen, a copy of those
settings needs to be stored unencrypted so the framework can
query them. This adds support to vold to store up to 32
property like key/value pairs that are not encrypted.
Change-Id: Id5c936d2c57d46ed5cff9325d92ba1e8d2ec8972
This vold command returns 0 if the given password matches the password
used to decrypt the device on boot. It returns 1 if they don't match,
and it returns -1 on an internal error, and -2 if the device is not encrypted.
Also check the uid of the sender of the command and only allow the root and
system users to issue cryptfs commands.
Change-Id: I5e5ae3b72a2d7814ae68c2d49aa9deb90fb1dac5
Add the force_and_revert option to the unmount command which will force
the unmount, and revert a crypto mapping. This is used during factory
reset so that when the internal sdcard volume is formatted, it formats
the raw device, not the encrypted mapping.
Change-Id: I36b6ff9bb54863b121de635472a303bf4a2334a9
Add support for keeping the keys in a separate file on another partition,
for devices with no space reserved for a footer after the userdata filesystem.
Add support for encrypting the volumes managed by vold, if they meet certain
criteria, namely being marked as nonremovable and encryptable in vold.fstab.
A bit of trickiness is required to keep vold happy.
Change-Id: Idf0611f74b56c1026c45742ca82e0c26e58828fe
Bug 3384231 is punted to MR1, but the code to set the flag is already
in the tree, so this CL does 3 things:
1. Comments out the lines that set the flag
2. Removes the change to the checkpw that was added in the last change.
3. Implements a new command to check the flag (which no one is calling
yet and the flag won't be set anyhow).
When MR1 comes, it will be a simple matter to enable the flag setting
code and start testing it.
The fear is a false positive detection of incomplete encryption could
cause people to be prompted to wipe their data when MR1 comes out and
the flag is checked. Not setting this for first release, and testing
this more before MR1, will give us confidence that the code will not
detect false positives of encryption failure.
Change-Id: I6dfba11646e291fe5867e8375b71a53c815f3968
For the case there encryption failes to complete because of a kernel
crash or the user power cycling the device, define a flag in the
crypto footer that says encryption is in progress. Set it when starting
the actual encryption, and clear it when it successfully completes.
When the user is asked for the disk password, if the flag is set,
return a special error to the caller so the UI can know to tell the
user there is no valid data on the disk, and present a button to
wipe and reset the device.
Change-Id: I3723ec77f33437d94b3ac9ad5db0a5c950d11648
The master key is now stored unhashed in memory. This
is needed because certain operation like remote reseting
of passwords the old password is not avaliable.
The changepw interface has been changed to only take
the new password as the only argument. When this is
called we reencrypt the master key with the new password
and old salt.
Bug: 3382129
Change-Id: I9a596b89013194605d6d7790067691aa0dc75e72
