Now that vold uses Keystore2 rather than the Keymaster HAL directly, and
also the new version of Keymaster is called "KeyMint" instead, replace
most of the references to Keymaster in vold with Keystore.
(I decided not to include the "2" in most places, as it seemed
unnecessarily precise in most places, and it would be something that
might need to keep being updated. Only Keystore.{cpp,h} really need to
care about the version number.)
I didn't rename many things in cryptfs.cpp, as that file will be going
away soon anyway. I also left "wait_for_keymaster" and "vdc keymaster
earlyBootEnded" as-is for now, as those are referenced outside vold.
Bug: 183669495
Change-Id: I92cd648fae09f8c9769f7cf34dbf6c6e956be4e8
Now that isSecure() always returns true, we can remove it and simplify
all the callers (i.e. cryptfs). Refer to the commit description for
Iaebfef082eca0da8a305043fafb6d85e5de14cf8 for why this function always
return true.
Bug: 181910578
Test: Cuttlefish and bramble boot
Change-Id: I185dd8180bd7842b05295263f0b1aa7205329a88
Make vold use keystore2 for all its operations instead of directly using
keymaster. This way, we won't have any clients that bypass keystore2,
and we'll no longer need to reserve a keymaster operation for vold.
Note that we now hardcode "SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT" (TEE)
when talking to Keystore2 since Keystore2 only allows TEE and STRONGBOX.
Keystore2 presents any SOFTWARE implementation as a TEE to callers when
no "real" TEE is present. As far as storage encryption is concerned,
there's no advantage to using a STRONGBOX when a "real" TEE is present,
and a STRONGBOX can't be present if a "real" TEE isn't, so asking
Keystore2 for a TEE is the best we can do in any situation.
The difference in behaviour only really affects the full disk encryption
code in cryptfs.cpp, which used to explicitly check that the keymaster
device is a "real" TEE (as opposed to a SOFTWARE implementation) before
using it (it can no longer do so since Keystore2 doesn't provide a way
to do this).
A little code history digging (7c49ab0a0b in particular) shows that
cryptfs.cpp cared about two things when using a keymaster.
- 1) that the keys generated by the keymaster were "standalone" keys -
i.e. that the keymaster could operate on those keys without
requiring /data or any other service to be available.
- 2) that the keymaster was a non-SOFTWARE implementation so that things
would still work in case a "real" TEE keymaster was ever somehow
added to the device after first boot.
Today, all "real" TEE keymasters always generate "standalone" keys, and
a TEE has been required in Android devices since at least Android N. The
only two exceptions are Goldfish and ARC++, which have SOFTWARE
keymasters, but both those keymasters also generate "standalone" keys.
We're also no longer worried about possibly adding a "real" TEE KM to
either of those devices after first boot. So there's no longer a reason
cryptfs.cpp can't use the SOFTWARE keymaster on those devices.
There's also already an upgrade path in place (see
test_mount_encrypted_fs() in cryptfs.cpp) to upgrade the kdf that's
being used once a TEE keymaster is added to the device. So it's safe for
cryptfs.cpp to ask for a TEE keymaster from Keystore2 and use it
blindly, without checking whether or not it's a "real" TEE, which is why
Keymaster::isSecure() just returns true now. A future patch will remove
that function and simplify its callers.
Bug: 181910578
Test: cuttlefish and bramble boot. Adding, switching between, stopping
and removing users work.
Change-Id: Iaebfef082eca0da8a305043fafb6d85e5de14cf8
HardwareAuthTokens are no longer used by vold since Android P. So remove
the auth token parameter from vold. This patch doesn't remove the token
from IVold.aidl, and the methods in VoldNativeService.cpp return an
error if a non-empty auth token is passed to them.
Bug: 181910578
Test: cuttlefish and bramble boot with patch
Change-Id: I1a9f54e10f9efdda9973906afd0a5de5a699ada5
Vold incorrectly sends the earlyBootEnded signal only to the Keymaster
instance used for device encryption, but all of them need it.
Bug: 152932559
Test: VtsHalKeymasterV4_1TargetTest
Change-Id: Id8f01a1dc7d2398395f369c3ea74656a82888829
To prevent keys from being compromised if an attacker
acquires read access to kernel memory, some inline
encryption hardware supports protecting the keys in
hardware without software having access to or the
ability to set the plaintext keys. Instead, software
only sees "wrapped keys", which may differ on every boot.
'wrappedkey_v0' fileencryption flag is used to denote
that the device supports inline encryption hardware that
supports this feature. On such devices keymaster is used
to generate keys with STORAGE_KEY tag and export a
per-boot ephemerally wrapped storage key to install it in
the kernel.
The wrapped key framework in the linux kernel ensures the
wrapped key is provided to the inline encryption hardware
where it is unwrapped and the file contents key is derived
to encrypt contents without revealing the plaintext key in
the clear.
Test: FBE validation with Fscrypt v2 + inline crypt + wrapped
key changes kernel.
Bug: 147733587
Change-Id: I1f0de61b56534ec1df9baef075acb74bacd00758
Just before mounting partition(s) not verified by verified boot, vold
should notify keymaster that early boot has ended so it won't allow
EARLY_BOOT_ONLY keys to be created or used.
Test: VtsHalKeymasterV4_1TargetTest
Change-Id: I74ffec8d5b33f01e62f845a8fc824b3a3cad50f3
Merged-In: I74ffec8d5b33f01e62f845a8fc824b3a3cad50f3
This CL updates vold to use the Keymaster 4.1 interface, but does not
yet call any of the new methods.
Test: Boot the device
Change-Id: I4574a2f6eead3b71d1e89488b496b734694620c7
Merged-In: I4574a2f6eead3b71d1e89488b496b734694620c7
This CL updates vold to use the Keymaster 4.1 interface, but does not
yet call any of the new methods.
Test: Boot the device
Change-Id: I4574a2f6eead3b71d1e89488b496b734694620c7
Objects derived from RefBase should always be owned by sp rather then
unique_ptr or other smart pointer implementations.
Bug: 79474587
Change-Id: I6a3ca04b3a3bab74c6114643ffdaeac537188d12
We make some of the C++ member functions 'const', to reflect how
they (don't) affect the state of the class.
Test: TreeHugger
Change-Id: Iec1c2801bfe721e2741406ed1ac0ef95662840a6
Merged-In: Iec1c2801bfe721e2741406ed1ac0ef95662840a6
We make some of the C++ member functions 'const', to reflect how
they (don't) affect the state of the class.
Test: TreeHugger
Change-Id: Iec1c2801bfe721e2741406ed1ac0ef95662840a6
During the analysis of b/72953784 it was noticed that vold was calling
keymaster abort() and failing, though vold was succeeding with its
keymaster operation. This had nothing to do with the bug, but the
presence of the error appeared to implicate keymaster, and it's bad
form in any case. This CL correctly clears the mDevice member during
a move, so the destructor will not attempt to call abort.
Test: Build & boot
Bug: 72953784
Change-Id: Ib0700f829e87f19b089396087085585ddd6b96a5
This CL changes vold from using a KM3 device directly to using the KM4
support wrapper from the KM4 support library, which supports both KM3
and KM4 devices (KM0, 1 and 2 devices are still supported as well,
because the default KM3 device is a wrapper that uses them).
In addition, I found myself getting confused about which "Keymaster"
types were locally-defined vold keymaster types and which were from
the KM4 HAL and support library, so I changd the approach to
referencing the latter, so all of them are qualified with the "km::"
namespace reference.
Test: Build & boot
Change-Id: I08ed5425641e7496f8597d5716cb3cd0cbd33a7f
Correctly handle a key upgrade error from keymaster by upgrading the
FDE RSA key and writing the new key blob to disk.
Bug: 69792304
Test: Roll back PLATFORM_SECURITY_PATCH a month, wipe and reboot, roll
forwards again, check logs with and without this patch.
Change-Id: I220d2dd4e3d791f636e9bc5f063064cecbf1b88a
This is temporary. Keystore is in the process of being upgraded to use
the new Keymaster 4.0 HAL, and I want to leave vold alone, using
Keymaster 3.0 for the moment. This CL just copies relevant bits of
keystore support utilities into vold, so it can stop depending on the
copies from keystore.
After the keystore update is complete, vold will be changed either to
use Keymaster 4.0 or -- more likely -- to use keystore rather than
talking to Keymaster directly. At that point the files added by this CL
will be deleted.
Test: Device boots and successfully decrypts /data
Change-Id: I73f6d4cc4c5e20d89d7ac37d29d025bf279f9e12
std::vector with custom zeroing allocator is used instead of
std::string for data that can contain encryption keys.
Bug: 64201177
Test: manually created a managed profile, changed it's credentials
Test: manually upgraded a phone with profile from O to MR1.
Change-Id: Ic31877049f69eba9f8ea64fd99acaaca5a01d3dd
Change to use WaitForProperty API to wait for vold.post_fs_data_done
Also change cryptfs to C++
Bug: 35425974
Test: mma, marlin/angler boot
Change-Id: Id821f2035788fcc91909f296c83c871c67571de3
Cryptfs uses keymaster for key derivation. Vold has a C++ abstraction
for Keymaster. However, cryptfs, being a pure C implementation, uses
its own abstraction of the keymaster HAL.
This patch expresses cryptfs' keymaster abstraction in terms of
vold's C++ Keymaster abstraction, consolidating the code base to a
single point where the actual keymaster HAL is beeing used.
Test: successfully upgrade bullhead/angler while using FDE and
having a PIN set
run vold_cryptfs_scrypt_hidlization_equivalence_test
Bug: 35028230
Bug: 32020919
Change-Id: Ic3b765720be0cf7899dda5005fa89347ffb59b9f
bullhead-userdebug with disk encryption enabled and with PIN prompt at
boot can no longer unlock/mount encrypted userdata partition at boot
after updating from bullhead-userdebug prior to the two commits being
reverted here.
This reverts commit 6b7fa1bf17.
This reverts commit bbe31ba776.
Test: Flash bullhead-userdebug build created prior to the above two
commits, enable disk (set PIN to 1234) with PIN required at
boot, reboot, confirm that PIN prompt accepts the PIN, confirm
that device fully boots up and appears operational. Flash build
with this commit without wiping userdata, confirm that PIN
prompt at boot accepts the PIN and device fully boots up and
appears operational.
Bug: 35028230
Change-Id: I1e9303e9d007c0c9a3021c874340156748dff5f5
Cryptfs uses keymaster for key derivation. Vold has a C++ abstraction
for Keymaster. However, cryptfs, being a pure C implementation, uses
its own abstraction of the keymaster HAL.
This patch expresses cryptfs' keymaster abstraction in terms of
vold's C++ Keymaster abstraction, consolidating the code base to a
single point where the actual keymaster HAL is beeing used.
Test: marlin device boots with FBE enabled
Change-Id: Ia51fed5508e06fd6c436cca193791e57e0ab99ea
The formatting here is inconsistent with Android house style; use
clang-format to bring it back into line.
Change-Id: Id1fe6ff54e9b668ca88c3fc021ae0a5bdd1327eb
Google/Android C++ style requires that arguments passed in for writing
should be pointers, not references, so that it's visible in the caller
that they'll be written to.
Bug: 27566014
Change-Id: I5cd55906cc4b2f61c8b97b223786be0b3ce28862
Added a new call change_user_key which changes the way that disk
encryption keys are protected; a key can now be protected with a
combination of an auth token and a secret which is a hashed password.
Both of these are passed to unlock_user_key.
This change introduces a security bug, b/26948053, which must be fixed
before we ship.
Bug: 22950892
Change-Id: Iac1e45bb6f86f2af5c472c70a0fe3228b02115bf
The key storage module didn't comply with Android coding standards
and had room for improvemnet in a few other ways, so have cleaned up.
Change-Id: I260ccff316423169cf887e538113b5ea400892f2
Instead of writing raw keys, encrypt the keys with keymaster. This
paves the way to protecting them with auth tokens and passwords later.
In addition, fold in the hash of a 16k file into their encryption, to
ensure secure deletion works properly.
Now even C++ier!
Bug: 22502684
Bug: 22950892
Change-Id: If70f139e342373533c42d5a298444b8438428322
