/* * Copyright (C) 2015 The Android Open Source Project * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #include "Ext4Crypt.h" #include "KeyStorage.h" #include "Utils.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "key_control.h" #include "cryptfs.h" #include "ext4_crypt.h" #define LOG_TAG "Ext4Crypt" #define EMULATED_USES_SELINUX 0 #include #include #include #include #include #include using android::base::StringPrintf; using android::vold::kEmptyAuthentication; // NOTE: keep in sync with StorageManager static constexpr int FLAG_STORAGE_DE = 1 << 0; static constexpr int FLAG_STORAGE_CE = 1 << 1; namespace { // Key length in bits const int key_length = 128; static_assert(key_length % 8 == 0, "Key length must be multiple of 8 bits"); const std::string device_key_dir = std::string() + DATA_MNT_POINT + "/unencrypted"; const std::string device_key_path = device_key_dir + "/key"; const std::string device_key_temp = device_key_dir + "/temp"; const std::string user_key_dir = std::string() + DATA_MNT_POINT + "/misc/vold/user_keys"; const std::string user_key_temp = user_key_dir + "/temp"; bool s_global_de_initialized = false; // Some users are ephemeral, don't try to wipe their keys from disk std::set s_ephemeral_users; // Map user ids to key references std::map s_de_key_raw_refs; std::map s_ce_key_raw_refs; // TODO abolish this map. Keys should not be long-lived in user memory, only kernel memory. // See b/26948053 std::map s_ce_keys; // ext4enc:TODO get this const from somewhere good const int EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE = 8; // ext4enc:TODO Include structure from somewhere sensible // MUST be in sync with ext4_crypto.c in kernel const int EXT4_MAX_KEY_SIZE = 64; const int EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS = 1; struct ext4_encryption_key { uint32_t mode; char raw[EXT4_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; uint32_t size; }; } // TODO replace with proper function to test for file encryption bool e4crypt_is_native() { char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX]; property_get("ro.crypto.type", value, "none"); return !strcmp(value, "file"); } static bool e4crypt_is_emulated() { return property_get_bool("persist.sys.emulate_fbe", false); } static const char* escape_null(const char* value) { return (value == nullptr) ? "null" : value; } // Get raw keyref - used to make keyname and to pass to ioctl static std::string generate_key_ref(const char* key, int length) { SHA512_CTX c; SHA512_Init(&c); SHA512_Update(&c, key, length); unsigned char key_ref1[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; SHA512_Final(key_ref1, &c); SHA512_Init(&c); SHA512_Update(&c, key_ref1, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH); unsigned char key_ref2[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; SHA512_Final(key_ref2, &c); return std::string((char*)key_ref2, EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE); } static ext4_encryption_key fill_key(const std::string &key) { // ext4enc:TODO Currently raw key is required to be of length // sizeof(ext4_key.raw) == EXT4_MAX_KEY_SIZE, so zero pad to // this length. Change when kernel bug is fixed. ext4_encryption_key ext4_key = {EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS, {0}, sizeof(ext4_key.raw)}; memset(ext4_key.raw, 0, sizeof(ext4_key.raw)); static_assert(key_length / 8 <= sizeof(ext4_key.raw), "Key too long!"); memcpy(ext4_key.raw, &key[0], key.size()); return ext4_key; } static std::string keyname(const std::string &raw_ref) { std::ostringstream o; o << "ext4:"; for (auto i = raw_ref.begin(); i != raw_ref.end(); ++i) { o << std::hex << std::setw(2) << std::setfill('0') << (int)*i; } return o.str(); } // Get the keyring we store all keys in static key_serial_t e4crypt_keyring() { return keyctl_search(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, "keyring", "e4crypt", 0); } // Install password into global keyring // Return raw key reference for use in policy static bool install_key(const std::string &key, std::string &raw_ref) { if (key.size() != key_length/8) { LOG(ERROR) << "Wrong size key " << key.size(); return false; } auto ext4_key = fill_key(key); raw_ref = generate_key_ref(ext4_key.raw, ext4_key.size); auto ref = keyname(raw_ref); key_serial_t device_keyring = e4crypt_keyring(); key_serial_t key_id = add_key("logon", ref.c_str(), (void*)&ext4_key, sizeof(ext4_key), device_keyring); if (key_id == -1) { PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to insert key into keyring " << device_keyring; return false; } LOG(INFO) << "Added key " << key_id << " (" << ref << ") to keyring " << device_keyring << " in process " << getpid(); return true; } static std::string get_de_key_path(userid_t user_id) { return StringPrintf("%s/de/%d", user_key_dir.c_str(), user_id); } static std::string get_ce_key_path(userid_t user_id) { return StringPrintf("%s/ce/%d/current", user_key_dir.c_str(), user_id); } static bool read_and_install_user_ce_key( userid_t user_id, const android::vold::KeyAuthentication &auth) { if (s_ce_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) != 0) return true; const auto ce_key_path = get_ce_key_path(user_id); std::string ce_key; if (!android::vold::retrieveKey(ce_key_path, auth, ce_key)) return false; std::string ce_raw_ref; if (!install_key(ce_key, ce_raw_ref)) return false; s_ce_keys[user_id] = ce_key; s_ce_key_raw_refs[user_id] = ce_raw_ref; LOG(DEBUG) << "Installed ce key for user " << user_id; return true; } static bool prepare_dir(const std::string &dir, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { LOG(DEBUG) << "Preparing: " << dir; if (fs_prepare_dir(dir.c_str(), mode, uid, gid) != 0) { PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare " << dir; return false; } return true; } static bool random_key(std::string &key) { if (android::vold::ReadRandomBytes(key_length / 8, key) != 0) { // TODO status_t plays badly with PLOG, fix it. LOG(ERROR) << "Random read failed"; return false; } return true; } static bool path_exists(const std::string &path) { return access(path.c_str(), F_OK) == 0; } // NB this assumes that there is only one thread listening for crypt commands, because // it creates keys in a fixed location. static bool store_key(const std::string &key_path, const std::string &tmp_path, const android::vold::KeyAuthentication &auth, const std::string &key) { if (path_exists(key_path)) { LOG(ERROR) << "Already exists, cannot create key at: " << key_path; return false; } if (path_exists(tmp_path)) { android::vold::destroyKey(tmp_path); } if (!android::vold::storeKey(tmp_path, auth, key)) return false; if (rename(tmp_path.c_str(), key_path.c_str()) != 0) { PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to move new key to location: " << key_path; return false; } LOG(DEBUG) << "Created key " << key_path; return true; } static bool create_and_install_user_keys(userid_t user_id, bool create_ephemeral) { std::string de_key, ce_key; if (!random_key(de_key)) return false; if (!random_key(ce_key)) return false; if (create_ephemeral) { // If the key should be created as ephemeral, don't store it. s_ephemeral_users.insert(user_id); } else { if (!store_key(get_de_key_path(user_id), user_key_temp, kEmptyAuthentication, de_key)) return false; if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir + "/ce/" + std::to_string(user_id), 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false; if (!store_key(get_ce_key_path(user_id), user_key_temp, kEmptyAuthentication, ce_key)) return false; } std::string de_raw_ref; if (!install_key(de_key, de_raw_ref)) return false; s_de_key_raw_refs[user_id] = de_raw_ref; std::string ce_raw_ref; if (!install_key(ce_key, ce_raw_ref)) return false; s_ce_keys[user_id] = ce_key; s_ce_key_raw_refs[user_id] = ce_raw_ref; LOG(DEBUG) << "Created keys for user " << user_id; return true; } static bool lookup_key_ref(const std::map &key_map, userid_t user_id, std::string &raw_ref) { auto refi = key_map.find(user_id); if (refi == key_map.end()) { LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot find key for " << user_id; return false; } raw_ref = refi->second; return true; } static bool ensure_policy(const std::string &raw_ref, const std::string& path) { if (e4crypt_policy_ensure(path.c_str(), raw_ref.data(), raw_ref.size()) != 0) { LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set policy on: " << path; return false; } return true; } static bool is_numeric(const char *name) { for (const char *p = name; *p != '\0'; p++) { if (!isdigit(*p)) return false; } return true; } static bool load_all_de_keys() { auto de_dir = user_key_dir + "/de"; auto dirp = std::unique_ptr(opendir(de_dir.c_str()), closedir); if (!dirp) { PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to read de key directory"; return false; } for (;;) { errno = 0; auto entry = readdir(dirp.get()); if (!entry) { if (errno) { PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to read de key directory"; return false; } break; } if (entry->d_type != DT_DIR || !is_numeric(entry->d_name)) { LOG(DEBUG) << "Skipping non-de-key " << entry->d_name; continue; } userid_t user_id = atoi(entry->d_name); if (s_de_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) == 0) { auto key_path = de_dir + "/" + entry->d_name; std::string key; if (!android::vold::retrieveKey(key_path, kEmptyAuthentication, key)) return false; std::string raw_ref; if (!install_key(key, raw_ref)) return false; s_de_key_raw_refs[user_id] = raw_ref; LOG(DEBUG) << "Installed de key for user " << user_id; } } // ext4enc:TODO: go through all DE directories, ensure that all user dirs have the // correct policy set on them, and that no rogue ones exist. return true; } bool e4crypt_initialize_global_de() { LOG(INFO) << "e4crypt_initialize_global_de"; if (s_global_de_initialized) { LOG(INFO) << "Already initialized"; return true; } std::string device_key; if (path_exists(device_key_path)) { if (!android::vold::retrieveKey(device_key_path, kEmptyAuthentication, device_key)) return false; } else { LOG(INFO) << "Creating new key"; if (!random_key(device_key)) return false; if (!store_key(device_key_path, device_key_temp, kEmptyAuthentication, device_key)) return false; } std::string device_key_ref; if (!install_key(device_key, device_key_ref)) { LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to install device key"; return false; } std::string ref_filename = std::string("/data") + e4crypt_key_ref; if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile(device_key_ref, ref_filename)) { PLOG(ERROR) << "Cannot save key reference"; return false; } s_global_de_initialized = true; return true; } bool e4crypt_init_user0() { LOG(DEBUG) << "e4crypt_init_user0"; if (e4crypt_is_native()) { if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir, 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false; if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir + "/ce", 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false; if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir + "/de", 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false; auto de_path = get_de_key_path(0); auto ce_path = get_ce_key_path(0); if (!path_exists(de_path) || !path_exists(ce_path)) { if (path_exists(de_path)) { android::vold::destroyKey(de_path); // Ignore failure } if (path_exists(ce_path)) { android::vold::destroyKey(ce_path); // Ignore failure } if (!create_and_install_user_keys(0, false)) return false; } // TODO: switch to loading only DE_0 here once framework makes // explicit calls to install DE keys for secondary users if (!load_all_de_keys()) return false; } // We can only safely prepare DE storage here, since CE keys are probably // entangled with user credentials. The framework will always prepare CE // storage once CE keys are installed. if (!e4crypt_prepare_user_storage(nullptr, 0, 0, FLAG_STORAGE_DE)) { LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare user 0 storage"; return false; } // If this is a non-FBE device that recently left an emulated mode, // restore user data directories to known-good state. if (!e4crypt_is_native() && !e4crypt_is_emulated()) { e4crypt_unlock_user_key(0, 0, "!", "!"); } return true; } bool e4crypt_vold_create_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial, bool ephemeral) { LOG(DEBUG) << "e4crypt_vold_create_user_key for " << user_id << " serial " << serial; if (!e4crypt_is_native()) { return true; } // FIXME test for existence of key that is not loaded yet if (s_ce_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) != 0) { LOG(ERROR) << "Already exists, can't e4crypt_vold_create_user_key for " << user_id << " serial " << serial; // FIXME should we fail the command? return true; } if (!create_and_install_user_keys(user_id, ephemeral)) { return false; } // TODO: create second key for user_de data return true; } static bool evict_key(const std::string &raw_ref) { auto ref = keyname(raw_ref); auto key_serial = keyctl_search(e4crypt_keyring(), "logon", ref.c_str(), 0); if (keyctl_revoke(key_serial) != 0) { PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to revoke key with serial " << key_serial << " ref " << ref; return false; } LOG(DEBUG) << "Revoked key with serial " << key_serial << " ref " << ref; return true; } bool e4crypt_destroy_user_key(userid_t user_id) { LOG(DEBUG) << "e4crypt_destroy_user_key(" << user_id << ")"; if (!e4crypt_is_native()) { return true; } bool success = true; s_ce_keys.erase(user_id); std::string raw_ref; success &= lookup_key_ref(s_ce_key_raw_refs, user_id, raw_ref) && evict_key(raw_ref); s_ce_key_raw_refs.erase(user_id); success &= lookup_key_ref(s_de_key_raw_refs, user_id, raw_ref) && evict_key(raw_ref); s_de_key_raw_refs.erase(user_id); auto it = s_ephemeral_users.find(user_id); if (it != s_ephemeral_users.end()) { s_ephemeral_users.erase(it); } else { success &= android::vold::destroyKey(get_ce_key_path(user_id)); success &= android::vold::destroyKey(get_de_key_path(user_id)); } return success; } static bool emulated_lock(const std::string& path) { if (chmod(path.c_str(), 0000) != 0) { PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to chmod " << path; return false; } #if EMULATED_USES_SELINUX if (setfilecon(path.c_str(), "u:object_r:storage_stub_file:s0") != 0) { PLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to setfilecon " << path; return false; } #endif return true; } static bool emulated_unlock(const std::string& path, mode_t mode) { if (chmod(path.c_str(), mode) != 0) { PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to chmod " << path; // FIXME temporary workaround for b/26713622 if (e4crypt_is_emulated()) return false; } #if EMULATED_USES_SELINUX if (selinux_android_restorecon(path.c_str(), SELINUX_ANDROID_RESTORECON_FORCE) != 0) { PLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to restorecon " << path; // FIXME temporary workaround for b/26713622 if (e4crypt_is_emulated()) return false; } #endif return true; } static bool parse_hex(const char *hex, std::string &result) { if (strcmp("!", hex) == 0) { result = ""; return true; } if (android::vold::HexToStr(hex, result) != 0) { LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid FBE hex string"; // Don't log the string for security reasons return false; } return true; } bool e4crypt_change_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial, const char* token_hex, const char* old_secret_hex, const char* new_secret_hex) { LOG(DEBUG) << "e4crypt_change_user_key " << user_id << " serial=" << serial << " token_present=" << (strcmp(token_hex, "!") != 0); if (!e4crypt_is_native()) return true; if (s_ephemeral_users.count(user_id) != 0) return true; std::string token, old_secret, new_secret; if (!parse_hex(token_hex, token)) return false; if (!parse_hex(old_secret_hex, old_secret)) return false; if (!parse_hex(new_secret_hex, new_secret)) return false; auto auth = new_secret.empty() ? kEmptyAuthentication : android::vold::KeyAuthentication(token, new_secret); auto it = s_ce_keys.find(user_id); if (it == s_ce_keys.end()) { LOG(ERROR) << "Key not loaded into memory, can't change for user " << user_id; return false; } auto ce_key = it->second; auto ce_key_path = get_ce_key_path(user_id); android::vold::destroyKey(ce_key_path); if (!store_key(ce_key_path, user_key_temp, auth, ce_key)) return false; return true; } // TODO: rename to 'install' for consistency, and take flags to know which keys to install bool e4crypt_unlock_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial, const char* token_hex, const char* secret_hex) { LOG(DEBUG) << "e4crypt_unlock_user_key " << user_id << " serial=" << serial << " token_present=" << (strcmp(token_hex, "!") != 0); if (e4crypt_is_native()) { if (s_ce_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) != 0) { LOG(WARNING) << "Tried to unlock already-unlocked key for user " << user_id; return true; } std::string token, secret; if (!parse_hex(token_hex, token)) return false; if (!parse_hex(secret_hex, secret)) return false; android::vold::KeyAuthentication auth(token, secret); if (!read_and_install_user_ce_key(user_id, auth)) { LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't read key for " << user_id; return false; } } else { // When in emulation mode, we just use chmod. However, we also // unlock directories when not in emulation mode, to bring devices // back into a known-good state. if (!emulated_unlock(android::vold::BuildDataSystemCePath(user_id), 0771) || !emulated_unlock(android::vold::BuildDataMiscCePath(user_id), 01771) || !emulated_unlock(android::vold::BuildDataMediaPath(nullptr, user_id), 0770) || !emulated_unlock(android::vold::BuildDataUserPath(nullptr, user_id), 0771)) { LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to unlock user " << user_id; return false; } } return true; } // TODO: rename to 'evict' for consistency bool e4crypt_lock_user_key(userid_t user_id) { if (e4crypt_is_native()) { // TODO: remove from kernel keyring } else if (e4crypt_is_emulated()) { // When in emulation mode, we just use chmod if (!emulated_lock(android::vold::BuildDataSystemCePath(user_id)) || !emulated_lock(android::vold::BuildDataMiscCePath(user_id)) || !emulated_lock(android::vold::BuildDataMediaPath(nullptr, user_id)) || !emulated_lock(android::vold::BuildDataUserPath(nullptr, user_id))) { LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to lock user " << user_id; return false; } } return true; } bool e4crypt_prepare_user_storage(const char* volume_uuid, userid_t user_id, int serial, int flags) { LOG(DEBUG) << "e4crypt_prepare_user_storage for volume " << escape_null(volume_uuid) << ", user " << user_id << ", serial " << serial << ", flags " << flags; if (flags & FLAG_STORAGE_DE) { auto system_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataSystemDePath(user_id); auto misc_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataMiscDePath(user_id); auto user_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataUserDePath(volume_uuid, user_id); if (!prepare_dir(system_de_path, 0770, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false; if (!prepare_dir(misc_de_path, 01771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_MISC)) return false; if (!prepare_dir(user_de_path, 0771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false; if (e4crypt_is_native()) { std::string de_raw_ref; if (!lookup_key_ref(s_de_key_raw_refs, user_id, de_raw_ref)) return false; if (!ensure_policy(de_raw_ref, system_de_path)) return false; if (!ensure_policy(de_raw_ref, misc_de_path)) return false; if (!ensure_policy(de_raw_ref, user_de_path)) return false; } } if (flags & FLAG_STORAGE_CE) { auto system_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataSystemCePath(user_id); auto misc_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataMiscCePath(user_id); auto media_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataMediaPath(volume_uuid, user_id); auto user_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataUserPath(volume_uuid, user_id); if (!prepare_dir(system_ce_path, 0770, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false; if (!prepare_dir(misc_ce_path, 01771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_MISC)) return false; if (!prepare_dir(media_ce_path, 0770, AID_MEDIA_RW, AID_MEDIA_RW)) return false; if (!prepare_dir(user_ce_path, 0771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false; if (e4crypt_is_native()) { std::string ce_raw_ref; if (!lookup_key_ref(s_ce_key_raw_refs, user_id, ce_raw_ref)) return false; if (!ensure_policy(ce_raw_ref, system_ce_path)) return false; if (!ensure_policy(ce_raw_ref, misc_ce_path)) return false; if (!ensure_policy(ce_raw_ref, media_ce_path)) return false; if (!ensure_policy(ce_raw_ref, user_ce_path)) return false; } } return true; }