platform_system_vold/MetadataCrypt.cpp
Barani Muthukumaran 3dfb094cb2 vold: Support Storage keys for FBE
To prevent keys from being compromised if an attacker
acquires read access to kernel memory, some inline
encryption hardware supports protecting the keys in
hardware without software having access to or the
ability to set the plaintext keys.  Instead, software
only sees "wrapped keys", which may differ on every boot.

'wrappedkey_v0' fileencryption flag is used to denote
that the device supports inline encryption hardware that
supports this feature. On such devices keymaster is used
to generate keys with STORAGE_KEY tag and export a
per-boot ephemerally wrapped storage key to install it in
the kernel.

The wrapped key framework in the linux kernel ensures the
wrapped key is provided to the inline encryption hardware
where it is unwrapped and the file contents key is derived
to encrypt contents without revealing the plaintext key in
the clear.

Test: FBE validation with Fscrypt v2 + inline crypt + wrapped
key changes kernel.

Bug: 147733587

Change-Id: I1f0de61b56534ec1df9baef075acb74bacd00758
2020-02-12 14:26:26 -08:00

291 lines
11 KiB
C++

/*
* Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include "MetadataCrypt.h"
#include "KeyBuffer.h"
#include <algorithm>
#include <string>
#include <thread>
#include <vector>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <android-base/file.h>
#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <android-base/properties.h>
#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
#include <cutils/fs.h>
#include <fs_mgr.h>
#include <libdm/dm.h>
#include "Checkpoint.h"
#include "EncryptInplace.h"
#include "KeyStorage.h"
#include "KeyUtil.h"
#include "Keymaster.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include "VoldUtil.h"
#define TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES 10
using android::fs_mgr::FstabEntry;
using android::fs_mgr::GetEntryForMountPoint;
using android::vold::KeyBuffer;
using namespace android::dm;
static const std::string kDmNameUserdata = "userdata";
static const char* kFn_keymaster_key_blob = "keymaster_key_blob";
static const char* kFn_keymaster_key_blob_upgraded = "keymaster_key_blob_upgraded";
static bool mount_via_fs_mgr(const char* mount_point, const char* blk_device) {
// We're about to mount data not verified by verified boot. Tell Keymaster that early boot has
// ended.
//
// TODO(paulcrowley): Make a Keymaster singleton or something, so we don't have to repeatedly
// open and initialize the service.
::android::vold::Keymaster keymaster;
keymaster.earlyBootEnded();
// fs_mgr_do_mount runs fsck. Use setexeccon to run trusted
// partitions in the fsck domain.
if (setexeccon(android::vold::sFsckContext)) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to setexeccon";
return false;
}
auto mount_rc = fs_mgr_do_mount(&fstab_default, const_cast<char*>(mount_point),
const_cast<char*>(blk_device), nullptr,
android::vold::cp_needsCheckpoint());
if (setexeccon(nullptr)) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to clear setexeccon";
return false;
}
if (mount_rc != 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "fs_mgr_do_mount failed with rc " << mount_rc;
return false;
}
LOG(DEBUG) << "Mounted " << mount_point;
return true;
}
namespace android {
namespace vold {
// Note: It is possible to orphan a key if it is removed before deleting
// Update this once keymaster APIs change, and we have a proper commit.
static void commit_key(const std::string& dir) {
while (!android::base::WaitForProperty("vold.checkpoint_committed", "1")) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Wait for boot timed out";
}
Keymaster keymaster;
auto keyPath = dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob;
auto newKeyPath = dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob_upgraded;
std::string key;
if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(keyPath, &key)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to read old key: " << dir;
return;
}
if (rename(newKeyPath.c_str(), keyPath.c_str()) != 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to move upgraded key to location: " << keyPath;
return;
}
if (!keymaster.deleteKey(key)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Key deletion failed during upgrade, continuing anyway: " << dir;
}
LOG(INFO) << "Old Key deleted: " << dir;
}
static bool retrieveMetadataKey(bool create_if_absent, const std::string& key_path,
const std::string& tmp_path, KeyBuffer* key, bool keepOld) {
if (pathExists(key_path)) {
LOG(DEBUG) << "Key exists, using: " << key_path;
if (!retrieveKey(key_path, kEmptyAuthentication, key, keepOld)) return false;
} else {
if (!create_if_absent) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No key found in " << key_path;
return false;
}
LOG(INFO) << "Creating new key in " << key_path;
if (!randomKey(key)) return false;
if (!storeKeyAtomically(key_path, tmp_path, kEmptyAuthentication, *key)) return false;
}
return true;
}
static bool read_key(const FstabEntry& data_rec, bool create_if_absent, KeyBuffer* key) {
if (data_rec.metadata_key_dir.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get metadata_key_dir";
return false;
}
std::string metadata_key_dir = data_rec.metadata_key_dir;
std::string sKey;
auto dir = metadata_key_dir + "/key";
LOG(DEBUG) << "metadata_key_dir/key: " << dir;
if (fs_mkdirs(dir.c_str(), 0700)) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Creating directories: " << dir;
return false;
}
auto temp = metadata_key_dir + "/tmp";
auto newKeyPath = dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob_upgraded;
/* If we have a leftover upgraded key, delete it.
* We either failed an update and must return to the old key,
* or we rebooted before commiting the keys in a freak accident.
* Either way, we can re-upgrade the key if we need to.
*/
Keymaster keymaster;
if (pathExists(newKeyPath)) {
if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(newKeyPath, &sKey))
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to read old key: " << dir;
else if (!keymaster.deleteKey(sKey))
LOG(ERROR) << "Old key deletion failed, continuing anyway: " << dir;
else
unlink(newKeyPath.c_str());
}
bool needs_cp = cp_needsCheckpoint();
if (!retrieveMetadataKey(create_if_absent, dir, temp, key, needs_cp)) return false;
if (needs_cp && pathExists(newKeyPath)) std::thread(commit_key, dir).detach();
return true;
}
} // namespace vold
} // namespace android
static bool get_number_of_sectors(const std::string& real_blkdev, uint64_t* nr_sec) {
if (android::vold::GetBlockDev512Sectors(real_blkdev, nr_sec) != android::OK) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to measure size of " << real_blkdev;
return false;
}
return true;
}
static std::string lookup_cipher(const std::string& cipher_name, bool is_legacy) {
if (is_legacy) {
if (cipher_name.empty() || cipher_name == "aes-256-xts") {
return "AES-256-XTS";
}
} else {
if (cipher_name.empty() || cipher_name == "aes-256-xts") {
return "aes-xts-plain64";
} else if (cipher_name == "adiantum") {
return "xchacha12,aes-adiantum-plain64";
}
}
LOG(ERROR) << "No metadata cipher named " << cipher_name << " found, is_legacy=" << is_legacy;
return "";
}
static bool create_crypto_blk_dev(const std::string& dm_name, const FstabEntry* data_rec,
const KeyBuffer& key, std::string* crypto_blkdev) {
uint64_t nr_sec;
if (!get_number_of_sectors(data_rec->blk_device, &nr_sec)) return false;
bool is_legacy;
if (!DmTargetDefaultKey::IsLegacy(&is_legacy)) return false;
auto cipher = lookup_cipher(data_rec->metadata_cipher, is_legacy);
if (cipher.empty()) return false;
KeyBuffer hex_key_buffer;
if (android::vold::StrToHex(key, hex_key_buffer) != android::OK) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to turn key to hex";
return false;
}
std::string hex_key(hex_key_buffer.data(), hex_key_buffer.size());
// Non-legacy driver always sets DUN
bool set_dun = !is_legacy || android::base::GetBoolProperty("ro.crypto.set_dun", false);
if (!set_dun && data_rec->fs_mgr_flags.checkpoint_blk) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Block checkpoints and metadata encryption require ro.crypto.set_dun option";
return false;
}
DmTable table;
table.Emplace<DmTargetDefaultKey>(0, nr_sec, cipher, hex_key, data_rec->blk_device, 0,
is_legacy, set_dun);
auto& dm = DeviceMapper::Instance();
for (int i = 0;; i++) {
if (dm.CreateDevice(dm_name, table)) {
break;
}
if (i + 1 >= TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Could not create default-key device " << dm_name;
return false;
}
PLOG(INFO) << "Could not create default-key device, retrying";
usleep(500000);
}
if (!dm.GetDmDevicePathByName(dm_name, crypto_blkdev)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot retrieve default-key device status " << dm_name;
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool fscrypt_mount_metadata_encrypted(const std::string& blk_device, const std::string& mount_point,
bool needs_encrypt) {
LOG(DEBUG) << "fscrypt_mount_metadata_encrypted: " << mount_point << " " << needs_encrypt;
auto encrypted_state = android::base::GetProperty("ro.crypto.state", "");
if (encrypted_state != "" && encrypted_state != "encrypted") {
LOG(DEBUG) << "fscrypt_enable_crypto got unexpected starting state: " << encrypted_state;
return false;
}
auto data_rec = GetEntryForMountPoint(&fstab_default, mount_point);
if (!data_rec) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get data_rec for " << mount_point;
return false;
}
if (blk_device != data_rec->blk_device) {
LOG(ERROR) << "blk_device " << blk_device << " does not match fstab entry "
<< data_rec->blk_device << " for " << mount_point;
return false;
}
KeyBuffer key;
if (!read_key(*data_rec, needs_encrypt, &key)) return false;
std::string crypto_blkdev;
if (!create_crypto_blk_dev(kDmNameUserdata, data_rec, key, &crypto_blkdev)) return false;
// FIXME handle the corrupt case
if (needs_encrypt) {
uint64_t nr_sec;
if (!get_number_of_sectors(data_rec->blk_device, &nr_sec)) return false;
LOG(INFO) << "Beginning inplace encryption, nr_sec: " << nr_sec;
off64_t size_already_done = 0;
auto rc = cryptfs_enable_inplace(crypto_blkdev.data(), blk_device.data(), nr_sec,
&size_already_done, nr_sec, 0, false);
if (rc != 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Inplace crypto failed with code: " << rc;
return false;
}
if (static_cast<uint64_t>(size_already_done) != nr_sec) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Inplace crypto only got up to sector: " << size_already_done;
return false;
}
LOG(INFO) << "Inplace encryption complete";
}
LOG(DEBUG) << "Mounting metadata-encrypted filesystem:" << mount_point;
mount_via_fs_mgr(data_rec->mount_point.c_str(), crypto_blkdev.c_str());
return true;
}