a827f55629
* Comment out unused function. Bug: 66996870 Test: build with WITH_TIDY=1 Change-Id: I18db09be2ff8ef27f822876a6832ca5f08ce939f Merged-In: I7a23573af0d664a5f39f1cde3a22ac0001dac1ac
480 lines
16 KiB
C++
480 lines
16 KiB
C++
/*
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**
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** Copyright 2017, The Android Open Source Project
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**
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** Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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** you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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** You may obtain a copy of the License at
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**
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** http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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**
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** Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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** distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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** WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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** See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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** limitations under the License.
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*/
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#define LOG_TAG "scrypt_test"
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#include <log/log.h>
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#include <hardware/keymaster0.h>
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#include <hardware/keymaster1.h>
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#include <cstring>
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#include <gtest/gtest.h>
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#include "../cryptfs.h"
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#include "../Keymaster.h"
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#ifdef CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION
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#include "cryptfs_hw.h"
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#endif
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#define min(a, b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b))
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/* Maximum allowed keymaster blob size. */
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#define KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE 2048
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/* Key Derivation Function algorithms */
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#define KDF_PBKDF2 1
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#define KDF_SCRYPT 2
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/* Algorithms 3 & 4 deprecated before shipping outside of google, so removed */
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#define KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER 5
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#define KEY_LEN_BYTES 16
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#define DEFAULT_PASSWORD "default_password"
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#define RSA_KEY_SIZE 2048
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#define RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES (RSA_KEY_SIZE / 8)
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#define RSA_EXPONENT 0x10001
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#define KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT 1 // Maximum one try per second
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static int keymaster_init(keymaster0_device_t **keymaster0_dev,
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keymaster1_device_t **keymaster1_dev)
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{
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int rc;
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const hw_module_t* mod;
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rc = hw_get_module_by_class(KEYSTORE_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, NULL, &mod);
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if (rc) {
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ALOGE("could not find any keystore module");
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goto err;
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}
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SLOGI("keymaster module name is %s", mod->name);
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SLOGI("keymaster version is %d", mod->module_api_version);
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*keymaster0_dev = NULL;
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*keymaster1_dev = NULL;
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if (mod->module_api_version == KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_1_0) {
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SLOGI("Found keymaster1 module, using keymaster1 API.");
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rc = keymaster1_open(mod, keymaster1_dev);
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} else {
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SLOGI("Found keymaster0 module, using keymaster0 API.");
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rc = keymaster0_open(mod, keymaster0_dev);
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}
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if (rc) {
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ALOGE("could not open keymaster device in %s (%s)",
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KEYSTORE_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, strerror(-rc));
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goto err;
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}
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return 0;
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err:
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*keymaster0_dev = NULL;
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*keymaster1_dev = NULL;
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return rc;
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}
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/* Should we use keymaster? */
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static int keymaster_check_compatibility_old()
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{
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keymaster0_device_t *keymaster0_dev = 0;
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keymaster1_device_t *keymaster1_dev = 0;
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int rc = 0;
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if (keymaster_init(&keymaster0_dev, &keymaster1_dev)) {
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SLOGE("Failed to init keymaster");
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rc = -1;
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goto out;
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}
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if (keymaster1_dev) {
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rc = 1;
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goto out;
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}
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if (!keymaster0_dev || !keymaster0_dev->common.module) {
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rc = -1;
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goto out;
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}
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// TODO(swillden): Check to see if there's any reason to require v0.3. I think v0.1 and v0.2
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// should work.
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if (keymaster0_dev->common.module->module_api_version
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< KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_0_3) {
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rc = 0;
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goto out;
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}
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if (!(keymaster0_dev->flags & KEYMASTER_SOFTWARE_ONLY) &&
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(keymaster0_dev->flags & KEYMASTER_BLOBS_ARE_STANDALONE)) {
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rc = 1;
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}
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out:
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if (keymaster1_dev) {
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keymaster1_close(keymaster1_dev);
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}
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if (keymaster0_dev) {
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keymaster0_close(keymaster0_dev);
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}
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return rc;
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}
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/* Create a new keymaster key and store it in this footer */
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static int keymaster_create_key_old(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *ftr)
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{
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uint8_t* key = 0;
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keymaster0_device_t *keymaster0_dev = 0;
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keymaster1_device_t *keymaster1_dev = 0;
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if (ftr->keymaster_blob_size) {
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SLOGI("Already have key");
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return 0;
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}
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if (keymaster_init(&keymaster0_dev, &keymaster1_dev)) {
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SLOGE("Failed to init keymaster");
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return -1;
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}
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int rc = 0;
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size_t key_size = 0;
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if (keymaster1_dev) {
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keymaster_key_param_t params[] = {
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/* Algorithm & size specifications. Stick with RSA for now. Switch to AES later. */
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keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_ALGORITHM, KM_ALGORITHM_RSA),
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keymaster_param_int(KM_TAG_KEY_SIZE, RSA_KEY_SIZE),
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keymaster_param_long(KM_TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, RSA_EXPONENT),
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/* The only allowed purpose for this key is signing. */
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keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_SIGN),
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/* Padding & digest specifications. */
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keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_NONE),
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keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_NONE),
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/* Require that the key be usable in standalone mode. File system isn't available. */
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keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS, KM_BLOB_STANDALONE),
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/* No auth requirements, because cryptfs is not yet integrated with gatekeeper. */
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keymaster_param_bool(KM_TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
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/* Rate-limit key usage attempts, to rate-limit brute force */
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keymaster_param_int(KM_TAG_MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS, KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT),
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};
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keymaster_key_param_set_t param_set = { params, sizeof(params)/sizeof(*params) };
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keymaster_key_blob_t key_blob;
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keymaster_error_t error = keymaster1_dev->generate_key(keymaster1_dev, ¶m_set,
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&key_blob,
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NULL /* characteristics */);
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if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
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SLOGE("Failed to generate keymaster1 key, error %d", error);
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rc = -1;
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goto out;
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}
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key = (uint8_t*)key_blob.key_material;
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key_size = key_blob.key_material_size;
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}
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else if (keymaster0_dev) {
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keymaster_rsa_keygen_params_t params;
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memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
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params.public_exponent = RSA_EXPONENT;
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params.modulus_size = RSA_KEY_SIZE;
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if (keymaster0_dev->generate_keypair(keymaster0_dev, TYPE_RSA, ¶ms,
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&key, &key_size)) {
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SLOGE("Failed to generate keypair");
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rc = -1;
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goto out;
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}
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} else {
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SLOGE("Cryptfs bug: keymaster_init succeeded but didn't initialize a device");
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rc = -1;
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goto out;
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}
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if (key_size > KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE) {
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SLOGE("Keymaster key too large for crypto footer");
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rc = -1;
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goto out;
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}
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memcpy(ftr->keymaster_blob, key, key_size);
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ftr->keymaster_blob_size = key_size;
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out:
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if (keymaster0_dev)
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keymaster0_close(keymaster0_dev);
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if (keymaster1_dev)
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keymaster1_close(keymaster1_dev);
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free(key);
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return rc;
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}
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/* This signs the given object using the keymaster key. */
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static int keymaster_sign_object_old(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *ftr,
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const unsigned char *object,
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const size_t object_size,
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unsigned char **signature,
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size_t *signature_size)
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{
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int rc = 0;
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keymaster0_device_t *keymaster0_dev = 0;
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keymaster1_device_t *keymaster1_dev = 0;
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unsigned char to_sign[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
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size_t to_sign_size = sizeof(to_sign);
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memset(to_sign, 0, RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES);
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if (keymaster_init(&keymaster0_dev, &keymaster1_dev)) {
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SLOGE("Failed to init keymaster");
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rc = -1;
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goto out;
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}
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// To sign a message with RSA, the message must satisfy two
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// constraints:
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//
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// 1. The message, when interpreted as a big-endian numeric value, must
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// be strictly less than the public modulus of the RSA key. Note
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// that because the most significant bit of the public modulus is
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// guaranteed to be 1 (else it's an (n-1)-bit key, not an n-bit
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// key), an n-bit message with most significant bit 0 always
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// satisfies this requirement.
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//
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// 2. The message must have the same length in bits as the public
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// modulus of the RSA key. This requirement isn't mathematically
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// necessary, but is necessary to ensure consistency in
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// implementations.
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switch (ftr->kdf_type) {
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case KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER:
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// This ensures the most significant byte of the signed message
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// is zero. We could have zero-padded to the left instead, but
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// this approach is slightly more robust against changes in
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// object size. However, it's still broken (but not unusably
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// so) because we really should be using a proper deterministic
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// RSA padding function, such as PKCS1.
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memcpy(to_sign + 1, object, min(RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES - 1, object_size));
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SLOGI("Signing safely-padded object");
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break;
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default:
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SLOGE("Unknown KDF type %d", ftr->kdf_type);
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rc = -1;
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goto out;
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}
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if (keymaster0_dev) {
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keymaster_rsa_sign_params_t params;
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params.digest_type = DIGEST_NONE;
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params.padding_type = PADDING_NONE;
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rc = keymaster0_dev->sign_data(keymaster0_dev,
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¶ms,
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ftr->keymaster_blob,
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ftr->keymaster_blob_size,
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to_sign,
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to_sign_size,
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signature,
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signature_size);
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goto out;
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} else if (keymaster1_dev) {
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keymaster_key_blob_t key = { ftr->keymaster_blob, ftr->keymaster_blob_size };
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keymaster_key_param_t params[] = {
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keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_NONE),
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keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_NONE),
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};
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keymaster_key_param_set_t param_set = { params, sizeof(params)/sizeof(*params) };
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keymaster_operation_handle_t op_handle;
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keymaster_error_t error = keymaster1_dev->begin(keymaster1_dev, KM_PURPOSE_SIGN, &key,
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¶m_set, NULL /* out_params */,
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&op_handle);
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if (error == KM_ERROR_KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED) {
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// Key usage has been rate-limited. Wait a bit and try again.
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sleep(KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT);
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error = keymaster1_dev->begin(keymaster1_dev, KM_PURPOSE_SIGN, &key,
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¶m_set, NULL /* out_params */,
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&op_handle);
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}
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if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
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SLOGE("Error starting keymaster signature transaction: %d", error);
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rc = -1;
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goto out;
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}
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keymaster_blob_t input = { to_sign, to_sign_size };
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size_t input_consumed;
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error = keymaster1_dev->update(keymaster1_dev, op_handle, NULL /* in_params */,
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&input, &input_consumed, NULL /* out_params */,
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NULL /* output */);
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if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
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SLOGE("Error sending data to keymaster signature transaction: %d", error);
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rc = -1;
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goto out;
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}
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if (input_consumed != to_sign_size) {
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// This should never happen. If it does, it's a bug in the keymaster implementation.
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SLOGE("Keymaster update() did not consume all data.");
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keymaster1_dev->abort(keymaster1_dev, op_handle);
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rc = -1;
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goto out;
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}
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keymaster_blob_t tmp_sig;
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error = keymaster1_dev->finish(keymaster1_dev, op_handle, NULL /* in_params */,
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NULL /* verify signature */, NULL /* out_params */,
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&tmp_sig);
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if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
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SLOGE("Error finishing keymaster signature transaction: %d", error);
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rc = -1;
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goto out;
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}
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*signature = (uint8_t*)tmp_sig.data;
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*signature_size = tmp_sig.data_length;
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} else {
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SLOGE("Cryptfs bug: keymaster_init succeded but didn't initialize a device.");
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rc = -1;
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goto out;
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}
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out:
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if (keymaster1_dev)
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keymaster1_close(keymaster1_dev);
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if (keymaster0_dev)
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keymaster0_close(keymaster0_dev);
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return rc;
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}
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/* Should we use keymaster? */
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static int keymaster_check_compatibility_new()
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{
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return keymaster_compatibility_cryptfs_scrypt();
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}
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#if 0
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/* Create a new keymaster key and store it in this footer */
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static int keymaster_create_key_new(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *ftr)
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{
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if (ftr->keymaster_blob_size) {
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SLOGI("Already have key");
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return 0;
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}
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int rc = keymaster_create_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(RSA_KEY_SIZE, RSA_EXPONENT,
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KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT, ftr->keymaster_blob, KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE,
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&ftr->keymaster_blob_size);
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if (rc) {
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if (ftr->keymaster_blob_size > KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE) {
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SLOGE("Keymaster key blob to large)");
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ftr->keymaster_blob_size = 0;
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}
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SLOGE("Failed to generate keypair");
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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#endif
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/* This signs the given object using the keymaster key. */
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static int keymaster_sign_object_new(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *ftr,
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const unsigned char *object,
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const size_t object_size,
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unsigned char **signature,
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size_t *signature_size)
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{
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unsigned char to_sign[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
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size_t to_sign_size = sizeof(to_sign);
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memset(to_sign, 0, RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES);
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// To sign a message with RSA, the message must satisfy two
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// constraints:
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//
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// 1. The message, when interpreted as a big-endian numeric value, must
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// be strictly less than the public modulus of the RSA key. Note
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// that because the most significant bit of the public modulus is
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// guaranteed to be 1 (else it's an (n-1)-bit key, not an n-bit
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// key), an n-bit message with most significant bit 0 always
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// satisfies this requirement.
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//
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// 2. The message must have the same length in bits as the public
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// modulus of the RSA key. This requirement isn't mathematically
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// necessary, but is necessary to ensure consistency in
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// implementations.
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switch (ftr->kdf_type) {
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case KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER:
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// This ensures the most significant byte of the signed message
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// is zero. We could have zero-padded to the left instead, but
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// this approach is slightly more robust against changes in
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// object size. However, it's still broken (but not unusably
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// so) because we really should be using a proper deterministic
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// RSA padding function, such as PKCS1.
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memcpy(to_sign + 1, object, min(RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES - 1, object_size));
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SLOGI("Signing safely-padded object");
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break;
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default:
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SLOGE("Unknown KDF type %d", ftr->kdf_type);
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return -1;
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}
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if (keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt(
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ftr->keymaster_blob, ftr->keymaster_blob_size, KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT, to_sign,
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to_sign_size, signature, signature_size) != KeymasterSignResult::ok)
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return -1;
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return 0;
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}
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namespace android {
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class CryptFsTest : public testing::Test {
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protected:
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virtual void SetUp() {
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}
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virtual void TearDown() {
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}
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};
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TEST_F(CryptFsTest, ScryptHidlizationEquivalenceTest) {
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crypt_mnt_ftr ftr;
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ftr.kdf_type = KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER;
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ftr.keymaster_blob_size = 0;
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ASSERT_EQ(0, keymaster_create_key_old(&ftr));
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uint8_t *sig1 = nullptr;
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uint8_t *sig2 = nullptr;
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size_t sig_size1 = 123456789;
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size_t sig_size2 = 123456789;
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uint8_t object[] = "the object";
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ASSERT_EQ(1, keymaster_check_compatibility_old());
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ASSERT_EQ(1, keymaster_check_compatibility_new());
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ASSERT_EQ(0, keymaster_sign_object_old(&ftr, object, 10, &sig1, &sig_size1));
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ASSERT_EQ(0, keymaster_sign_object_new(&ftr, object, 10, &sig2, &sig_size2));
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|
ASSERT_EQ(sig_size1, sig_size2);
|
|
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, sig1);
|
|
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, sig2);
|
|
EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(sig1, sig2, sig_size1));
|
|
free(sig1);
|
|
free(sig2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|