platform_system_sepolicy/prebuilts/api/31.0/public/fsck.te

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# Any fsck program run by init
type fsck, domain;
type fsck_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
# /dev/__null__ created by init prior to policy load,
# open fd inherited by fsck.
allow fsck tmpfs:chr_file { read write ioctl };
# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
allow fsck devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
# Allow stdin/out back to vold
allow fsck vold:fd use;
allow fsck vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
# Run fsck on certain block devices
allow fsck block_device:dir search;
allow fsck userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allow fsck cache_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allow fsck dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
userdebug_or_eng(`
allow fsck system_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
')
# For the block devices where we have ioctl access,
# allow at a minimum the following common fsck ioctls.
allowxperm fsck dev_type:blk_file ioctl {
BLKDISCARDZEROES
BLKROGET
};
# To determine if it is safe to run fsck on a filesystem, e2fsck
# must first determine if the filesystem is mounted. To do that,
# e2fsck scans through /proc/mounts and collects all the mounted
# block devices. With that information, it runs stat() on each block
# device, comparing the major and minor numbers to the filesystem
# passed in on the command line. If there is a match, then the filesystem
# is currently mounted and running fsck is dangerous.
# Allow stat access to all block devices so that fsck can compare
# major/minor values.
allow fsck dev_type:blk_file getattr;
allow fsck {
proc_mounts
proc_swaps
}:file r_file_perms;
allow fsck rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
###
### neverallow rules
###
# fsck should never be run on these block devices
neverallow fsck {
boot_block_device
frp_block_device
recovery_block_device
root_block_device
swap_block_device
system_block_device
userdebug_or_eng(`-system_block_device')
vold_device
}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
# Only allow entry from init or vold via fsck binaries
neverallow { domain -init -vold } fsck:process transition;
neverallow * fsck:process dyntransition;
neverallow fsck { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;