08d4c8fa6e
This commit adds fake 31.0 prebuilt. The prebuilt is based on AOSP policy, but slightly modified so the set of types and attributes is a subset of real 31.0 prebuilt (sc-dev policy). Steps taken to make the fake prebuilt: 1) build plat_sepolicy.cil both on AOSP and sc-dev, with lunch target aosp_arm64-eng. 2) diff both outputs to find out which types and attributes don't exist. 3) remove all relevant files and statements. As a result, the following types are removed. artd artd_exec artd_service power_stats_service transformer_service virtualizationservice virtualizationservice_data_file virtualizationservice_exec Bug: 189161483 Test: N/A, will do after adding 31.0 mapping files. Change-Id: Ia957fc32b1838dae730d9dd7bd917d684d4a24cf Merged-In: Ia4ea2999f4bc8ae80f13e51d99fba3e98e293447
68 lines
2.1 KiB
Text
68 lines
2.1 KiB
Text
# Any fsck program run by init
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type fsck, domain;
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type fsck_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
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# /dev/__null__ created by init prior to policy load,
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# open fd inherited by fsck.
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allow fsck tmpfs:chr_file { read write ioctl };
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# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
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allow fsck devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
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# Allow stdin/out back to vold
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allow fsck vold:fd use;
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allow fsck vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
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# Run fsck on certain block devices
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allow fsck block_device:dir search;
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allow fsck userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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allow fsck cache_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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allow fsck dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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allow fsck system_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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')
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# For the block devices where we have ioctl access,
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# allow at a minimum the following common fsck ioctls.
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allowxperm fsck dev_type:blk_file ioctl {
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BLKDISCARDZEROES
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BLKROGET
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};
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# To determine if it is safe to run fsck on a filesystem, e2fsck
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# must first determine if the filesystem is mounted. To do that,
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# e2fsck scans through /proc/mounts and collects all the mounted
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# block devices. With that information, it runs stat() on each block
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# device, comparing the major and minor numbers to the filesystem
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# passed in on the command line. If there is a match, then the filesystem
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# is currently mounted and running fsck is dangerous.
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# Allow stat access to all block devices so that fsck can compare
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# major/minor values.
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allow fsck dev_type:blk_file getattr;
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allow fsck {
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proc_mounts
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proc_swaps
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}:file r_file_perms;
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allow fsck rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# fsck should never be run on these block devices
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neverallow fsck {
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boot_block_device
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frp_block_device
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recovery_block_device
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root_block_device
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swap_block_device
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system_block_device
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userdebug_or_eng(`-system_block_device')
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vold_device
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}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
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# Only allow entry from init or vold via fsck binaries
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neverallow { domain -init -vold } fsck:process transition;
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neverallow * fsck:process dyntransition;
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neverallow fsck { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;
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