sepolicy: Clean up mls constraints.
Require equivalence for all write operations. We were already doing this for app_data_file as a result of restricting open rather than read/write, so this makes the model consistent across all objects and operations. It also addresses the scenario where we have mixed usage of levelFrom=all and levelFrom=user for different apps on the same device where the dominated-by (domby) relation may not be sufficiently restrictive. Drop the System V IPC constraints since System V IPC is never allowed by TE and thus these constraints are dead policy. Change-Id: Ic06a35030c086e3978c02d501c380889af8d21e0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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1 changed files with 9 additions and 25 deletions
34
mls
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mls
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@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ mlsconstrain process { transition dyntransition }
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mlsconstrain process { getsched getsession getpgid getcap getattr ptrace share }
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(l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
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# Process write operations: No write down unless trusted.
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# Process write operations: Require equivalence unless trusted.
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mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop signal setsched setpgid setcap setrlimit ptrace share }
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(l1 domby l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
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(l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
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#
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# Socket constraints
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@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop signal setsched setpgid setcap setrlimit
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mlsconstrain socket_class_set { create relabelfrom relabelto }
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((h1 eq h2 and l1 eq l2) or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
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# Datagram send: Sender must be dominated by receiver unless one of them is
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# trusted.
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# Datagram send: Sender must be equivalent to the receiver unless one of them
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# is trusted.
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mlsconstrain unix_dgram_socket { sendto }
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(l1 domby l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedsubject);
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(l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedsubject);
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# Stream connect: Client must be equivalent to server unless one of them
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# is trusted.
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@ -83,13 +83,13 @@ mlsconstrain dir { read getattr search }
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mlsconstrain { file lnk_file sock_file chr_file blk_file } { read getattr execute }
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(t2 == app_data_file or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
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# Write operations: Subject must be dominated by the object unless the
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# Write operations: Subject must be equivalent to the object unless the
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# subject or the object is trusted.
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mlsconstrain dir { write setattr rename add_name remove_name reparent rmdir }
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(t2 == app_data_file or l1 domby l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
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(t2 == app_data_file or l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
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mlsconstrain { file lnk_file sock_file chr_file blk_file } { write setattr append unlink link rename }
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(t2 == app_data_file or l1 domby l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
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(t2 == app_data_file or l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
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# Special case for FIFOs.
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# These can be unnamed pipes, in which case they will be labeled with the
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@ -100,23 +100,7 @@ mlsconstrain fifo_file { read getattr }
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(l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject or t2 == domain);
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mlsconstrain fifo_file { write setattr append unlink link rename }
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(l1 domby l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject or t2 == domain);
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#
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# IPC constraints
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#
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# Create/destroy: equivalence or trusted.
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mlsconstrain ipc_class_set { create destroy }
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(l2 eq h2 and (l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject));
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# Read ops: No read up unless trusted.
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mlsconstrain ipc_class_set r_ipc_perms
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(l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
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# Write ops: No write down unless trusted.
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mlsconstrain ipc_class_set w_ipc_perms
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(l1 domby l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
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(l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject or t2 == domain);
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#
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# Binder IPC constraints
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