ro.tuner.lazyhal: system_vendor_config_prop to decide whether the lazy
tuner HAL is enabled.
tuner.server.enable: system_internal_prop to decide whether tuner server
should be enabled.
Bug: 236002754
Test: Check tuner HAL and framework behavior
Change-Id: I6a2ebced0e0261f669e7bda466f46556dedca016
Grant system_server and flags_health_check permission to set the
properties that correspond to vendor system native boot experiments.
Bug: 241730607
Test: Build
Merged-In: Idc2334534c2d42a625b451cfce488d7d7a651036
Change-Id: I3e98f1b05058245cad345061d801ecd8de623109
This is needed for Watchdog to be able to dump InputProcessor HAL.
Watchdog can be triggered locally for testing by patching
InputDispatcher.cpp:
void InputDispatcher::monitor() {
// Acquire and release the lock to ensure that the dispatcher has not deadlocked.
std::unique_lock _l(mLock);
+ std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::minutes(40));
mLooper->wake();
mDispatcherIsAlive.wait(_l);
Bug: 237322365
Test: adb bugreport (after triggering watchdog)
Change-Id: I746df8be4faaef2a67293d6b1c0cde5fa7810de6
Merged-In: I746df8be4faaef2a67293d6b1c0cde5fa7810de6
Goal is to gain a better handle on who has access to which maps
and to allow (with bpfloader changes to create in one directory
and move into the target directory) per-map selection of
selinux context, while still having reasonable defaults for stuff
pinned directly into the target location.
BPFFS (ie. /sys/fs/bpf) labelling is as follows:
subdirectory selinux context mainline usecase / usable by
/ fs_bpf no (*) core operating system (ie. platform)
/net_private fs_bpf_net_private yes, T+ network_stack
/net_shared fs_bpf_net_shared yes, T+ network_stack & system_server
/netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_readonly yes, T+ network_stack & system_server & r/o to netd
/netd_shared fs_bpf_netd_shared yes, T+ network_stack & system_server & netd [**]
/tethering fs_bpf_tethering yes, S+ network_stack
/vendor fs_bpf_vendor no, T+ vendor
* initial support for bpf was added back in P,
but things worked differently back then with no bpfloader,
and instead netd doing stuff by hand,
bpfloader with pinning into /sys/fs/bpf was (I believe) added in Q
(and was definitely there in R)
** additionally bpf programs are accesible to netutils_wrapper
for use by iptables xt_bpf extensions
'mainline yes' currently means shipped by the com.android.tethering apex,
but this is really another case of bad naming, as it's really
the 'networking/connectivity/tethering' apex / mainline module.
Long term the plan is to merge a few other networking mainline modules
into it (and maybe give it a saner name...).
The reason for splitting net_private vs tethering is that:
S+ must support 4.9+ kernels and S era bpfloader v0.2+
T+ must support 4.14+ kernels and T beta3 era bpfloader v0.13+
The kernel affects the intelligence of the in-kernel bpf verifier
and the available bpf helper functions. Older kernels have
a tendency to reject programs that newer kernels allow.
/ && /vendor are not shipped via mainline, so only need to work
with the bpfloader that's part of the core os.
Bug: 218408035
Test: TreeHugger, manually on cuttlefish
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Change-Id: I674866ebe32aca4fc851818c1ffcbec12ac4f7d4
(cherry picked from commit 15715aea32)
These will get read by system libraries in arbitrary processes, so it's
a public property with read access by `domain`.
Bug: 235129567
Change-Id: I1ab880626e4efa2affe90165ce94a404b918849d
The feature was superseded by tzdata mainline module(s).
Bug: 148144561
Test: see system/timezone
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I48d445ac723ae310b8a134371342fc4c0d202300
Merged-In: I48d445ac723ae310b8a134371342fc4c0d202300
This change enables xfrm netlink socket use for the system server,
and the network_stack process. This will be used by IpSecService
to configure SAs, and network stack to monitor counters & replay
bitmaps for monitoring of IPsec tunnels.
Bug: 233392908
Test: Compiled
Change-Id: I25539dc579f21d6288fa962d1fad9b51573f017d
Give system_server and network_stack the same permissions as netd.
This is needed as we are continuously moving code out of netd into
network_stack and system_server.
Test: TH
Bug: 233300834
Change-Id: I9559185081213fdeb33019733654ce95af816d99
Currently, app process can freely execute path at
`/data/misc_ce/0/sdksandbox/<package-name>` since it's labeled as system
file. They can't read or write, but use 403/404
error to figure out if an app is installed or not.
By changing the selinux label of the parent directory:
`/data/misc_ce/0/sdksandbox`, we can restrict app process from executing
inside the directory and avoid the privacy leak.
Sandbox process should only have "search" permission on the new label so
that it can pass through it to its data directory located in
`/data/misc_ce/0/sdksandbox/<package-name>/<per-sdk-dir>`.
Bug: 214241165
Test: atest SdkSandboxStorageHostTest
Test: `adb shell cd /data/misc_ce/0/sdksandbox` gives error
Test: manual test to verify webview still works
Change-Id: Id8771b322d4eb5532eaf719f203ca94035e2a8ed
Merged-In: Id8771b322d4eb5532eaf719f203ca94035e2a8ed
Remove references in sepolicy. Leave a few of the types defined since
they're public and may be used in device-specific policy.
Bug: 211461392
Test: build/boot cuttlefish
Change-Id: I615137b92b82b744628ab9b7959ae5ff28001169
As a follow-up to https://r.android.com/2078213, remove init's write
access to directories with type system_userdir_file or
media_userdir_file. This has been made possible by moving the creation
of /data/user/0 and /data/media/obb to vold.
Bug: 156305599
Change-Id: Ib9f43f2b111518833efe08e8cacd727c75b80266
Creating a per-user encrypted directory such as /data/system_ce/0 and
the subdirectories in it too early has been a recurring bug. Typically,
individual services in system_server are to blame; system_server has
permission to create these directories, and it's easy to write
"mkdirs()" instead of "mkdir()". Such bugs are very bad, as they
prevent these directories from being encrypted, as encryption policies
can only be set on empty directories. Due to recent changes, a factory
reset is now forced in such cases, which helps detect these bugs;
however, it would be much better to prevent them in the first place.
This CL locks down the ability to create these directories to just vold
and init, or to just vold when possible. This is done by assigning new
types to the directories that contain these directories, and then only
allowing the needed domains to write to these parent directories. This
is similar to what https://r.android.com/1117297 did for /data itself.
Three new types are used instead of just one, since these directories
had three different types already (system_data_file, media_rw_data_file,
vendor_data_file), and this allows the policy to be a bit more precise.
A significant limitation is that /data/user/0 is currently being created
by init during early boot. Therefore, this CL doesn't help much for
/data/user/0, though it helps a lot for the other directories. As the
next step, I'll try to eliminate the /data/user/0 quirk. Anyway, this
CL is needed regardless of whether we're able to do that.
Test: Booted cuttlefish. Ran 'sm partition disk:253,32 private', then
created and deleted a user. Used 'ls -lZ' to check the relevant
SELinux labels on both internal and adoptable storage. Also did
similar tests on raven, with the addition of going through the
setup wizard and using an app that creates media files. No
relevant SELinux denials seen during any of this.
Bug: 156305599
Change-Id: I1fbdd180f56dd2fe4703763936f5850cef8ab0ba
