Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.
To that end, this change:
* Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
priority than apps.
* Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
* Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
* Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.
Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
"Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: atest netd_integration_test
Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest
Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
(cherry picked from commit 087318957f)
* Note on cherry-pick: Some of the dependent changes are not in AOSP.
In order to keep hostapd running correctly in AOSP, I've modified this
change to only include policy additions.
Change sepolicy permissions to now classify hostapd as a HAL exposing
HIDL interface.
Sepolicy denial for accessing /data/vendor/misc/wifi/hostapd:
12-27 23:40:55.913 4952 4952 W hostapd : type=1400 audit(0.0:19): avc:
denied { write } for name="hostapd" dev="sda13" ino=4587601
scontext=u:r:hal_wifi_hostapd_default:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
01-02 19:07:16.938 5791 5791 W hostapd : type=1400 audit(0.0:31): avc:
denied { search } for name="net" dev="sysfs" ino=30521
scontext=u:r:hal_wifi_hostapd_default:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_net:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
Bug: 36646171
Test: Device boots up and able to turn on SoftAp.
Change-Id: Ibacfcc938deab40096b54b8d0e608d53ca91b947
Merged-In: Ibacfcc938deab40096b54b8d0e608d53ca91b947
(cherry picked from commit 5bca3e860d)
com.android.server.power.PowerManagerServiceTest#testGetLastShutdownReasonInternal due to "RuntimeException: failed to set system property"
W/roidJUnitRunner: type=1400 audit(0.0:6): avc: denied { write } for name="property_service" dev="tmpfs" ino=13178 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:property_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=0
W/libc : Unable to set property "test.sys.boot.reason" to "shutdown,thermal": connection failed; errno=13 (Permission denied)
Had to use precise property definition as com.android.phone accesses
test properties as well.
Test: compile
Bug: 78245377
Change-Id: I2cc810846f8615f2a2fae8e0d4f41de585b7abd7
It's used in build-time tests and in CTS.
Bug: 78898770
Test: build user-build
Change-Id: I254bf4d7ed0c0cb029b55110ceec982b84e4a91b
Merged-In: I254bf4d7ed0c0cb029b55110ceec982b84e4a91b
On userdebug builds we can now profile system server without disabling
selinux. This is the final piece, and allows the system server to save its
own profile.
Test: manual, on a device with system server profiling enabled
Bug: 73313191
Change-Id: Iaf9575d3cda19ae4c38f1e20a8e1b9288b7abc83
Give all the right permissions to find and send a message to
perfprofd from the system server.
Bug: 73175642
Test: m
Test: manual
Change-Id: I82b63ec097dcd445d9e8169fe0df4398d62ac184
com.android.server.power.PowerManagerServiceTest#testGetLastShutdownReasonInternal due to "RuntimeException: failed to set system property"
W/roidJUnitRunner: type=1400 audit(0.0:6): avc: denied { write } for name="property_service" dev="tmpfs" ino=13178 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:property_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=0
W/libc : Unable to set property "test.sys.boot.reason" to "shutdown,thermal": connection failed; errno=13 (Permission denied)
Test: compile
Bug: 78245377
Change-Id: Id21436d281bab27823969a9f7e92318d70b5a2d6
Vendor public libs are exposed to apps (not system), and their ABI
stability is guaranteed by vendor. Introducing new selinux type so that
we don't conflate concepts of same-process HAL and vendor public lib.
The former is exposed to all domains, while the latter should only be
acessible by apps.
Bug: 76413554
Test: build-only change, policy builds
Change-Id: I89dad351374f46c7fe2726991eb4c05064c37ed5
When opening the dex files we sometime need to check for the real location
of the file (even if it was open via an fd).
Denial example:
avc: denied { getattr } for comm="profman" path="/data/app" dev="sda13"
ino=1048577 scontext=u:r:profman:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
tclass=dir permissive=0
Test: verify we get no denials when taking a profile snapshot.
Bug: 77922323
(cherry picked from commit 9e80bfc880)
Change-Id: I934170a67640bb8534c123848468c0861b245eeb
Grant fsetid as it was done for installd. Suppress write to
profile files.
Bug: 77958490
Test: m
Test: manual
Change-Id: I33f47db7c16f0eda41ffdb526cf43f8fa9484c62
The following properties will be whitelisted.
- ro.hdmi.device_type, ro.hdmi.wake_on_hotplug and
persist.sys.hdmi.keep_awake for hdmi
- ro.sf.disable_triple_buffer for SurfaceFlinger
- media.stagefright.cache-params and persist.sys.media.avsync for
nuplayer
Bug: 78205669
Bug: 78430613
Test: succeeded building
Change-Id: I5ee1a1de72c265bca87aa041c6acd9554f5f8c07
Bug: 78591623
Test: Create a new user with a fingerprint. Reboot. Delete that user.
Check for denials, files left over in /data/*_{c,d}e/10
Merged-In: Ib818e112a98c5b954ee829e93ebd69c3b12940cf
Change-Id: Ib818e112a98c5b954ee829e93ebd69c3b12940cf
In order to support passthrough + binderized implementations
with a simple switch, there is a hierarchy of attributes for
different hal servers.
/------- hal_X --------\
| ** |
v v
hal_X_client hal_X_server
| |
| |
v v
halclientdomain halserverdomain
** - hal_X -> hal_X_server is only on non-Treble devices. This
is because on these devices, certain HALs are allowed to be
loaded directly into the client process in "passthrough" mode
as was the case in Android before Android O. This is a legacy
compatibility mode. On Treble devices, any client can also be
hal_X just by virtue of a server being able to also be a hal
client.
There is also one exception to this rule. su is not given every
hal_* permission. If it is given all of these permissions on
non-Treble devices, it must be added as an exemption to many
other neverallow rules. As a sideeffect (which existed before
this patch), su is not allowed to talk directly to all hardware
on non-Treble devices as with Treble devices.
Fixes: 34180936
Test: compile only (neverallow rules are resolved at compile time)
Change-Id: I47122daf95acd49cadaf8b7664e56268dac78945
The /dev/ion driver's file operations structure does not specify a
write operation. Granting write is meaningless. This audit statement
has been around since Android Oreo and logs collected from dogfooders
shows that no apps are attempting to open the file with write
permissions.
Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Test: verify no "granted" messages from dogfood devices.
Change-Id: Id4f3540bba8c9f30f9d912f7a7473933be779cbb
This is needed for interface configuration - see e.g. nl80211_configure_data_frame_filters.
Bug: 77903086
Test: WiFi still working
Change-Id: I4b5e2b59eeeb6d0ac19dbcbcf0e7e80942247893
Currently, when vendor APK try to use MediaPlayer to play its audio
resource, it would fail due to this neverallow rules.
avc: denied { read } for path="/vendor/app/TicFitness/TicFitness.apk" dev="dm-1" ino=183 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
Bug: 78436043
Change-Id: Id910184c16955f9e4e4c8d3bb6eca2253ab59063
