CAP_MAC_ADMIN was originally introduced into the kernel for use
by Smack and not used by SELinux. However, SELinux later appropriated
CAP_MAC_ADMIN as a way to control setting/getting security contexts
unknown to the currently loaded policy for use in labeling filesystems
while running a policy that differs from the one being applied to
the filesystem, in
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=12b29f34558b9b45a2c6eabd4f3c6be939a3980f
circa v2.6.27.
Hence, the comment about mac_admin being unused by SELinux is inaccurate.
Remove it.
The corresponding change to refpolicy is:
5fda529636
Test: policy builds
Change-Id: Ie3637882200732e498c53a834a27284da838dfb8
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Add selinux contexts for the new system config service.
Test: atest -it -w SystemConfigTest
Bug: 143112379
Change-Id: Ibe67acb404b6951e1fda9ce28bd50a0efdd44c5f
This patch adds the necessary rules to support the existing usage of
perf_event_open by the system partition, which almost exclusively
concerns the simpleperf profiler. A new domain is introduced for some
(but not all) executions of the system image simpleperf. The following
configurations are supported:
* shell -> shell process (no domain transition)
* shell -> debuggable app (through shell -> runas -> runas_app)
* shell -> profileable app (through shell -> simpleperf_app_runner ->
untrusted_app -> simpleperf)
* debuggable/profile app -> self (through untrusted_app -> simpleperf)
simpleperf_app_runner still enters the untrusted_app domain immediately
before exec to properly inherit the categories related to MLS. My
understanding is that a direct transition would require modifying
external/selinux and seapp_contexts as with "fromRunAs", which seems
unnecessarily complex for this case.
runas_app can still run side-loaded binaries and use perf_event_open,
but it checks that the target app is exactly "debuggable"
(profileability is insufficient).
system-wide profiling is effectively constrained to "su" on debug
builds.
See go/perf-event-open-security for a more detailed explanation of the
scenarios covered here.
Tested: "atest CtsSimpleperfTestCases" on crosshatch-user/userdebug
Tested: manual simpleperf invocations on crosshatch-userdebug
Bug: 137092007
Change-Id: I2100929bae6d81f336f72eff4235fd5a78b94066
As a result of commit f8a00cef17206ecd1b30d3d9f99e10d9fa707aa7
("proc: restrict kernel stack dumps to root")
the userdebug feature where llkd can monitor for live lock
signatures in the stack traces broke.
So now userdebug variant of llkd requires sys_admin permissions.
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
Test: llkd_unit_test
Bug: 147486902
Change-Id: I31572afa08daa490a69783855bce55313eaed96c
The open, audit_access, execmod, and watch* permissions
are all defined in the COMMON_FILE_PERMS in the kernel
classmap and inherited by all the file-related classes;
we can do the same in the policy by putting them into the
common file declaration.
refpolicy recently similarly reorganized its definitions and added the
watch* permissions to common file, see:
e5dbe75276c656b97a283952ecb4dd
Adding new permissions to the end of the existing classes was only
required for kernels that predate the dynamic class/perm mapping
support (< v2.6.33).
Test: policy still builds
Change-Id: I44a2c3a94c21ed23410b6f807af7f1179e2c1747
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
This property essentially implements
PowerManager.isRebootingUserspaceSupported[0] public API, hence apps
should be able to read it.
[0]: 73cab34d9f:core/java/android/os/PowerManager.java;l=1397
Test: m checkbuild
Test: atest CtsUserspaceRebootHostSideTestCases
Test: adb shell getprop ro.init.userspace_reboot.is_supported
Bug: 135984674
Change-Id: I09cab09735760529de81eb6d5306f052ee408a6e
Setup SELinux to allow the world to read, and system_server to write, a
property used as an indicator that we need to refresh local caches
for PowerManager.isPowerSaveMode and PowerManager.isInteractive.
Bug: 140788621
Test: Flashed build and tested that phone boots and does not crash
as PowerManager operations take place.
Change-Id: I3e7e513756c8d881295721c2729cd37ad3bec8b8
The binder_cache_system_server_prop context allows any user to read the
property but only the system_server to write it. The only property with
this context is currently binder.cache_key.has_system_feature but users
will be added.
Bug: 140788621
Test: this was tested on an image with a binder cache implementation. No
permission issues were found. The implementation is not part of the current
commit.
Change-Id: I4c7c3ddf809ed947944408ffbbfc469d761a6043
This patch allows us to write SELinux policies for the
perf_event_open() syscall LSM hooks added to the kernel in the following
commit:
da97e18458
Bug: 137092007
Change-Id: I0005759eb7a487faebe94a4653e3865343eb441e
We added an auditallow for these permissions on 11/26/2019, and have not
seen any recent logs for this in go/sedenials. No other priv-app should
rely on this now that gmscore is running in its own domain.
Bug: 142672293
Test: TH
Change-Id: Ic2f68b3af861e0c00e2dea731c4d6b3255ab5175
Also, allow zygote to scan dirs in /mnt/expand and relabel.
Test: No denials at boot
Test: No denials seen when creating mounts
Bug: 143937733
Change-Id: I86e77d27f5e9fb2f5852f787c7e5d9179c7404aa
It follows examples of other APEX to make file_contexts of cronet
module as "android:path" property
Bug: 146416755
Test: atest cronet_e2e_tests
Test: atest CronetApiTest
Change-Id: I0608eb4bb43cee50f49217f19fb53f297fbf5ead
Merged-In: I0608eb4bb43cee50f49217f19fb53f297fbf5ead
We added an auditallow for these permissions on 12/11/2019, and have not
seen any recent logs for this in go/sedenials. No other priv-app should
rely on this now that gmscore is running in its own domain.
Bug: 142672293
Test: TH
Change-Id: Iaeaef560883b61644625b21e5c7095d4d9c68da9
We added an auditallow for these permissions on 11/26/2019, and have not
seen any recent logs for this in go/sedenials. No other priv-app should
rely on this now that gmscore is running in its own domain.
Bug: 142672293
Test: TH
Change-Id: I18f99f54385b7c4e7c2ae923eff4c76800323a73