Enabling/disabling sepolicy based on ENABLE_TREBLE is not granular
enough (ref: b/32978887 #4).
Bug: 32978887
Test: compiles, doesn't cause any additional denials on device. Nothing
depends on these things I'm removing.
Change-Id: I10acbde16e5e2093f2c9205ed79cd20caed7f44d
Generate a compile time error if someone unexpectedly tries to
transition into logpersist or logd domain.
Test: compile
Bug: 30566487
Change-Id: Ib55f301f104ad63de5ac513cdc9dc9937e3ba48d
- transition to logpersist from init
- sort some overlapping negative references
- intention is to allow logpersist to be used by vendor
userdebug logging
Test: gTest liblog-unit-tests, logd-unit-tests & logcat-unit-tests
Bug: 30566487
Change-Id: I7806f5a2548cbe0c1f257a0ba2855f2eb69d8e7c
auditallow (added in commit 758e6b3678)
has been in place for about 2 weeks now, and no hits. Remove
execute_no_trans.
The net effect of this change is that priv_apps won't be able to exec()
a file from their home directory, but dlopen() and friends will still
work.
Test: Compiles and boots successfully.
Test: No auditallow messages received via SELinux denial collection.
Change-Id: I60fcdc260d12e1bcc2355ca4dd912de7e6d0a145
init switch from a setcon() based transition to an exec() based
transition in bug 19702273. Fixup stale comment.
Test: comment only change. Policy compiles.
Bug: 19702273
Change-Id: I6e1b4b3680193453adafa8952a7ea343d2977505
Bug: http://b/32905206
Test: Boot sailfish and no new selinux failures observed in logs
Change-Id: Id9a46180074a61f8cf8d176a7b2ebc995a13b9f9
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Prevent sepolicy and sepolicy.recover from showing up in the root
filesystem when they will not be created as part of it. Also make
sure both are added as dependencies to version_policy to ensure the
neverallow checks are run.
Bug: 31363362
Test: Builds and boots, including recovery, without additional
denials. Neverallow violations still caught at build time.
Change-Id: I39e3cbc150551c9316952523927d057538cd00a7
And do some clean up:
Replace LOCAL_TARGET_ARCH with global arch specifier that won't get
clobbered, clean up sepolicy.recovery's eng specification, ensure that
build macros are applied across all policy generation, not just
plat_policy, and make sure that all private variables are cleared and
alphabetized at the end.
Bug: 31363362
Bug: 31369363
Test: Boot into recovery and observe no selinux denials.
Change-Id: Ibc15b097f6d19acf01f6b22bee0e083b15f4ef75
Test: tested with default health HAL on angler running as service.
Bug: b/32754732
Change-Id: Ie0b70d43cb23cd0878e1b7b99b9bebdbd70d17c7
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit ef62fd9159)
- allows binder calls to hwservicemanager
- allows healthd to read system_file for passthrough HAL
Test: Tested healthd with and without a board specific health HAL on
Angler.
Bug: b/32724915
Change-Id: Icf621859f715cb44bce5d8d3b60320ef495d1543
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit 32cacb42b9)
healthd is being split into 'charger' and 'healthd' processes, that
will never run together. 'charger' is to be run only in charge-only
and recovery, while healthd runs with Android.
While they both share much of battery monitoring code, they both now
have reduced scope. E.g. 'charger', doesn't need to use binder anymore
and healthd doesn't need to do charging ui animation. So, amend the
SEPolicy for healthd to reduce it's scope and add a new one for charger.
Test: Tested all modes {recovery, charger-only, android} with new policy
Change-Id: If7f81875c605f7f07da4d23a313f308b9dde9ce8
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit c73d0022ad)
In order for hal clients to use IServiceManager::registerForNotifications,
the hwservicemanager needs to be able to call into client processes.
Test: WIP
Bug: 33383725
Change-Id: I59470e9cd5cbeafda010fedc0b91eeb41280e0a1
Add a compile time assertion that only authorized SELinux domains are
allowed to touch the metadata_block_device. This domain may be wiped at
will, and we want to ensure that we're not inadvertently destroying
other people's data.
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I9854b527c3d83e17f717d6cc8a1c6b50e0e373b6
system/core commit 331cf2fb7c16b5b25064f8d2f00284105a9b413f created a
number of new properties of the form:
[ro.boottime.init]: [5294587604]
[ro.boottime.InputEventFind]: [10278767840]
[ro.boottime.adbd]: [8359267180]
...
These properties were assigned the default_prop SELinux label because a
better label did not exist. Properties labeled with the default_prop
label are readable to any SELinux domain, which is overly broad.
bullhead:/ $ getprop -Z ro.boottime.adbd
u:object_r:default_prop:s0
Instead, create a new label for the ro.boottime.* properties so we can
apply more fine grain read access control to these properties.
bullhead:/ $ getprop -Z ro.boottime.adbd
u:object_r:boottime_prop:s0
New SELinux property labels have minimal permissions by default. As a
result, after this change, ro.boottime.* properties will only be
readable to system_server, bootstat, init (because it manages the property
space), and "adb root" (because no SELinux permissions are enforced there).
Additional read access can be granted as-needed.
This is part of a larger effort to implement fine-grain access control
on the properties managed by init.
Test: Device boots and no SELinux denials on boot.
Change-Id: Ibf981cb81898f4356fdc5c1b6f15dd93c0d6d84d
core_property_type is an attribute which was given to all existing
properties known to core SELinux policy. Any property with this label is
readable to all SELinux domains, which is overly broad. The long term
goal is to remove the core_property_type attribute entirely.
Add a neverallow rule prohibiting the introduction of new properties
with the core_property_type attribute. Device specific properties, or
new properties in core SELinux policy, should not have this attribute.
Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: Ie89a9f0d81c8561616001ff8451496ce2278dbb2
There is no reason for vold to have this permission, and a proper
auditallow rule has been used and monitored to ensure that nothing on
android uses this permission.
Bug: 26901147
Test: Phone boots
Change-Id: Id36ed2722348f433fe3d046a3429066338230fec
Simulate platform and non-platform split by sending the split files to the
device to be compiled by init.
Bug: 31363362
Test: Policy builds on-device and boots. sediff shows no difference.
Change-Id: I9627d1c66ca37786d97a049666278a4992ad7579
The new domain wasn't fully tested, and it caused many regressions
on the daily build. Revert back to using "priv_app" domain until we
can fully test and re-land the new domain.
Temporarily add the USB functionfs capabilities to priv_app domain
to keep remainder of MtpService changes working; 33574909 is tracking
removing that from the priv_app domain.
Test: builds, boots, verified UI and downloads
Bug: 33569176, 33568261, 33574909
Change-Id: I1bd0561d52870df0fe488e59ae8307b89978a9cb
