Commit graph

3636 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
dcashman
e814ad7217 am 41d961a7: Allow bluetooth surfaceflinger access.
* commit '41d961a7281bff9e345dcefcf7a6ea95f6129714':
  Allow bluetooth surfaceflinger access.
2015-02-12 18:04:06 +00:00
dcashman
41d961a728 Allow bluetooth surfaceflinger access.
Address the following denial:
02-12 07:51:42.702: E/SELinux(158): avc:  denied  { find } for service=SurfaceFlinger scontext=u:r:bluetooth:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0 tclass=service_manager

which occurs when the remote service starts up.
02-12 07:51:42.702: E/ServiceManager(158): find_service('SurfaceFlinger') uid=1002 - PERMISSION DENIED
02-12 07:51:42.702: I/ServiceManager(2827): Waiting for service SurfaceFlinger...
02-12 07:51:42.959: E/ActivityManager(469): ANR in com.google.android.remote.tv.services
02-12 07:51:42.959: E/ActivityManager(469): PID: 2827
02-12 07:51:42.959: E/ActivityManager(469): Reason: executing service com.google.android.tv.remote/.RemoteService

Bug: 19268019
Change-Id: I2d415c2ea2f70cf71851147253cf6e1906fd0940
2015-02-12 09:50:20 -08:00
Nick Kralevich
88eb71f76c am 9ad26a7f: fix user builds.
* commit '9ad26a7f5c2da1d40fcaa836f2b413079a63d4d3':
  fix user builds.
2015-02-12 17:35:21 +00:00
Nick Kralevich
9ad26a7f5c fix user builds.
14d5619a1a added a neverallow
rule for System V IPC calls. Since this was still allowed
for unconfined domains, this broke user builds.

Remove System V IPC stuff from unconfined and fix the build.

Change-Id: Iea66a9f97a90f8db496f6fa34b5e9642ee926fe6
2015-02-12 09:12:50 -08:00
Nick Kralevich
ce29a85909 am 3c985dd6: Merge "domain.te: neverallow System V IPC classes"
* commit '3c985dd6b13141c2e1a1b5cc23cf6281028d55e7':
  domain.te: neverallow System V IPC classes
2015-02-11 23:28:48 +00:00
Nick Kralevich
3c985dd6b1 Merge "domain.te: neverallow System V IPC classes" 2015-02-11 23:23:59 +00:00
Nick Kralevich
14d5619a1a domain.te: neverallow System V IPC classes
Android doesn't want to support System V IPC classes.
Ensure that it isn't supported by adding a neverallow rule
(compile time assertion).

Change-Id: I278d45960ee557917584f9137323b4cabfe140a9
2015-02-11 15:15:23 -08:00
dcashman
3be6699930 am 895a4f2c: Allow bluetooth mediaserver_service access.
* commit '895a4f2cf7a3530ad0a6cfbc0fc16134f43bb5cf':
  Allow bluetooth mediaserver_service access.
2015-02-11 23:02:03 +00:00
dcashman
895a4f2cf7 Allow bluetooth mediaserver_service access.
This was observed when attempting to change volume for a bluetooth device
supporting AVRCP volume control.

Addresses the following denials:
avc:  denied  { find } for service=media.audio_flinger scontext=u:r:bluetooth:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
avc:  denied  { find } for service=media.audio_policy scontext=u:r:bluetooth:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager

Bug: 19341236
Change-Id: If7f2ff1ea9fc694bad700cf59f400f2d2df8c2dd
2015-02-11 13:25:57 -08:00
Nick Kralevich
df770fcb71 am b8ef2b02: fix "Unable to add user\'s profile photo id."
* commit 'b8ef2b0297ca112846cb7ed27b78ba7137f20076':
  fix "Unable to add user's profile photo id."
2015-02-11 17:27:44 +00:00
Nick Kralevich
b8ef2b0297 fix "Unable to add user's profile photo id."
Commit a833763ba0 enabled per-user
isolation, which requires that any files / processes which cross
user boundaries be marked with the mlstrustedsubject attribute.

system_app_data_file, used for storing a user's profile photos,
is not marked as such. As a result, users are unable to add profile
photos.

Addresses the following denial:

  avc: denied { write } for path="/data/data/com.android.settings/cache/TakeEditUserPhoto2.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82184 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:system_app_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Steps to reproduce:

  1.Flash & Factory the Deb device with tip-of-tree build
  2.Go to 'Settings-Users'
  3.Under users&profiles,click on Owner to add profile photo.
  4.Select 'Choose photo from Gallery' and select a photo.
  5.Then click the 'Done' button.
  6.Device showed the message as 'Unable to save the photo edits'.

OBSERVED RESULTS:
  Unable to add user's profile photo id. This issue is coming for all
  users(Restricted user,second user)also.

EXPECTED RESULTS:
  Device should allow to add profile photo id.

Bug: 19170844
Change-Id: If657dc09dd391e63ca85320f9cc1728580e51a15
2015-02-11 08:39:41 -08:00
Stephen Smalley
dc7090628c am 509186de: Allow fsck to search /dev/block.
* commit '509186dea59e5ff115b72c282aff1b8c0c47c4f6':
  Allow fsck to search /dev/block.
2015-02-11 00:10:52 +00:00
Stephen Smalley
509186dea5 Allow fsck to search /dev/block.
Addresses denials such as:
avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=143 comm="e2fsck" name="block" dev="tmpfs" ino=5987 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=dir

Change-Id: Ieb72fc5e28146530c2f3b235ce74f2f397e49c56
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2015-02-10 16:13:45 -05:00
Stephen Smalley
f583565e69 am f6cc34e0: fsck: remove permissive_or_unconfined()
* commit 'f6cc34e098a9c4b1a149417adf42a85445dba330':
  fsck: remove permissive_or_unconfined()
2015-02-10 19:06:33 +00:00
Stephen Smalley
f6cc34e098 fsck: remove permissive_or_unconfined()
Change-Id: I70529f83ccba57fae20742827737a300a9f0733f
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2015-02-10 12:05:22 -05:00
dcashman
4d26a187ce am 0e30164b: Allow bluetooth access to keystore service.
* commit '0e30164b17af20f680635c7c6c522e670ecc3df3':
  Allow bluetooth access to keystore service.
2015-02-09 23:01:42 +00:00
dcashman
0e30164b17 Allow bluetooth access to keystore service.
Address the following denial:
SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=android.security.keystore scontext=u:r:bluetooth:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:keystore_service:s0 tclass=service_manager

Encountered when remote service attempts access:
02-04 00:15:19.174 E/AndroidRuntime(10847): FATAL EXCEPTION: main
02-04 00:15:19.174 E/AndroidRuntime(10847): Process: com.google.android.remote.tv.services, PID: 10847
02-04 00:15:19.174 E/AndroidRuntime(10847): java.lang.RuntimeException: Unable to create service com.google.android.tv.remote.RemoteService: java.lang.NullPointerException: Attempt to invoke interface method 'int android.security.IKeystoreService.exist(java.lang.String, int)' on a null object reference
02-04 00:15:19.174 E/AndroidRuntime(10847):         at android.app.ActivityThread.handleCreateService(ActivityThread.java:2801)

Bug: 19268019
Change-Id: I86f85cb19c5540bf041c82ec9a8088aacae67792
2015-02-09 14:45:46 -08:00
Nick Kralevich
9e0aaf000c am fcd86911: allow init fs_type:dir search
* commit 'fcd86911d7102b049bd3c2208a133b310827cf66':
  allow init fs_type:dir search
2015-02-09 01:55:53 +00:00
Nick Kralevich
fcd86911d7 allow init fs_type:dir search
We allow chmod/chown of files / directories by init, but don't allow
init to search into subdirectories. Feels wrong.

Addresses the following denial:

  avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=1 comm="init" name="/" dev="pstore" ino=5570 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:pstorefs:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1

which results from the following init.rc statement:

  # pstore/ramoops previous console log
  mount pstore pstore /sys/fs/pstore
  chown system log /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops
  chmod 0440 /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops
  chown system log /sys/fs/pstore/pmsg-ramoops-0
  chmod 0440 /sys/fs/pstore/pmsg-ramoops-0

Bug: 19050686
Change-Id: I0528ecb17686891b66262de1f3c229cc68a56830
2015-02-08 15:09:29 +00:00
Elliott Hughes
12d56dcc75 am b00a0379: No one needs LD_PRELOAD from init any more.
* commit 'b00a037992e07b52f811079444a0406820443cce':
  No one needs LD_PRELOAD from init any more.
2015-02-07 16:27:55 +00:00
Elliott Hughes
b00a037992 No one needs LD_PRELOAD from init any more.
Change-Id: I40a3d089a4a2325abcd1e12aa57b1fd97a1f7902
2015-02-06 23:40:42 -08:00
dcashman
51dfc00a69 am 616c787b: Remove service_manager_type auditing of shell source domain.
* commit '616c787b531acf899a0b15352506d3472a6c3609':
  Remove service_manager_type auditing of shell source domain.
2015-02-06 23:47:16 +00:00
dcashman
616c787b53 Remove service_manager_type auditing of shell source domain.
The shell domain is already allowed to list and find all service_manager
objects, so extra auditing is pointless.

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: I8dbf674fa7ea7b05e48e5bbc352b0c9593f2b627
2015-02-06 15:27:06 -08:00
Nick Kralevich
f901c4ccd5 am 74df7f59: don\'t allow mounting on top of /system files/directories
* commit '74df7f593494a00dcc3be410b2d82267b6b31ca0':
  don't allow mounting on top of /system files/directories
2015-02-05 20:17:11 +00:00
Nick Kralevich
74df7f5934 don't allow mounting on top of /system files/directories
Change-Id: If311f53b9e5a1020f188ae2346dbf6466e6129ac
2015-02-05 09:31:52 -08:00
Christopher Ferris
8aaf546402 am 5ec38c49: Dumpstate runs the same from shell as service.
* commit '5ec38c49e3b61b8a3228b56278e85fc276eaec6b':
  Dumpstate runs the same from shell as service.
2015-02-05 02:30:42 +00:00
Christopher Ferris
5ec38c49e3 Dumpstate runs the same from shell as service.
Without this change, any selinux warning you might get when running
dumpstate from init do not show up when running from the shell
as root. This change makes them run the same.

Change-Id: I6b74e0f6f48f47952a2dbe7728b1853008f60dbb
2015-02-04 14:19:26 -08:00
dcashman
fc3204f664 am bba18381: Allow radio access to drmserver_service.
* commit 'bba18381039dbe45f6acce61d6be1ea7abb2fb06':
  Allow radio access to drmserver_service.
2015-02-02 18:11:00 +00:00
dcashman
bba1838103 Allow radio access to drmserver_service.
Address the following denial:
SELinux  E  avc:  denied  { find } for service=drm.drmManager scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0

which occurs when a non-default SMS app sends an MMS. The message would be
stored into system automatically in MMS service (from phone process and phone
UID). The storing of the message involves the creation of
android.drm.DrmManagerClient instance.

Change-Id: Ic4e493f183c9ce7f7ac3f74f6ea062893ea67608
2015-02-02 09:25:57 -08:00
Nick Kralevich
8fb5aad03d am 3c77d4d1: Add compile time checks for /data/dalvik-cache access
* commit '3c77d4d1c113282315fbccf696298e04f99a20b4':
  Add compile time checks for /data/dalvik-cache access
2015-01-30 21:16:29 +00:00
Nick Kralevich
437f713936 am 361cdaff: system_server: neverallow dex2oat exec
* commit '361cdaff3096fafc16bbe88b84d6f99f7944def7':
  system_server: neverallow dex2oat exec
2015-01-30 19:43:41 +00:00
Nick Kralevich
3c77d4d1c1 Add compile time checks for /data/dalvik-cache access
Add an SELinux neverallow rule (compile time assertion) that only
authorized SELinux domains are writing to files in /data/dalvik-cache.

Currently, SELinux policy only allows the following SELinux domains
to perform writes to files in /data/dalvik-cache

  * init
  * zygote
  * installd
  * dex2oat

For zygote, installd, and dex2oat, these accesses make sense.

For init, we could further restrict init to just relabelfrom
on /data/dalvik-cache files, and { create, write, setattr }
on /data/dalvik-cache directories. Currently init has full
write access, which can be reduced over time.

This change was motivated by the discussion
in https://android-review.googlesource.com/127582

Remove /data/dalvik-cache access from the unconfined domain.
This domain is only used by init, kernel, and fsck on user builds.
The kernel and fsck domains have no need to access files in
/data/dalvik-cache. Init has a need to relabel files, but
that rule is already granted in init.te.

The neverallow rule is intended to prevent regressions. Neverallow
rules are CTS tested, so regressions won't appear on our devices
or partner devices.

Change-Id: I15e7d17b1121c556463114d1c6c49557a57911cd
2015-01-30 11:27:35 -08:00
Nick Kralevich
361cdaff30 system_server: neverallow dex2oat exec
system_server should never be executing dex2oat. This is either
a bug (for example, bug 16317188), or represents an attempt by
system server to dynamically load a dex file, something we don't
want to allow.

This change adds a compile time assertion which will detect
if an allow rule granting this access is ever added.
No new rules are added or deleted as a result of this change.
This neverallow rule is automatically enforced via CTS.

Bug: 16317188
Change-Id: Id783e05d9f48d48642dbb89d9c78be4aae8af70c
2015-01-29 16:57:15 -08:00
Ruben Brunk
6cfd9d1319 am db1320f5: Add security policy for ProcessInfoService.
* commit 'db1320f550723616165d67faffd6197b8415dbf8':
  Add security policy for ProcessInfoService.
2015-01-29 23:26:33 +00:00
Ruben Brunk
db1320f550 Add security policy for ProcessInfoService.
Bug: 19186859

Change-Id: Ic08858f346d6b66e7bfc9da6faa2c6e38d9b2e82
2015-01-29 14:58:24 -08:00
Nick Kralevich
ae5c3c1ba6 am d31936f8: appdomain: relax netlink_socket neverallow rule
* commit 'd31936f89c49bc5c54b84bd5095f3c417da14935':
  appdomain: relax netlink_socket neverallow rule
2015-01-29 19:24:45 +00:00
Nick Kralevich
d31936f89c appdomain: relax netlink_socket neverallow rule
Relax the neverallow netlink restrictions for app domains.
In particular, some non-AOSP app domains may use netlink sockets
to communicate with a kernel driver.

Continue to neverallow generic netlink sockets for untrusted_app.
The intention here is that only app domains which explicitly need
this functionality should be able to request it.

This change does not add or remove any SELinux rules. Rather, it
just changes SELinux compile time assertions, as well as allowing
this behavior in CTS.

Modify other neverallow rules to use "domain" instead of "self".
Apps shouldn't be able to handle netlink sockets, even those
created in other SELinux domains.

Change-Id: I40de0ae28134ce71e808e5ef4a39779b71897571
2015-01-28 17:46:30 -08:00
Nick Kralevich
54477ed781 am bfe4c8ba: radio.te: make radio mlstrustedsubject
* commit 'bfe4c8ba89aebe0154aeaee6ce65215095fe0840':
  radio.te: make radio mlstrustedsubject
2015-01-27 16:35:31 +00:00
Nick Kralevich
bfe4c8ba89 radio.te: make radio mlstrustedsubject
Messenger can't send MMSes on the master branch. When Messenger sends
an MMS, it stores the message data in local file and publishes it
via a content provider. The URI is passed to the MMS API. The
MmsServiceBroker in system process gets the call and grant URI
permission to phone UID. The MmsService in phone process (and sharing
the phone UID) needs to read the URI to get message data to send.

Addresses the following denial:

  type=1400 audit(0.0:32): avc: denied { read } for path="/data/data/com.google.android.apps.messaging/cache/rawmms/5394791820000274558.dat" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=83180 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file

Change-Id: I2b694ff6c516714d3524e0613bae0f6773ed2e95
2015-01-26 15:25:03 -08:00
dcashman
f111d2fa4d am 5fef2de3: Allow shell to find all services.
* commit '5fef2de32079337d99f4515fa3a70cb2faed1305':
  Allow shell to find all services.
2015-01-24 00:19:42 +00:00
dcashman
5fef2de320 Allow shell to find all services.
dumpsys from shell results in many denials:
11-08 02:52:13.087   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=SurfaceFlinger scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.089   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=android.security.keystore scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:keystore_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.093   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=batteryproperties scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:healthd_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.103   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=display.qservice scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.104   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=drm.drmManager scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.113   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=media.audio_flinger scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.113   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=media.audio_policy scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.113   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=media.camera scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.114   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=media.player scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.114   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=media.sound_trigger_hw scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.118   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=nfc scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:nfc_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.130   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=SurfaceFlinger scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.379   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=android.security.keystore scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:keystore_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.388   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=batteryproperties scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:healthd_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.574   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=display.qservice scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.576   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=drm.drmManager scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.712   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=media.audio_flinger scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.712   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=media.audio_policy scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.713   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=media.camera scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.713   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=media.player scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
11-08 02:52:13.713   171   171 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=media.sound_trigger_hw scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager

Bug: 18799966
Change-Id: Id2bf69230338ac9dd45dc5d70f419fa41056e4fc
2015-01-23 16:06:13 -08:00
Nick Kralevich
77e195210f am 0f0324cc: domain.te: allow /proc/net/psched access
* commit '0f0324cc826afb9beefda802d496befe823a081e':
  domain.te: allow /proc/net/psched access
2015-01-22 20:47:12 +00:00
Nick Kralevich
0f0324cc82 domain.te: allow /proc/net/psched access
external/sepolicy commit 99940d1af5
(https://android-review.googlesource.com/123331) removed /proc/net
access from domain.te.

Around the same time, system/core commit
9a20e67fa62c1e0e0080910deec4be82ebecc922
(https://android-review.googlesource.com/123531) was checked in.
This change added libnl as a dependency of libsysutils.

external/libnl/lib/utils.c has a function called get_psched_settings(),
which is annotated with __attribute__((constructor)). This code
gets executed when the library is loaded, regardless of whether or
not other libnl code is executed.

By adding the libnl dependency, even code which doesn't use the
network (such as vold and logd) ends up accessing /proc/net/psched.

For now, allow this behavior. However, in the future, it would be
better to break this dependency so the additional code isn't loaded
into processes which don't need it.

Addresses the following denials:

  avc: denied { read } for  pid=148 comm="logd" name="psched" dev="proc" ino=4026536508 scontext=u:r:logd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
  avc: denied { read } for pid=152 comm="vold" name="psched" dev="proc" ino=4026536508 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
  avc: denied { read } for pid=930 comm="wpa_supplicant" name="psched" dev="proc" ino=4026536508 scontext=u:r:wpa:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Bug: 19079006
Change-Id: I1b6d2c144534d3f70f0028ef54b470a75bace1cf
2015-01-22 10:59:21 -08:00
Sharif Inamdar
d99660444d am 99b40521: Allow system_app to access /data/data link files
* commit '99b40521266450dca66a5375e8134bb1d3d5fbe0':
  Allow system_app to access /data/data link files
2015-01-21 23:12:31 +00:00
Nick Kralevich
90b8471e5a am 9dc5956f: Merge "Revert "isolated_app: Do not allow access to the gpu_device.""
* commit '9dc5956f09ad98f1f49b0d538b48443c2eb158a2':
  Revert "isolated_app: Do not allow access to the gpu_device."
2015-01-21 23:12:30 +00:00
Sharif Inamdar
99b4052126 Allow system_app to access /data/data link files
system_app tries to access files in /data/data (lnk_files).
But due to permission issue it is not able to access the
link files.

Change-Id: I2959d899f5e3ab9caa219d684541d36587a6c059
2015-01-21 23:08:20 +00:00
Nick Kralevich
9dc5956f09 Merge "Revert "isolated_app: Do not allow access to the gpu_device."" 2015-01-21 23:05:52 +00:00
Christopher Ferris
a48dd6c107 am c21e9cc1: Merge "Allow debuggerd to redirect requests."
* commit 'c21e9cc1fc6ef69cdca1829e7a78cb68badd631f':
  Allow debuggerd to redirect requests.
2015-01-21 22:58:12 +00:00
Christopher Ferris
c21e9cc1fc Merge "Allow debuggerd to redirect requests." 2015-01-21 18:39:29 +00:00
Nick Kralevich
2ada7f3c10 Revert "isolated_app: Do not allow access to the gpu_device."
Chrome team recommends reverting this patch and introducing
it into a future version of Android, to avoid potential
compatibility issues.

This reverts commit 9de62d6ffe.

Bug: 17471434
Bug: 18609318
Change-Id: I9adaa9d0e4cb6a592011336e442e9d414dbac470
2015-01-20 16:20:42 -08:00