This adds support for private volumes which is just a filesystem
wrapped in a dm-crypt layer. For now we're using the exact same
configuration as internal encryption (aes-cbc-essiv:sha256), but we
don't store any key material on the removable media. Instead, we
store the key on internal storage, and use the GPT partition GUID
to identify which key should be used.
This means that private external storage is effectively as secure as
the internal storage of the device. That is, if the internal storage
is encrypted, then our external storage key is also encrypted.
When partitioning disks, we now support a "private" mode which has
a PrivateVolume partition, and a currently unused 16MB metadata
partition reserved for future use. It also supports a "mixed" mode
which creates both a PublicVolume and PrivateVolume on the same
disk. Mixed mode is currently experimental.
For now, just add ext4 support to PrivateVolume; we'll look at f2fs
in a future change. Add VolumeBase lifecycle for setting up crypto
mappings, and extract blkid logic into shared method. Sprinkle some
more "static" around the cryptfs code to improve invariants.
Bug: 19993667
Change-Id: Ibd1df6250735b706959a1eb9d9f7219ea85912a0
This is the first in a series of changes that are designed to
introduce better support for dynamic block devices.
It starts by defining a new Volume object which represents a storage
endpoint that knows how to mount, unmount, and format itself. This
could be a filesystem directly on a partition, or it could be an
emulated FUSE filesystem, an ASEC, or an OBB.
These new volumes can be "stacked" so that unmounting a volume will
also unmount any volumes stacked above it. Volumes that provide
shared storage can also be asked to present themselves (through bind
mounts) into user-specific mount areas.
This change also adds a Disk class which is created based on block
kernel netlink events. Instead of waiting for partition events from
the kernel, it uses gptfdisk to read partition details and creates
the relevant Volume objects.
Change-Id: I0e8bc1f8f9dcb24405f5e795c0658998e22ae2f7
The libcrypto and libssl modules (and their respective static and host
versions) use LOCAL_EXPORT_C_INCLUDE_DIRS thus just including the module
is sufficient.
Additionally, cryptfs.h was including an OpenSSL header just to get the
length of a SHA-256 hash. Rather than force all users of this header to
also depend on libcrypto, it's easier just to define that value in the
header file.
Change-Id: I3e3e0db906a212e1093944b298e4a8ff2e2fb07d
Since the dm_ioctl struct was being allocated on the stack as a large
character array, it was getting character alignment rather than the
proper alignment for the struct. GCC had been getting away with this
so far, but it's undefined behavior that clang managed to expose.
Bug: 18736778
Change-Id: Ied275dfad7fcc41d712b2d02c8a185f499221f57
-Wno-missing-field-initializers is used as well, but that is an
overzealous warning from initializing structs with {0} and not a
real warning.
bug 18736778 and 16868177
Change-Id: Iffde89cd7200d9a11193e1614f1819f9fcace30a
It looks like clang might have a miscompile that is causing SIGBUS in
`ioctl_init` when the device is encrypted. Move back to GCC until we
can sort this out.
Bug: 18736778
Change-Id: I21ae3b9d7d9ebff8679ecc1a828b7c59f27d0903
Currently Android provides disk encryption support using dm-crypt
which is based on bios. dm-crypt uses 512 bytes packet size for
crypto operations. While 512 bytes size packet is ok for SW based
disk encryption, it is inefficient for HW based crypto engines.
dm-req-crypt is similar to dm-crypt except it uses block requests
rathe bios for crypto operations. block requests when unpacked
carries data upto 512KB. Hence, HW based crypto engine can be used
more efficiently.
Also move create disk encryption key before framework start as
HW based disk encryption creates key in secure side. Key creation
can take sometime to create the key securely. If framework is
started before creating the key, it is possible that framework
requests service from secure side. Secure side can serve mostly one
request at a time. Secure side may reject framework request if key
creation request is still going on. This may cause problem in the
system
b/17475056 Enable hardware crypto for userdata encryption
Change-Id: I5480ab72a37c02532218a18faaba598a824589fd
Signed-off-by: Iliyan Malchev <malchev@google.com>
ASAN_ALL uses ASAN for anything built with clang. Since some of vold's
dependencies use clang, they will have unresolved ASAN symbols unless
vold is also built with clang. There's no harm in just moving this
project to clang.
Change-Id: Ia6f412beb7bf092121bff2a5a980531636adcdb9
Stop encryption when battery is low, mark position, and continue on reboot.
Note - support for multiple encrypted volumes removed as no devices seem
to exist with an fstab that uses this feature. If you want support for such
a device, contact me and we will re-add it with appropriate testing.
Bug: 13284213
Change-Id: I1f7178e4f7dd8ea816cbc03ab5c4f6543e98acaa
This will allow fine-grained labeling of the
contents of ASEC containers. Some of the contents
need to be world readable and thus should be
distinguishable in policy.
Change-Id: Iefee74214d664acd262edecbb4f981d633ff96ce
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
The kernel headers are already in the include path, and manually
adding them again will break on a multiarch build, where the
kernel headers may be different for each arch.
Change-Id: Ifb11fa7bdff6b317c44258968244313b7039a9e1
Uses "blkid" tool to extract metadata from an inserted volume, and
reports it up to the framework. This needs to happen in vold, since
only the FUSE-wrapped volume is visible to userspace.
Remove autorun sanitization, since FUSE takes care of this now.
Bug: 11175082
Change-Id: Ie69b38011ad6011bfb50e40d4f35a29e02150c19
A quick fix to a broken build resulted in using a static library
to build vold when a shared library was available. This fixes
that.
Bug: 10332978
Change-Id: I31c2b4a87c7b37647e71f7f3c93b0d64dd52da44
scrypt is a sequential memory-hard key derivation algorithm that makes
it more difficult for adversaries to brute force passwords using
specialized equipment. See http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf for
more details of the algorithm.
This adds support for initializing disk encryption using scrypt and
upgrading from the previous PBKDF2 algorithm.
Change-Id: I1d26db4eb9d27fea7310be3e49c8e6219e6d2c3b
The new wipe option to the vold format command will invoke BLKDISCARD
on the partition before invoking newfs_msdos. This will be used whenever
a full wipe of the device is wanted, as this is more secure than just
doing newfs_msdos.
Bug: 9392982
Change-Id: Ie106f1b9cc70abc61206006d1821641c27c7ccae
The fstrim subsystem implements the dotrim command, which goes
through all the writable filesystems on the device, and invokes
the FITRIM ioctl() on them. This marks all the unused blocks on
the underlying flash device as unused, so the device performs better.
Change-Id: I5fc8c2f60e0bc823f162d0f89580fb288ecb2160
The new filesystem manager is in charge of mounting the block devices now,
removing much of the knowledge from init.<device>.rc. This also let us
clean up some init code dealing with encryption, so this change updates
vold to work with that. More cleanup is possible, but the main goal of the
filesystem manager was to enable e2fsck, not a full cleanup of encryption.
Change-Id: I00ea80a923d14770ed8fdd190e8840be195f8514
Now forward locked applications will be in ASEC containers both internal
to the system and externally.
This change adds support for putting applications in ext4-based ASECs.
Change-Id: I8d6765b72dd2606e429c067b47a2dbcaa8bef37d
The Progress bar UI grabs a full wakelock when encrypting, but we've seen
a case where it looks like the progress bar UI crashes, and the wakelock is
lost, and then all hell breaks loose. The enablecrypto command has a lot of
work to do, and it will take some time, so it should grab a wakelock to
ensure it can finish without being interrupted and put to sleep.
It grabs a partial wake lock, as it doesn't need the screen to be on to do
its work. If the UI wants to keep it on, it should also grab a full wakelock,
which it does. If the UI crashes, the screen may turn off, but the encryption
will keep going, and vold will reboot the device when it's done.
Change-Id: I51d3a72b8c77383044a3facb1604c1ee510733ae
If the already existing filesystem encompasses the entire /data partition
and does not leave the last 16 Kbytes for the crypto footer, refuse to
do encrypt in place and return an error. This is only an issue for folks
with early development systems trying to encrypt an old /data. This should
not be seen in released devices.
Also, if there is an error, try to report back to the UI what the error was
so it can deal with it.
Change-Id: If66781a4fe03034c96c3dd12075240deb8663db0
There are still a few hacks and performance issues related
to shutting down the framework in this code, but it is
functional and tested. Without the UI changes, it requires
cryptic adb shell commands to enable, which I shall not
utter here.
Change-Id: I0b8f90afd707e17fbdb0373d156236946633cf8b
- Fix issue where container-names > 64 bytes were getting truncated in the
kernel. lo_name is only 64 bytes in length, so we now hash the container
id via md5
- Add 'dump' command to dump loop and devicemapper status
- Add 'debug' command to enable more detailed logging at runtime
- Log vold IPC arguments (minus encryption keys)
- Fix premature return from Loop::lookupActive() and friends
Change-Id: I0e833261a445ce9dc1a8187e5501d27daba1ca76
Signed-off-by: San Mehat <san@google.com>
Also handles an issue where NPARTS=0 on a disk change uevent
Change-Id: I77c56f177dc65df91468bbd7d5fe1889db414d7a
Signed-off-by: San Mehat <san@google.com>
