The dynamic linker needs to read this node to determine how it should
load ELF files.
Allow the node to be enabled/disabled by init.
Bug: 330117029
Bug: 327600007
Bug: 330767927
Bug: 328266487
Bug: 329803029
Test: Free Fire Chaos App launches
Test: no avc deined in logcat
Change-Id: I2b35d6aebe39bf3e1e7489b47f23a817e477ef72
We are adding the ability for apps to create "storage areas", which are
transparently encrypted directories that can only be opened when the
device is unlocked.
This CL makes the required SELinux policy changes.
First, assign the type "system_userdir_file" to the new top-level
directory /data/storage_area (non-recursively). This is the same type
used by the other top-level directories containing app data, such as
/data/user, and it restricts access to the directory in the desired way.
Second, add new types to represent an app's directory of storage areas,
the storage areas themselves, and their contents:
`storage_area_app_dir`, `storage_area_dir`, and
`storage_area_content_file` respectively.
All are `app_data_file_type`s.
The directory structure and their associated labels is as follows (note
that they also all get the categories of the user+package):
/data/storage_area/userId/pkgName
storage_area_app_dir
/data/storage_area/userId/pkgName/storageAreaName
storage_area_dir
/data/storage_area/userId/pkgName/storageAreaName/myFile.txt
storage_area_content_file
/data/storage_area/userId/pkgName/storageAreaName/mySubDir
storage_area_content_file
These new types allow us to restrict how and which processes interact
with storage areas.
The new type for the contents of storage areas allows us to add new,
desirable restrictions that we cannot add to the more general
`app_data_file` type in order to maintain backwards-compatibility,
e.g., we block apps from executing any files in their storage areas.
Third, allow:
-- vold_prepare_subdirs to create and delete
storage areas on behalf of apps, and assign them the SElinux type
`storage_area_dir`
i.e. create directories
/data/storage_area/$userId/$pkgName/$storageAreaName
-- vold to assign encryption policies to storage area directories
-- installd to create an app's directory of storage areas on app
install, and delete them on app uninstall, and assign them the SElinux
type `storage_area_app_dir`,
i.e. directories /data/storage_area/$userId/$pkgName
We also add a new SELinux type to represent the storage area encryption
keys: `storage_area_key_file`.
The keys are created by vold on storage area creation, and deleted
either by vold if an app calls
the `deleteStorageArea` API function explicitly, or by installd on
app uninstall.
These keys are stored in `/data/misc_ce/$userId/storage_area_keys`,
and only installd and vold have access to them.
Bug: 325121608
Test: atest StorageAreaTest
Change-Id: I74805d249f59226fc6963693f682c70949bfad93
System server needs to create a file in /metadata/aconfig, and set its
permissions.
Bug: 328444881
Test: m
Change-Id: I30aa576e46d8963e78ff21ad328160a99bd5d523
Ideally, public should only contain APIs (types / attributes) for
vendor. The other statements like allow/neverallow/typeattributes are
regarded as implementation detail for platform and should be in private.
Bug: 232023812
Test: m selinux_policy
Test: diff <(git diff --staged | grep "^-" | cut -b2- | sort) \
<(git diff --staged | grep "^+" | cut -b2- | sort)
Test: remove comments on plat_sepolicy.cil, replace base_typeattr_*
to base_typeattr and then compare old and new plat_sepolicy.cil
Change-Id: I5e7d2da4465ab0216de6bacdf03077d37f6ffe12
- Add pm.dexopt.* properties.
- Add rules for running artd in chroot.
Bug: 311377497
Test: manual - Run Pre-reboot Dexopt and see no denial.
Change-Id: If5ff9b23e99be033f19ab257c90e0f52bf250ccf
Create a new folder for connectivity blobs, to be used by
ConnectivityBlobStore for VPN and WIFI to replace legacy
keystore.
System server will need permissions to manage databases in the
folder and system server will create the folder in init.rc.
Bug: 307903113
Test: checkfc -t private/file_contexts contexts/plat_file_contexts_test
Test: build and manual test.
Change-Id: Ib51632af9624d8c3ebf2f752547e162a3fbbb1b0
policy
system, system_ext, product and vendor partitions have aconfig storage
files under /<partition>/etc/aconfig dir. need to grant access to
aconfigd.
Bug: b/312459182
Test: m and tested with AVD
Change-Id: I9750c24ffa26994e4f5deadd9d772e31211a446a
Give perfetto rw dir and create file permissions for new directory.
Give system server control to read, write, search, unlink files from new directory.
Test: locally ensure traces can be written by perfetto and accessed and deleted by system server
Bug: 293957254
Change-Id: Id015429b48ffffb73e7a71addddd48a22e4740bf
Although /proc/device-tree is symlink to /sys/firmware/devicetree/base,
/proc/device-tree is the stable API but the absolute path may be
changed in the future.
Bug: 322465386
Test: atest CustomPvmfwHostTestCases
Change-Id: I81cbe8a4dddbac97e4fb94e6684d2a91127f3378
There will not be separate private/public BPF directories. All BPFs will
be under a uprobestats/ directory.
Bug: 296108553
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I00934cb14ead44c457ccee6957763dc01370dac6
This commit includes two sepolicy changes:
1. change threadnetwork data file to
/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.tethering/threadnetwork
2. use apex_tethering_data_file for files under
/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.tethering
The background is that the Thread daemon (ot_daemon) is merged into the
Tethering mainline module, which means the the Tehtering module now has
code running in both system_server and the standalone unprivileged
ot_daemon process. To prevent ot_daemon from accessing other
apex_system_server_data_file dirs, here use the specific
apex_tethering_data_file for both Tethering and Thread files (A
subdirectory threadnetwork/ will be created for Thread at runtime). This
is similar to apex_art_data_file and apex_virt_data_file.
Note that a file_contexts rule like
```
/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.tethering/threadnetwork(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_threadnetwork_data_file:s0
```
won't work because the threadnetwork/ subdir doesn't exist before the
sepolicy rules are evaluated.
Bug: 309932508
Test: manually verified that Thread settings file can be written to
/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.tethering/threadnetwork
Change-Id: I66539865ef388115c8e9b388b43291d8faf1f384
This reverts commit 5e1d7f1c85.
Reason for revert: retry with a fix to the failed tests
Test: atest art_standalone_oatdump_tests
Change-Id: I28872c643ba4ec07ef41b1f9be86036c592a6e4e
The changes include
- allow binder calls to ActivityManager and NativePackageManager
- allow binder calls from system server
- allow writes of statsd atoms
- allow init to start uprobestats
- permission for uprobestats config files and propery
- allow execution of oatdump so it can look up code offsets
- allow scanning /proc.
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: Id1864b7dac3a2c5dcd8736c4932778e36b658ce3
This reverts commit e2bd44d48d.
Reason for revert: 2nd attempt to add the policy change
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I5b9a102879a65917d496ba2194187ddd2b4545d1
/data/bootanim location is changed to /data/misc/bootanim as a follow up
change to aosp/q/topic:"bootanim_data_folder". The label is updated for the new file location.
Bug: 210757252
Test: /data/misc/bootanim is labeled correctly. BootAnimation can access this folder.
Change-Id: I9a54cf0dba470302df4180fb17fb104fb483b23d
Introduce hypervisor-generic type for VM managers:
vm_manager_device_type.
Bug: 274758531
Change-Id: I0937e2c717ff973eeb61543bd05a7dcc2e5dc19c
Suggested-by: Steven Moreland <smoreland@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Elliot Berman <quic_eberman@quicinc.com>
virtualizationmanager may handle some AVF debug policies for unproteted VM.
Bug: 243630590
Test: Run unprotected VM with/without ramdump
Change-Id: I2941761efe230a9925d1146f8ac55b50e984a4e9
This is enabled on debuggable builds only, includes
- Grant mlstrustedsubject typeattribute to wm_trace_data_file
- Grant platform_app (like systemui) the write access to
wm_trace_data_file
Bug: 251513116
Test: adb shell dumpsys activity service SystemUIService \
WMShell protolog [start | stop]
Change-Id: I9f77f8995e4bf671616ce6c49eeb93720e31430e
Split virtualizationservice policy into rules that should remain with
the global service and rules that now apply to virtmgr - a child process
of the client that runs the VM on its behalf.
The virtualizationservice domain remains responsible for:
* allocating CIDs (access to props)
* creating temporary VM directories (virtualization_data_file, chown)
* receiving tombstones from VMs
* pushing atoms to statsd
* removing memlock rlimit from virtmgr
The new virtualizationmanager domain becomes responsible for:
* executing crosvm
* creating vsock connections, handling callbacks
* preparing APEXes
* pushing ramdumps to tombstoned
* collecting stats for telemetry atoms
The `virtualizationservice_use` macro is changed to allow client domains
to transition to the virtmgr domain upon executing it as their child,
and to allow communication over UDS.
Clients are not allowed to communicate with virtualizationservice via
Binder, only virtmgr is now allowed to do that.
Bug: 250685929
Test: atest -p packages/modules/Virtualization:avf-presubmit
Change-Id: Iefdccd908fc28e5d8c6f4566290e79ed88ade70b
To be used for things that only the bpfloader should be access.
Expected use case is for programs that the bpfloader should load,
pin into the filesystem, *and* attach.
[ie. no need for anything else to attach the programs]
Test: TreeHugger
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Change-Id: I035d3fcbf6cee523e41cdde23b8edc13311a45e8
Manual testing protocol:
* Verify prng_seeder daemon is running and has the
correct label (via ps -Z)
* Verify prng_seeder socket present and has correct
label (via ls -Z)
* Verify no SELinux denials
* strace a libcrypto process and verify it reads seeding
data from prng_seeder (e.g. strace bssl rand -hex 1024)
* strace seeder daemon to observe incoming connections
(e.g. strace -f -p `pgrep prng_seeder`)
* Kill daemon, observe that init restarts it
* strace again and observe clients now seed from new instance
Bug: 243933553
Test: Manual - see above
Change-Id: I0a7e339115a2cf6b819730dcf5f8b189a339c57d
- Adapt installd rules for app compilation.
- Add profman rules for checking the profile before compilation. This is new behavior compared to installd.
Bug: 229268202
Test: -
1. adb shell pm art optimize-package -m speed-profile -f \
com.google.android.youtube
2. See no SELinux denial.
Change-Id: Idfe1ccdb1b27fd275fdf912bc8d005551f89d4fc
Goal is to gain a better handle on who has access to which maps
and to allow (with bpfloader changes to create in one directory
and move into the target directory) per-map selection of
selinux context, while still having reasonable defaults for stuff
pinned directly into the target location.
BPFFS (ie. /sys/fs/bpf) labelling is as follows:
subdirectory selinux context mainline usecase / usable by
/ fs_bpf no (*) core operating system (ie. platform)
/net_private fs_bpf_net_private yes, T+ network_stack
/net_shared fs_bpf_net_shared yes, T+ network_stack & system_server
/netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_readonly yes, T+ network_stack & system_server & r/o to netd
/netd_shared fs_bpf_netd_shared yes, T+ network_stack & system_server & netd [**]
/tethering fs_bpf_tethering yes, S+ network_stack
/vendor fs_bpf_vendor no, T+ vendor
* initial support for bpf was added back in P,
but things worked differently back then with no bpfloader,
and instead netd doing stuff by hand,
bpfloader with pinning into /sys/fs/bpf was (I believe) added in Q
(and was definitely there in R)
** additionally bpf programs are accesible to netutils_wrapper
for use by iptables xt_bpf extensions
'mainline yes' currently means shipped by the com.android.tethering apex,
but this is really another case of bad naming, as it's really
the 'networking/connectivity/tethering' apex / mainline module.
Long term the plan is to merge a few other networking mainline modules
into it (and maybe give it a saner name...).
The reason for splitting net_private vs tethering is that:
S+ must support 4.9+ kernels and S era bpfloader v0.2+
T+ must support 4.14+ kernels and T beta3 era bpfloader v0.13+
The kernel affects the intelligence of the in-kernel bpf verifier
and the available bpf helper functions. Older kernels have
a tendency to reject programs that newer kernels allow.
/ && /vendor are not shipped via mainline, so only need to work
with the bpfloader that's part of the core os.
Bug: 218408035
Test: TreeHugger, manually on cuttlefish
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Change-Id: I674866ebe32aca4fc851818c1ffcbec12ac4f7d4
(cherry picked from commit 15715aea32)
Currently, app process can freely execute path at
`/data/misc_ce/0/sdksandbox/<package-name>` since it's labeled as system
file. They can't read or write, but use 403/404
error to figure out if an app is installed or not.
By changing the selinux label of the parent directory:
`/data/misc_ce/0/sdksandbox`, we can restrict app process from executing
inside the directory and avoid the privacy leak.
Sandbox process should only have "search" permission on the new label so
that it can pass through it to its data directory located in
`/data/misc_ce/0/sdksandbox/<package-name>/<per-sdk-dir>`.
Bug: 214241165
Test: atest SdkSandboxStorageHostTest
Test: `adb shell cd /data/misc_ce/0/sdksandbox` gives error
Test: manual test to verify webview still works
Change-Id: Id8771b322d4eb5532eaf719f203ca94035e2a8ed
Merged-In: Id8771b322d4eb5532eaf719f203ca94035e2a8ed
odsign will be writing(metrics) to file
/data/misc/odsign/metrics/odsign-metrics.txt & system_server needs from it.
Test: adb pull /data/misc/odsign/metrics/odsign-metrics.txt after reboot
Bug: 202926606
Change-Id: I020efcee8ca7f5b81f1aa3374bbf2b3a7403186d
Add the compos_key_helper domain for the process which has access to
the signing key, make sure it can't be crashdumped. Also extend that
protection to diced & its HAL.
Rename compos_verify_key to compos_verify, because it doesn't verify
keys any more.
Move exec types used by Microdroid to file.te in the host rather than
their own dedicated files.
Bug: 218494522
Test: atest CompOsSigningHostTest CompOsDenialHostTest
Change-Id: I942667355d8ce29b3a9eb093e0b9c4f6ee0df6c1
dmesgd is a daemon that collects kernel memory error reports.
When system_server notices that a kernel error occured, it sets the
dmesgd.start system property to 1, which results in init starting
dmesgd.
Once that happens, dmesgd runs `dmesg` and parses its output to collect
the last error report. That report, together with the headers containing
device- and build-specific information is stored in Dropbox.
Empirically, dmesgd needs the following permissions:
- execute shell (for popen()) and toolbox (for dmesg),
read system_log (for dmesg)
- read /proc/version (to generate headers)
- perform Binder calls to servicemanager and system_server,
find dropbox_service (for dropbox)
- create files in /data/misc/dmesgd (to store persistent state)
Bug: 215095687
Test: run dmesgd on a user device with injected KFENCE bugs
Change-Id: Iff21a2ffd99fc31b89a58ac774299b5e922721ea
This partly reverts fa10a14fac. There we
removed individual labels for various apexdata labels, replacing them
with apex_system_server_data_file.
Unfortunately that doesn't handle upgrade scenarios well, e.g. when
updating system but keeping the old vendor sepolicy. The directories
keep their old labels, and vold_prepare_subdirs is unable to relabel
them as there is no policy to allow it to.
So we bring back the legacy labels, in private not public, and add the
rules needed to ensure system_server and vold_prepare_subdirs have the
access they need. All the other access needed is obtained via the
apex_data_file_type attribute.
Bug: 217581286
Test: Reset labels using chcon, reboot, directories are relabeled, no denials
Change-Id: If696882450f2634e382f217dab8f9f3882bff03f
Checkin apps use /data/misc_ce/<id>/checkin to backup the checkin
metadata. So users won't lose the checkin tokens when they clear
the app's storage.
One example is when GMScore is used for checkin, users may clear
GMScore data via "settings". If the device accidentally loses the
token without backup, it won't be able to checkin again until
factory reset.
The contents in checkin dir will be cleaned up when a user is removed
from the device. We also plan to add Gmscore test to ensure the dir
is cleaned up at checkin time, thus prevent other Gmscore modules
from using this storage by mistake.
Bug: 197636740
Test: boot device, check selinux label, check gmscore writes to the new dir
Change-Id: If3ff5e0fb75b4d49ce80d91b0086b58db002e4fb
composd spawns odrefresh in its usual domain. odrefresh then spawns
fd_server in a different domain, and makes binder calls back to
composd to perform individual compilation steps.
fd_server is fairly generic, and part of the virt APEX, but this
instance is specific to composd (e.g. it has access to ART files), so
I named the domain composd_fd_server.
Bug: 186126194
Test: Run composd_cmd, artifacts generated
Change-Id: I5a431dd00b5b396a67021c618fc6edcfb25aa21b
This reverts commit 7ed2456b45.
Reason for revert: /dev/userspace-panic is discarded (b/188777408#comment13)
Bug: 188777408
Change-Id: I98b0159890ee755ffaefc5533f9c40d54f8f26d2
